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Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and
Judges as Politicians*
Michael R. Diminot
If we fail to meet the challenge that is posed by recent developments in judicial
elections, we risk severe erosion of the role of state courts in the American system
of justice, and of the rule of law.
-Steering Committee of the National
Symposium on Judicial Campaign
Conduct and the First Amendment'
[Tihe evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
-Elbridge Gerry, delegate to the
Philadelphia Convention in 17872
I. INTRODUCTION
3. 4 56For years, political scientists, historians, pundits,  and casual observers
* The title paraphrases the Wizard of Oz's desperate attempt to conceal his humanity from Dorothy
and her fellow travelers. See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
t Law Clerk to the Honorable Laurence H. Silberman, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (2003-2004). Harvard Law School, J.D. 2001; State University of New
York at Buffalo, B.A. 1998. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and should not
be taken to reflect the views of Judge Silberman. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author
wishes to thank Lisa DellAquila, Richard Fallon, Heather Gerken, Joel Gora, Erik Jaffe, Andrew
Kaufman, David Markus, Roy Schotland, and Gabriel Torres. Frances Murray and Lisa Bohannon are
due great thanks for their patience and generous help in obtaining needed reference materials. Finally,
for her love and sacrifices (not to mention her editorial assistance), my wife, Laura, deserves endless
devotion.
1. The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and
the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649, 657 (2002). The Steering Committee members are Wisconsin
Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Georgia Chief Justice Norman Fletcher, Ohio Chief Justice Thomas
Moyer, Texas Chief Justice Thomas Phillips, and Missouri Judge William Ray Price. Id. at 649.
2. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 287 (1985).
3. See generally, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960).
4. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 425-
58 (1994); GIL TROY, SEE How THEY RAN: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
(1991).
5. See, e.g., SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE: THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE COLD
WAR 5 (1990); SIG MICKELSON, FROM WHISTLE STOP TO SOUND BITE: FOUR DECADES OF POLITICS
AND TELEVISION 157-65 (1989).
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have decried the degree to which campaigning politicians avoid discussions of
"the issues." Elections for executive and legislative offices have devolved into
"personality contests," in which candidates are concerned primarily with
avoiding the alienation of constituencies, rather than with the forceful advocacy
of ideas.7 Voters have reacted negatively to the substantive vacuum in modem
campaigning and turnout at the polls has suffered accordingly.
In the context of judicial elections, however, it is not the candidates who are
to blame for campaigns devoid of debate on policy issues. 8 Instead, judicial
candidates are often merely following the requirements of their states, which
make and enforce ethics rules governing the subjects candidates for judicial
office are permitted to discuss. These restrictions are often passed to ensure the
continued impartiality and independence of the judiciary, protecting the court
system from the degradation that comes with politics-particularly partisan
politics. The thrust of regulations of judicial campaigns is typically a fear of
"too much democracy," 9 i.e., the involvement of everyday voters in the making
of judicial policy.10 Proponents of limitations on judicial campaigns view voter
6. See, e.g., BOB NEWHART, Abe Lincoln Versus Madison Avenue, on BOB NEWHART BUTTON
DOWN CONCERT (Nick at Nite Records 1997) ("[O]ccasionally, you'll write a routine, and perform a
routine, that is more viable thirty years later than it was at the time you wrote it. And I think that's true
of this routine."). The act, poking fun at the ability of aides to "package" Presidents, was originally
performed in 1960. See BOB NEWHART, Abe Lincoln vs. Madison Avenue, on THE BuTTON-DOWN
MIND OF BOB NEWHART (Warner Bros. 1960).
7. See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 74-
75 (2001). As Congressman Ed Jenkins said, "We are simply afraid to make any difficult decisions.
We're afraid we'll make someone mad at us." Ed Jenkins, Editorial, The Politics of Anti-Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at A24, quoted in John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory
and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 855
(1991).
8. Despite the elections' lack of substance, "personality contests" may not be an accurate
characterization. In the words of a former Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice, many judicial
candidates are "'charismatically impaired."' Nathan S. Heffeman, Judicial Responsibility, Judicial
Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1997). The advantage
typically held in elections by candidates with name recognition, see Gary C. Byme & J. Kristian
Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote for for County Coroner?, 36 J. POL. 778 (1974), is present in judicial
elections as well. See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How
Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 300-01 (1992); David B. Rottman & Roy A.
Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2001); Mary L.
Volcansek, Money or Name?: A Sectional Analysis of Judicial Elections, 8 JUST. SYST. J. 46 (1983); see
also RICHARD NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 35 (1981) (discussing the importance of name
recognition in the author's judicial election campaign). In fact, because of restrictions on candidate
speech, voters often base their votes on minimally useful criteria, including the candidate's name, ballot
position, ethnicity, and sex. See Reynolds Cafferata, Note, A Proposal for an Empirical Interpretation of
Canon 5, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1659-60 (1992). For an analysis of the impact of ballot position in
elections without a concentration on judicial elections, see generally HENRY M. BAIN & DONALD S.
HECOCK, BALLOT POSITION AND VOTER'S CHOICE: THE ARRANGEMENT OF NAMES ON THE BALLOT
(1957).
9. WILLIAM E. HUDSON, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN PERIL: SEVEN CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S
FUTURE 116 (rev. ed. 1996).
10. Scholars, notably political scientist Samuel Huntington, have also questioned the wisdom of
allowing everyday voters to select legislative leaders, because those scholars believe voters are
incapable of making-or unwilling to make-necessary sacrifices to fund programs. See SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 102-06 (1981). Huntington
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participation (at least insofar as the participation is linked to the voters' views
on legal issues) as something to be avoided, lest the judicial candidate feel
obligated to decide cases with a view toward the decisions' likely effects on the
election returns. Speech restrictions in the name of protecting the polity and the
judiciary from themselves, however, raise important First Amendment
I
questions that the Supreme Court has only begun to answer.
At the conclusion of the October 2001 Term, in Republican Party v.
White, 12 the Supreme Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that states may not prohibit
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political
issues. The majority, however, explicitly eschewed the notion that their holding
"assert[s] []or impl[ies] that the First Amendment requires campaigns for
judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office." 13 The four
dissenting Justices would have drawn a sharp distinction between races for
political offices, in which representatives are to serve the interests and desires
of the electorate, and races for judicial office, in which, according to their view,
the judge's duty is to serve the law independent of political pressures. In the
view of the dissenters, the electorate should be privy to a discussion of issues in
races for legislative and executive offices, but not for judicial offices, because
the voters' positions on the issues are supposed to matter only when electing a
"representative." 14
The question this Article seeks to answer is whether the First Amendment
can maintain a distinction between the two types of races. Specifically, I
discuss whether the governmental interests in maintaining an independent,
impartial judiciary and in protecting the appearance of the judiciary as
independent and impartial can provide justification for the suppression of
speech, where such suppression would be held impermissible in elections for
other offices. I conclude that it cannot. My recommendation, therefore, is to
subject restrictions on legislative, executive, and judicial campaign speech to
the same exacting scrutiny.
5
The invalidation of speech restrictions on judicial candidates follows from
settled, rudimentary premises of First Amendment law. First, the protections of
the First Amendment are at their zenith when the exercise of political speech is
abridged, and require the application of strict scrutiny.' 6 Second, to survive
recommends "a greater degree of moderation in democracy." Id. at 113.
11. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been "incorporated" and is
routinely applied against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
12. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
13. Id. at 783.
14. See id at 805-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15. See generally Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-62 (1982) (discussing the requirements of the
First Amendment in legislative races).
16. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo,
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strict scrutiny, restrictions on the fundamental right of free speech must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.' 7 Third, it is the
function of voters-not the government-to determine what constitute "issues
... worth discussing or debating" in political campaigns.19 Fourth, the proper
corrective for speech promoting improper ideas is "more speech" promoting the
proper ideas, and not the "enforced silence" of the misguided or misinformed
speaker.2°
From these principles, it is clear that the Supreme Court's invalidation, in
Brown v. Hartlage,2 1 of restrictions on speech in state legislative campaigns
was correct, and limitations on the speech of political candidates are
unconstitutional. All that remains is to apply the same protection to judicial
candidates. I attempt to accomplish that goal by establishing that in practice
judges behave like politicians, and (under some theories) state court judges
should behave like politicians, adjusting the law to suit their policy
judgments.22 As this Article will demonstrate, both groups of elected officials
make policy, both are influenced by their personal predispositions, and both
mold their decisions to conform to the desires of the electorate. Accordingly,
there is no adequate basis on which to deprive judicial candidates of the same
First Amendment protection granted to candidates for other offices.
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the history of the independence of the
424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971).
17. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
666 (1990); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989). Strict scrutiny need
not apply to speech restrictions that are not "severe." See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992);
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). Forbidding judicial candidates from conveying information
the voters might find useful, however, would appear to be a "severe" restriction for the same reasons
that political speech holds a cherished place in the First Amendment hierarchy. See, e.g., Consol. Edison
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (noting that limiting the means of participation in
debate of controversial issues "strikes at the heart of the freedom to speak"). Communicating a
candidate's ideals and philosophies is core political speech, and is at the opposite end of the severe-
trivial continuum from a voter's desire to vote for Donald Duck (which was Burdick's alleged
constitutional right).
18. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
19. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 60 (quoting Mosley and applying its language to strike down a
regulation of political speech); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 537-38.
20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (using the now-familiar marketplace of
ideas metaphor).
21. 456 U.S. 45.
22. I recognize, of course, that differences between the judiciary and the other branches make
judges subject to some additional restrictions outside of the campaigning context. Ex parte contacts, for
example, are forbidden in the judiciary but not in the executive or legislative branches. Other
commentators have seized on these differences and argued that they allow for judicial candidates to be
muzzled during campaigns as well. See, e.g., Rottman & Schotland, supra note 8; Roy A. Schotland,
Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 DETROIT C. L. REv. 849, 853-61. The
preferable approach, however, is to restrict judicial speech only when allowing speech would violate the
rights of litigants, as would be the case if judges were completely free to disclose all confidential
information. See infra Part VI.
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judiciary in the United States. I discuss the choice made by the Framers of the
Constitution for an independent judiciary, and the later choice among some
states for a judiciary that is accountable to the electorate. I conclude that the
states selecting their judges via popular election have deliberately chosen to
avoid the political insulation and independence from the populace that is the
hallmark of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. They therefore have accepted
the sometimes degrading aspects of political campaigns as the price of exerting
electoral control over their judges.
Part III analyzes the treatments given to the First Amendment in judicial
elections by courts and commentators, paying particular attention to the
governmental interests put forth as justifications for stringent restrictions on the
speech rights of the judiciary.
In Part IV I critique those interests. Section A argues that the protection of
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary provides an insufficient
justification for judicial candidate speech restrictions, as litigants have no right
to have their cases adjudicated before judges free of that kind of "bias." Section
B argues that protecting the appearance of the judiciary objectively applying
fixed rules of law also fails to justify speech restrictions, as it consists of
nothing less than an attempt to deceive the voters into believing an empirically
false conception of the judiciary. I further argue that the influence of policy
considerations on judges' decisions (demonstrated by considerable political
science scholarship), or even the mere possibility of such influence, makes it
vital for the electorate to be able to determine which candidate is most likely to
decide cases in the manner preferred by the voters.
I continue, in Part V, by discussing the judiciary's attempt to increase its
legitimacy by decreasing both the content of judicial campaigns and voter
participation in judicial elections. I argue that allowing public debate of legal
issues in the context of judicial elections promotes popular sovereignty by
allowing voters to shape the public policies of their state by selecting judges
with whom they agree. I am therefore relatively unsympathetic to claims that
elections need to be controlled so that voters may be prevented from promoting
any particular vision of justice.
Part VI is a brief conclusion, in which I discuss speech restrictions that are
constitutional. Specifically, I note that states can proscribe the advocacy of
illegality, and accordingly can punish judges for pledging to refuse to
implement governing law. Pledges to refine precedent, or to give governing law
one of several reasonable interpretations, however, do not approach illegality,
and therefore must be protected under the First Amendment.
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II. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
A. The Founding
The protection of judicial independence is a foundational principle-
perhaps the foundational principle---of Article III. By granting judges tenure
"during good Behaviour" 23 and providing that their salaries "shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office, 24 the Constitution ensures (or
attempts to ensure) that federal judges need not consider the congressional or
presidential reaction to any particular ruling. By providing for appointment to
the federal courts through nomination by the President and confirmation by the
Senate, 25 the Constitution guarantees not only that federal judges will be
exempt from running for office, but also that the most representative body of
the United States government, the House of Representatives, will have no
official role in the appointment process.26 The Constitution thus provides for
judicial independence in two ways: independence from other departments of
government, and independence from the populace.
27
The Framers insulated the judiciary in this way for much the same reason
that modem judges and scholars resist issue-oriented judicial campaigns: to
encourage judges to decide cases based on the facts and law, instead of basing
28decisions on future job prospects. The dependence of judges on the whim of
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24. Id
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
26. The House, however, does have the exclusive authority to impeach federal judges and every
other "civil Officer" of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. Congress may also make
"Exceptions" and "Regulations" governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), and may decide to reduce
the lower federal courts' jurisdiction or eliminate those courts entirely, thereby eliminating the positions
of the judges who filled those courts. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Lauf v.
E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) ("There can be no question of the power of Congress...
to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States."); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(9 How.) 441 (1850) (holding that Congress may create lower federal courts while limiting their
jurisdiction to a subset of the cases the Constitution allows federal courts to hear). Judicial emoluments,
including staff, buildings, and the like, may, of course, be provided (or not) by Congress pursuant to
law.
27. But see, e.g., FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (1901) ("Th' supreme coort
follows th' iliction returns.").
28. It is debatable whether the Framers accomplished that goal. Judges' desire to advance within
the federal system (and the knowledge that Congress controls the amount spent on amenities for courts
and judges) may encourage pandering to public opinion, Congress, or the President, despite the strictly
appointive character of the federal judiciary. See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Two
Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 540, 544-45 (1999); Alex Kozinski, The
Many Faces of Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 864 (1998) (noting that the political
process controls "[t]he budget of the courts, how big a courtroom a judge will have, what amenities he
will have, whether he will have the materials necessary to research the law and write opinions, the staff,
the facilities and so on"); Roundtable Discussion, Is There a Threat to Judicial Independence in the
Vol. 21:301, 2003
Judges as Politicians
other governmental actors had been the situation in the colonies, 29 and it was
one of the problems about which the Declaration of Independence complained.
Protested the Declaration, King George III "has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.
'3°
Sentiment was so strong in favor of judicial independence at the
Constitutional Convention that life tenure and salary protection for judges were
unanimously agreed upon with little debate. 31 In the ratification debates,
however, there was considerable controversy over the extent to which the
federal courts should be independent of the people and the other branches.
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 78, defended the Constitution's choice to
insulate judges from political influence. Hamilton thought life tenure for judges
to be "indispensable," 32 "one of the most valuable of the modem improvements
in the practice of government ... an excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body. 33 Indeed, "[j]udges who relied on the
legislature for appointment and salary were liable to be tossed about by every
veering gale of politicks and could hardly possess dignity and independence." 34
Such job security was "the best expedient which can be devised in any
government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
35 36laws."35 Thus, in terms echoed through the following centuries, Hamilton
celebrated judges' life tenure as vital to the protection of individual rights and
the neutral application of the Constitution. 37
United States Today?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 26 (1998) (statement of Second Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi) (noting judges' desires for promotions as threats to judicial independence); id. at 12
(statement of panelist and Third Circuit Chief Judge Edward Becker) (same); Randall T. Shepard,
Judicial Independence: Telephone Justice, Pandering, and Judges Who Speak Out of School, 29
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 811, 816-17 (2002); Gregory B. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1487-93 (1998); David A.
Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J.
1491, 1516-17 (1992). The effect of "progressive ambition," or the desire to "move-up" in the prestige
of one's occupation, is not confined to the judiciary; it is endemic throughout government. See generally
JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER, AMBITION AND POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
29. English judges serving in England had tenure during good behavior, even during the period that
English judges in the colonies did not. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Origins and History of Federal
Judicial Independence, at http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/rab.html (last visited May 5,
2003).
30. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).
31. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 10 (4th ed. 1996); 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
428-29 (1911) (describing the one short-lived protest during the Constitutional Convention over judicial
tenure for good behavior); MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 253.
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
33. Id. at 465.
34. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 452 (1969)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-60 (1982)
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Anti-Federalists, though wary of the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review, 38 and therefore desiring that judges and their decisions be subject to
review by the Congress, 39 were nonetheless in agreement with Hamilton that
judicial election was dangerously unwise. 40 The accountability that the Anti-
Federalists desired was indirect accountability, to be effected through the
thoughtful judgment of Congress rather than by the hasty and ill-considered
actions of the masses.
This indirect accountability was a distinctive feature of the Constitution's
design for choosing members of the Senate and the President. Like judges, both
Senators and Presidents were to be selected by officials who were in turn
elected by the people.41 The original Constitution, therefore, did not reserve
"decisional" independence for the judiciary, though only judges were given
their positions for life. Senators and Presidents were to be independent in like
manner and for the same reasons the judiciary was to be independent: the input
of the people into the system of governance was seen as destructive. The
lengthy six-year senatorial term (with election by the state legislatures), and the
electoral college were designed to allow the Senators and Presidents to act
without feeling accountable to the people for each of their decisions. Strict
accountability in those bodies would defeat the very purpose of separated
powers: providing a defense of liberty in the face of a faction's clamor for
42
action. Similarly, the electoral college, which is charged with selecting the
President, is itself independent.43 The states are powerless to penalize (at least
38. Hamilton's discourse in The Federalist long foreshadowed the Supreme Court's decision in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803). See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[W]henever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
former."); CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 95-98 (1964); see also
WOOD, supra note 34, at 552 (noting that many, if not all, delegates to the Constitutional Convention
believed the Supreme Court would exercise the power of judicial review over the constitutionality of
statutes).
39. See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 78, at 224-25 ("Brutus" (likely Robert Yates)) (Morton Borden
ed., 1965).
40. See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 79, at 225 ("[lIt would be improper that the judicial
[department] should be elective, because their business requires ... that they may maintain firmness and
steadiness in their decisions.").
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CONST. art. II, §
1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379 (James Madison) ("The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions,
and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions."); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 63, at 384 (James Madison) (arguing that the Senate would serve "as a defense to the people against
their own temporary errors and delusions").
43. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 36 ("Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a
reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of the Chief Executive, but experience soon
demonstrated that ... they were ... simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect of a
particular candidate."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that the electoral college would be constituted by "men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a
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formally) the elector who changes his mind at the meeting of the electors.44
Nevertheless, the electors have never been forbidden from announcing their
views on who should be President, and in practice the electors are pledged to
vote for a particular individual.45 No. elector would be given serious
consideration today if he refused to answer questions as to his views on politics
or as to which candidate he preferred for the presidency, because voters
consider the views of the potential electors to be important indicators of the
electors' performance in office.
This short recounting of the political theory behind the Constitution should
serve to demonstrate that the prevailing wisdom at the Constitutional
Convention called for independence in more than the judiciary. In fact, little
can be clearer from the Constitution's original design and from the Federalist
46than the Framers' disdain for democracy. While pure democracy is a
mechanism for enacting into law the impulses of the masses47 (or "the
confusion of a multitude"),4t James Madison extolled the Constitution for
controlling those impulses,49 and in so doing, "the original Constitution
reflected a particularly elite conception of democratic politics. ' 50 The President
and the Senate were also independent of the people and were to govern without
judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice").
44. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1789, at 157 (Carolyn
Goldinger ed., 5th ed. 1991). Senator McConnell notes that although many states have statutes
purporting to demand electors' adherence to their pledges, "some do not have penalties attached to that
mandate, and it is not quite clear that these requirements, if tested, could meet constitutional muster."
Mitch McConnell, Introduction to SECURING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
at xiii, xix (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 2001).
45. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LISTON, POLITICS FROM PRECINCT TO PRESIDENCY 15-16 (1968).
46. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 10 (2000). See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001); DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC:
HOW THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING DEMOCRACY (1996). Although the Federalists tended to
reflect the views of the elite, see, e.g., BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 121 (1997), they were not alone in their attempt to insulate some aspects of government
from the people. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists perceived democracy as unstable and
destructive of property rights. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY
69-70 (1989).
47. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114-22 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
Mentor Books 1956) (1835).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
49. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 316 (James Madison) ("The [members of the judiciary],
by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed
from the people to share much in their prepossessions."). Federalist 10 is particularly noteworthy for its
condemnation of democracy, noting that democratic govemments "have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison).
50. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
1173, 1176 (1999). In fact, "Madison hoped that the new federal government might restore some aspect
of monarchy that had been lost in the Revolution." GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 255 (1992).
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being bound by their desires,5 1 yet any restriction on presidential or senatorial
candidates' right to speak would have been forcefully condemned by most as
inconsistent with the First Amendment.52 Though electioneering by politicians
was viewed at the time of the founding-similar to the way some states today
treat issue-oriented campaigning by judges-"as a debasement of the dignity of
the legislature and a corruption of the freedom and purity of elections," 53 there
was never any question that candidates could run that sort of dishonorable
campaign if they so chose. It seems clear that the First Amendment would
prohibit states from banning speech by potential electors, ostensibly to protect
the deliberative process of the electoral college and protect the presidential
election from "devolving" into a contest over issues. When voters wish to base
their votes on a certain criterion, the government may not instruct them that
such a consideration is illegitimate.
B. States'Adoption of Judicial Elections
Despite having the benefit of the Framers' lesson on the importance of
limiting governmental-and particularly judicial-accountability, most of the
states rejected it. Georgia began electing some of its judges in 1812, and other
states soon followed suit. Mississippi's 1832 Constitution required the election
of all its judges. From 1846 to 1860, nineteen states adopted constitutions
providing for judicial elections. 54 At present, a clear majority of states-thirty-
nine-elect some or all of their judges.
51. See THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("When... the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons
whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion in
order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection."). See generally HANNAH
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (discussing theories of how responsive
representatives should be); Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl3s7.html (last visited May 5, 2003) ("Your representative
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices
it to your opinion.").
52. Such would seem to be a reasonable conclusion from the widespread condemnation of the
Sedition Act, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
276 (1964) ("[T]he [Sedition] Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and
public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment."). On the reaction of Americans to the
Sedition Act, see, for example, JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETrERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 431-32 (1956). See also JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF
NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED
STATES 57-62 (2002) (describing Jefferson's and Madison's opposition to the Sedition Act).
53. J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 165 (1966); see also id. at 151 ("Issues seldom entered elections, and even when they did it
was often agreed that the natural leaders were the best men to entrust with the decisions.").
54. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an
Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337, 337 & n.2 (1983).
55. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 137-39 (2000). The
figure includes states that elect judges by partisan and nonpartisan ballots, as well as those that use
retention elections. It does not include those states that use elections as the means of selecting only
lower echelon judges, such as probate court judges.
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The adoption of judicial elections from 1846 to 1860, as historian Kermit
Hall has demonstrated, was the result of contention between three positions
represented at state constitutional conventions. 6 "Conservatives" sought to
maintain an appointive judiciary that would be independent of popular
influence. In their view, "[p]opular democracy in the selection process...
threatened to subject judges to the whim of the people and the manipulation of
party leaders, to breed contempt for the judicial process, and to hasten the day
when nonlawyers would preside on the bench. 5 7 It was these conservatives of
a century and a half ago that clung to the notion of a judiciary as one that
simply discovered and applied law as "a science., 58 Popular election was to be
avoided as an interference with the judge's duty to find the law that existed
independent of his personal desires and those of the populace.59
"Radicals" were incensed with the decisions made by the conservative
judiciary of the time and urged the adoption of elections as a way of achieving
their favored policy results. 60 The radicals hoped that "by making the judges
accountable to the same electorate ' 61 that selected the other branches, judicial
elections would reverse what they saw as a trend of decisions "to the detriment
of debtors and of fugitive slaves and their benefactors, and in favor of vested
rights, corporations, and slavery." 62 Radicals thought judicial elections would
lessen the power of judges to impose a vision of society different from the
people's, and supported elections for that reason.
63
The third group, the "moderates," did not seek judicial elections as a means
of curtailing the judicial power. Quite the contrary. They supported judicial
elections as "a means of enhancing rather than subverting judicial power," but
"calmed conservative fears by developing constitutional devices that blunted
the full impact of popular will on the judiciary."64 The moderate view, which
"prevailed ' 65 in the conventions, believed that elections would improve judicial
independence by freeing judges from attempting to curry favor with the
56. See Hall, supra note 54, at 341-43; see also Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence,
and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 35 (1986)
(adopting Hall's view of history); Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial
Elections, 35 IND. L. REv. 659, 661-62 (2002) (same).
57. Hall, supra note 54, at 341.
58. Id. at 349 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the legal formalist thought, which was
prominent prior to the twentieth century, see generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.
PITr. L. REv. 1, 5 (1983); and Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View
from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 10-16 (1999).
59. See Hall, supra note 54, at 349.
60. See FRANCIS R. AUMANN, CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 187-89 (1940).
61. See Hall, supra note 54, at 341.
62. Id. at 348; see also id. at 345 (noting the radicals' argument that judicial elections would
"ensur[e] that debtors laws passed by the legislature would withstand constitutional scrutiny in the
courts").
63. See id. at 341.
64. Id. at 343.
65. Id. at 345.
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appointing authority,6 6 and would also increase judicial productivity by making
judges accountable for taking undue time disposing of cases. 67
Even these moderates, however, saw elections as a way of altering the
likely decisions of the courts. Elections were believed to cause judges to "take
care that their opinions reflect justice and right" because the judges would need
periodic approval of the voters to remain in office. 68 Similarly, moderates
hoped that popular election would result in the selection of judges more in
touch with contemporary society than were appointed judges, and therefore
more likely to garner respect for the judiciary. 69
One later work by Caleb Nelson argued that Hall's explanation
underestimated the strength of popular elections' appeal, consistent with ideals
of Jacksonian democracy, as a way for the people to take control from elites.
70
Contrary to Professor Hall's view of history, Nelson understood states as
"intend[ing] the elective system to insulate the judiciary not from the people,
but rather from the branches that it was supposed to restrain." 71 As a result of
reformers' distrust of both judges and legislators, elections were supported as a
way of making judges more accountable to the people, and independent of only
the other branches. 72 Indeed, many felt it was impossible to create a judiciary
completely free of influence; they merely believed it better that the influence
come from the people than from the legislature.
73
Regardless of whether one agrees with Hall's tale of a conflict between
conservatives, radicals, and moderates, or Nelson's description of the conflict
as centering on a dispute between elites and populists, the motivation of the
states was not purely disagreement with the decisions of appointive judges, nor
was it purely an attempt to increase the objective quality of the state judiciary.
By all accounts, both motivations played a role, and policy-based disagreement
with the decisions of appointive courts was an important influence in the move
to find another system of judicial selection. 74 In general, those who were most
66. See id. at 347, 350.
67. 'See id. at 343-44.
68. Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
69. See id at 345-46.
70. See, Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary iWAntebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 140 (1950) (stating that the adoption of judicial
elections "was based on emotion rather than on a deliberate evaluation of experience under the
appointive system"); Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L.
REV. 1081, 1082 (1966) (asserting that the election of judges "was not particularly designed for
improving justice but was simply another manifestation of the populism movement").
71. Nelson, supra note 70, at 205.
72. See id. at 207-19.
73. See id at 217.
74. See Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The
Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 348
(1984); see also Michele Radosevich, Toward Meaningful Judicial Elections: A Case for Reform of
Canon 7, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 139, 149-51 (1993) (describing Washington State's adoption of
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dissatisfied with the appointive system tended, unsurprisingly, to be those who
were most dissatisfied with the decisions made by the appointed judges.75 It
should come as no surprise, then, that interest groups continue, after 150 years
of experimentation, to press for changes in judicial selection methods that
would place in power judges sympathetic to their views.76
Some reformers thought elections a way "to elevate the judiciary," 77 but
delegates to the state constitutional conventions recognized the potential for
popular influence on the law through the involvement of the public in the
selection of judges.78 They attempted to counter that danger by giving judges
fixed, long, staggered terms of office; prohibiting judges from running for
election during their term of service on the bench; and providing for election by
district rather than at-large.79 Moderates hoped that these measures would limit
judicial elections and the political gamesmanship in the fashioning of elections there).
75. As historian Arthur Schlesinger has noted with regard to criticism of the Supreme Court in the
early nineteenth century, whether one referred to "the 'independence' or 'irresponsibility' of the
judiciary" depended on nothing grander than one's view of the decisions. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 15-16 (1946); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Committee Assignment: A
Skeptical Look at Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 425, 438 (1999) (arguing that support for
judicial independence depends on the speaker's view of the decisions of judges); Kozinski, The Many
Faces of Judicial Independence, supra note 28, at 863-64.
76. See Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, Introduction to JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 1,
2 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993) (noting that value and policy choices made by
judges result in "systems of judicial selection becom[ing] issues in the interest group struggle. Conflicts
over judicial selection systems, if viewed from an interest group perspective, are clearly an important
aspect of interest group politics."); Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, Conclusion to JUDICIAL
REFORM IN THE STATES, supra, at 183, 183 ("[T]he debate over reform of judicial selection procedures
is indeed part of a conflict of interests among competing groups over competing values.... The
competing interest groups are those which have a stake in the judicial system."); cf SMITH, supra note 7,
at 119-20 (arguing that support for campaign finance reform measures depends on which groups are
likely to receive relative advantages under the proposed regulations).
77. Schotland, supra note 56, at 660. Elsewhere, though, Professor Schotland has recognized that
elevating the judiciary is not the only goal of election systems; "accountability" plays a role as well. See
Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 153 (1998) (remarks at Bulwarks of
Judicial Accountability in the American System of Government, Phila., Dec. 1998) [hereinafter,
Schotland, Comment] ("Every state, whatever its judicial election system, has one overriding goal: to
balance judicial independence and judicial accountability.").
78. But see Nelson, supra note 70, at 195-96 & nn.42-45 (noting state convention delegates'
argument that voters would elect fair judges, and not politicians).
79. See Hall, supra note 54, at 352. Moderates apparently thought that district elections kept
judgeships from falling under the direct control of party leaders in state nominating conventions,
afforded differing interests in a state a modicum of representation and protection, forced judges to retain
familiarity with legal practices peculiar to sections of their states, and allowed district residents to vote
intelligently and, perhaps, along nonpartisan lines based on their familiarity with the candidates. Id; see
also Nelson, supra note 70, at 196-97 (stating that states believed voters would vote on party lines when
no other information was present, but where a voter had familiarity with a candidate (which was more
likely to occur in a district-based system), then he would vote based on the personal qualities of the
candidate).
Aside from the rather obvious point that "represent[ing]" and "protect[ing]" "differing interests" is
a result-centered approach designed to enhance, rather than lessen, elected officials' concern with
appeasing the public, there is another, more practical, problem with district elections. Empirically,
judges elected from districts are more willing to alter their votes in contemplation of adverse public
reaction than are judges who are elected state-wide. See Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives:
Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 495-98 (1995) [hereinafter
Hall, Justices as Representatives]. This means that implementing a system of district elections did not
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the effect of a democratic assault on judicial independence, but their
"solutions" were incomplete, and voters used elections as a way of shaping
judicial policy.80 Nowhere in any of this history was there any indication that
states thought themselves free to impose limitations on the speech of candidates
for judicial office. The first attempt at such a limitation came some seventy
years later.
C. The American Bar Association 's Model Canons
The American Bar Association made its first attempt at promulgating rules
of judicial conduct in 1924.81 The ABA's Committee on Judicial Ethics, with
its chairman, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, drafted thirty-four "Canons
of Judicial Ethics," which included a prohibition on making campaign
promises. According to the Canon, a judge "should not announce in advance
his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support."
82
Eventually the 1924 Canon came to be seen as too vague for practical
application, and was accordingly revised in 1972.83 The new version of the
speech restriction was Canon 7(B)(1)(c). It prohibited judicial candidates from
"mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office; announc[ing] [their] views on
disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent[ing] [their] identit[ies],
qualifications, present position[s], or other fact[s]. ' 84 The second clause, having
been adopted in Minnesota and elsewhere, was held unconstitutional in
Republican Party v. White.
85
Presaging the Supreme Court's holding, the ABA revised the Canon in
1990 over concerns that the 1972 version unconstitutionally infringed on the
free speech rights of judicial candidates. 86 The new Canon backed away from
prohibiting all speech relating to disputed legal or political issues, and instead
attempted to tailor the restriction to issues reflecting on the impartiality of the
judiciary. As a result, the 1990 Canon prohibited only "statements that commit
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues
preserve some fraction ofjudicial independence, but rather undermined it further.
80. See Hall, supra note 54, at 353.
81. See generally Max Minzner, Gagged but Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules
Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REv. 209, 212-15 (1999); Adam R. Long, Note,
Keeping Mud off the Bench: The First Amendment and Regulation of Candidates' False or Misleading
Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 794-97 (2001).
82. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
83. See Minzner, supra note 81, at 213 & n.16 (citing Roger J. Traynor, The Code is Clear, 1972
UTAH L. REv. 333, 333 (1972)).
84. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972).
85. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).




that are likely to come before the court." 8
7
Most states today restrict judicial candidate speech with regulations
modeled on either the 1972 or the 1990 version of the ABA Canons. Since
1990, these regulations have come under increasing attack as violating the First
Amendment. Though White made it clear that prohibitions on the discussion of
all disputed legal and political issues are unconstitutional, the fate of more mild
restrictions, such as the 1990 Canon and the 1972 Canon's ban on "pledges or
promises" is still uncertain.
III. THE APPROACHES OF COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
A. Case Law
1. Republican Party v. White
The U.S. Supreme Court had not confronted the First Amendment's
applicability in judicial campaigns until Republican Party v. White." In that
case, the Court held unconstitutional Minnesota's "announce clause," which
prohibited a judicial candidate from "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues."89 The Court held that states may not choose to have
judicial elections and then, under the guise of maintaining "impartiality" and its
appearance, completely silence the candidates from discussing any topic that
might be relevant to their performance in office. The Court did not decide,
however, whether other restrictions would be upheld, or whether "impartiality"
vis-d-vis disputed legal issues could ever be an interest sufficiently compelling
to justify any speech restriction. Thus, the Court did not express an opinion on
the constitutionality of Minnesota's regulation prohibiting judicial candidates
from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office,"90 and also did not
address that state's prohibition on judicial candidates' "accept[ance] or use [of]
endorsements from a political organization."
91
87. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990). The Seventh, Circuit, for
one, has commented that restricting speech prohibitions to those subject areas likely to come before a
court is really no restriction at all, because nearly every question can present itself in a lawsuit before a
court of general jurisdiction. See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).
88. 536 U.S 765.
89. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002). Immediately after the
Supreme Court's decision, a district court likewise held Texas's version of the announce clause to be
unconstitutional. See Smith v. Phillips, No. A-02 CV 111 JRN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14913 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2002).
90. See 536 U.S. at 770.
91. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2002). That provision was challenged
below, and the Eighth Circuit upheld its constitutionality. See Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854,
868-76 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002). The Supreme Court chose to grant certiorari only as to the announce clause issue. 534 U.S. 1054
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In assessing Minnesota's claim that maintaining judicial independence
justified the announce clause, the Court first attempted to ascertain the meaning
of "impartiality" and "independence" as used by defenders of the restriction.
92
The Court first discussed the possibility that the announce clause was meant to
protect impartiality in the sense of favoritism to one party in litigation. The
Court quickly rejected this interpretation, noting that although a judge found to
violate the announce clause may have made up his mind on the legal issue
presented in a case, his decision would be made irrespective of the party that
argued the issue before him.93 In other words, litigants have the right to a judge
who will apply the law "evenhandedly," 94 but there is no guarantee "that each
judge will start off from dead center in his willingness or ability to reconcile the
opposing arguments of counsel with his understanding of the Constitution and
the law."
95
The next possible meaning of impartiality considered by the Court was
"lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view." 96 The
Court found that interest served by the announce clause, 97 but found
impartiality in that sense not to be "desirable," let alone compelling. Quoting a
1972 memorandum written by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court opined that
"[p]roof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack
of qualification, not lack of bias." 98 The Court also found no compelling
(2001).
92. See White, 536 U.S. at 775 n.6 ("Both [the Eighth Circuit] and respondents appear to use [an
'independent' judiciary], as applied to the issues involved in this case, as interchangeable with
'impartial."').
93. See id. at 777-78.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist (No. 71-208) (Oct. 10, 1972) (Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S.
824, 833-34) [hereinafter Rehnquist Memorandum].
96. White, 536 U.S. at 777 (emphasis omitted).
97. The Court did not address whether the announce clause would have been sufficiently narrowly
tailored to achieve the interest constitutionally if the interest itself were seen as compelling. There is a
significant problem of underinclusiveness. The announce clause would prohibit prospective judges from
announcing their views on disputed issues, but this theory of impartiality requires more than refraining
from announcing one's views; it requires that the judge not have any definitive views on those issues.
Both the judge who has made up his mind about an issue but not publicized that fact, and the judge who
has made up his mind and announced that he has done so are partial in this sense. See infra Subsection
IV.A. 1. The response to this argument, made by Justice Stevens in dissent, is that a judge will feel more
of a compulsion to maintain his stance if he has made a public announcement, and therefore the
announce clause protects judges from unnecessarily solidifying their position to the detriment of
litigants. See White, 536 U.S. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's view, however, more
aptly reflects the third definition of impartiality: open-mindedness. The judge who has made a decision
but not said anything about it does not give each litigant the "equal chance to persuade the court"
required by the second definition of impartiality. Id. at 777 (opinion of the Court). The only impartiality
interest for which the announce clause appears narrowly tailored, when impartiality is used in the sense
of eliminating all leanings one way or the other, is in promoting the appearance of impartiality. Touting
this appearance, as I discuss later, is of questionable legitimacy when the appearance is deceiving if not
outright inaccurate. See infra Subsection IV.B.3.
98. White, 536 U.S. at 778 (quoting Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 95).
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interest in promoting the appearance of this form of impartiality, given that the
actual achievement of that type of impartiality was not a proper goal for state
government.
99
The Court lastly considered a third possibility of the meaning of
impartiality: open-mindedness, that is, "not that [a judge] have no
preconceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues
arise in a pending case." 100 Finding that Minnesota did not adopt the announce
clause for that purpose,' 01 the Supreme Court declined to consider whether such
open-mindedness was a desirable quality in the judiciary, and whether
promotion of open-mindedness could constitute a compelling state interest.
1°2
The Court noted that judges announce their views on disputed legal and
political issues in numerous contexts outside of their campaigns, and
accordingly the announce clause prohibits "such -an infinitesimal portion of the
public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be) undertake,
that this object of the prohibition [i.e., open-mindedness] is implausible."' 0 3
The Court speculated that the real "purpose behind the announce clause is not
openmindedness in the judiciary, but the undermining of judicial elections."' 0 4
If Minnesota wished to end its judicial elections, however, it should have done
so directly, instead of "leaving the principle of elections in place while ...
conduct[ing them] under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance."',
0 5
The Court declined to decide whether the First Amendment would permit
more stringent restrictions on speech in judicial campaigns than in legislative
ones. While the Court quoted language from prior cases that stressed the
importance of allowing candidates to persuade voters on the issues of the day,
and opined that "[i]t is simply not the function of government to select which
issues are worth discussing or debating in the course of a political
campaign,' 1°6 it then retreated from the force of these arguments and declined
to extend them to judicial campaigns:
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. The means employed by the Court to determine the purpose of the Minnesota Suqreme Court
was essentially an analysis of whether the regulation was a narrowly tailored way to promote open-
mindedness on the bench. See id. at 780 ("As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness that
respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that
purpose a challenge to the credulous.").
102. See id. at 778.
103. Id. at 779; see also Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 306 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (stating that a rule barring, on grounds of judicial impartiality, anyone with prior political
exposure from running for judicial office would be "as absurd as it is constitutionally suspect").
104. White, 536 U.S. at 782; see also id. at 787 (noting the American Bar Association's origination
of the announce clause and its persistent and long-standing opposition to judicial elections).
105. Id. at788.
106. Id. at 782 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted in White)); see also id. at 781-82 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)).
Yale Law & Policy Review
[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for
judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.... We rely on the
cases involving speech during elections only to make the obvious point that this
underinclusiveness cannot be explained by resort to the notion that the First
Amendment provides less protection during an election campaign than at other
times.I°7
Immediately following that language, however, the Court criticized Justice
Ginsburg's dissent for "exaggerat[ing] the difference between judicial and
legislative elections,"'1 8 and thereby provided additional justification for
treating all elections under the same First Amendment rules. Noting that both
judges and legislators have the opportunity to fashion common law and "shape"
state constitutions, the Court implied that future cases might protect the ability
of voters to select judges and legislators based on the policy differences
between candidates in both types of elections.
Thus, while the holding of the case was narrow, there is language in White
to suggest that the First Amendment provides candidates and voters with much
broader protections in judicial elections than those required by the holding
alone. At bottom, Minnesota lost the case because its regulation was not a
narrowly tailored response to ensure independence, and because it failed to
define independence in a way that constituted a compelling interest. Because
the Court chose not to address whether a state has a compelling interest in
maintaining an open-minded judiciary, however, there remains the question of
whether a speech restriction narrowly tailored to suit that goal-say, a ban on
judicial campaign pledges or promises-would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion to express her dissatisfaction
with elections for judicial office. In her view, elections and the concomitant
practice of campaigning, with the inevitable need for soliciting funds to cover
campaign expenses, present a risk that the public will view judges as
"motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors."' 0 9 Justice O'Connor,
however, thought that by choosing popular elections as the means of selecting
judges, the states with judicial elections must assume the accompanying risks
of partiality, and cannot quell those risks through speech restrictions:' " 0 "If the
107. Id. at 783 (internal citation omitted). Contrary to the literal language of the Court's opinion,
the First Amendment could not possibly require judicial campaigns to sound the same as legislative
ones. See id. at 783-84 n. 11 ("[T]he practice of voluntarily demurring does not establish the legitimacy
of legal compulsion to demur."). The question, therefore, is not whether the First Amendment can
require the campaigns to be the same, but whether the First Amendment permits them to be the same in
the face of a state's attempt to keep them different.
108. Id. at 784.
109. Id. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Four months after the White decision, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Justice O'Connor and
struck down Georgia's prohibition on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judges, holding that
any corrupting influence caused by campaign fundraising is "created by the State's decision to elect
judges publicly." Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (1lth Cir. 2002); see also id at 1320 ("It is
the general practice of electing judges, not the specific practice of judicial campaigning, that gives rise
to impartiality concerns .... ).
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State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought
upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."' 1]
1
Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Taking a stronger
approach than did the Court," 2 Justice Kennedy viewed "direct restrictions on
the content of candidate speech [as] simply beyond the power of government to
impose." 113 In his concurrence, he drew an explicit connection between the
judiciary and the political branches, 14 suggesting that in neither case could a
state "censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves
which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the
relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the State."
115
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions, both of which were
joined by each other and Justices Souter and Breyer. In the dissenters' view,
statements made by a would-be judge during a campaign threaten to strip
neutrality from the judicial system and present due process concerns for
litigants. 16 Recognition that he has "announced his position on an issue likely
to come before him as a reason to vote for him"" 7 would, according to the
dissenters, prevent a judge from reevaluating his past pronouncements "in the
light of an adversarial presentation, and ... apply[ing] the governing rule of
law even when inconsistent with those views."'18 Because a reversal in
positions after gaining office would look bad to voters and might result in a
defeat at the next election, the dissenters concluded that judges evaluating
issues they had discussed in a campaign "may be thought to have a 'direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest' in ruling against certain
litigants,"1 9 thus depriving those litigants of due process.
The dissenters would treat judicial elections quite differently from elections
to other posts, because "[j]udges ... are not political actors. They do not sit as
representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no
faction or constituency."' 20 Instead, because judges' fidelity should be to the
111. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Justice Stevens referred to Justice Kennedy's approach as "extreme." Id. at 802 n.4 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 794-95 ("[F]rom the beginning there have been those who believed that the rough-
and-tumble of politics would bring our governmental institutions into ill repute. And some have sought
to cure this tendency with governmental restrictions on political speech.") (citing Sedition Act of 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596). The reference to "governmental institutions," without drawing a distinction between
types of institutions, bespeaks a willingness to treat all three branches with the same First Amendment
analysis.
115. Id. at 794 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
116. See id at 812-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
118. Id. at 801.
119. Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in White) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927)).
120. Id. at 806; see also THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 594 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1919) (quoting a
delegate to the Wisconsin constitutional convention of 1846 as stating that the judiciary "represents no
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law and not to the desires of the electorate, "the First Amendment does not
require that they be treated as politicians simply because they are chosen by
popular vote."'
2 1
2. Lower Courts' Application of the First Amendment to Judicial Elections
Courts have struggled with the question of whether the need to provide
voters with information about candidates 122 applies in judicial campaigns. The
District Court for the Northern District of Florida began the recent trend toward
granting judges the protections of the First Amendment with its decision in
ACLU v. Florida Bar. 23 That case struck down the Florida announce clause,
124
finding a prohibition of discussion concerning all disputed legal and political
issues to be an overbroad response to what it conceded was the compelling
interest of "protecting the integrity of the judiciary."'' 25 Despite nodding to free
speech, however, the court "ha[d] little trouble concluding that states need not
treat candidates for judicial office the same as candidates for other elective
offices.' 26 The court offered two reasons for this difference. First, although
political officials are "expected" to make campaign promises and make
decisions in office based on those promises, a judge may not "bind himself to
decide particular cases in order to achieve a given programmatic result."'
127
man, no majority, no people. It represents the written law of the land."), quoted in Schotland, supra note
22, at 851.
121. White, 536 U.S. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (per.curiam) ("[I]t is of particular
importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the
electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public
issues before choosing among them on election day."); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978) (striking down a law banning corporations from advertising in referendum campaigns,
and holding that the constitutionality of a speech restriction turns, not on the identity of the speaker, but
whether the law at issue "abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect").
123. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990). The Eastern District of Arkansas soon followed suit, but
was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. Beshear v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev 'd without
opinion, 966 F.2d 1458 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit was the court which was itself reversed in
White.
124. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
125. See Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. at 1098. It is unclear exactly what the court meant by
"integrity." The court contrasted the Florida announce clause with other, hypothetical judicial conduct
Canons, such as bans on pledges to decide cases in a certain way and bans on misleading or deceptive
advertising, that would presumably have a sufficient connection to "integrity" to pass that court's
constitutional scrutiny. "Integrity," therefore, appears either to mean "lack of corruption," "dignity," or
something between those two values. As I demonstrate in Subsection IV.A.1, there is nothing corrupt
about promising certain decisions, per se, and as I argue in Subsection IV.B.3, the protection of judicial
"dignity" is an insufficient interest to justify the suppression of speech.
126. Id. at 1097.
127. Id. (quoting Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)).
Morial upheld, against free speech and equal protection challenges, Louisiana's requirement that judges
resign before declaring their candidacy for non-judicial office. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the
restriction was "reasonably necessary" to protect against judges using their office to advance their
political candidacy, and to dicourage judges who, losing the election, would return to the bench and then
judge cases on the basis of their campaign promises. Morial, 565 F.2d at 302-03. According to the court,
while a candidate for executive or legislative office should forecast his actions in office, a judge decides
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Second, the court maintained that a state could regulate judicial candidates
more closely than other candidates because, as "members of a privileged and
responsible profession," judges could be expected to conform to strict ethical
guidelines. 128
Four days after the ACLU decision, the Ninth Circuit handed down Geary
v. Renne,129 which struck down California's prohibition of party endorsement
of candidates in nonpartisan elections. Judge Reinhardt, joined by Judge
Kozinski, concurred to address the claims, made by Judge Alarcon in dissent,
that forbidding party endorsements was necessary to preserve the independence
of the judiciary. Foreshadowing the arguments later made in Justice Kennedy's
White concurrence, Judge Reinhardt flatly declared that a state "has no
compelling interest in limiting the people's right to make informed choices or
to select candidates for office on whatever basis they deem relevant."
'1 30
In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,13 1 the Seventh Circuit
continued the trend of allowing speech in judicial elections, by holding
unconstitutional an Illinois regulation, like the Minnesota announce clause
struck down in White, that prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues. Judge Posner's opinion for a
unanimous panel found the prohibition to be vastly overbroad, prohibiting
candidates not only from taking positions on issues likely to appear before them
as judges, but effectively silencing speech on any issue of political or legal
interest. 132 The court refused to treat judicial elections like elections for other
offices, however, noting that the challengers of the regulation conceded
(correctly, in the court's estimation) that states could regulate judicial
campaigns more restrictively than they could regulate other political
campaigns. 133 Although declining to elaborate, the court found judges to be
different from politicians even when both are elected. 134 The court further
expressed its belief that free speech guarantees should be relaxed when they
threaten the ideal that judges should decide cases independently from "any
express or implied commitments that they may have made to their campaign
individual cases, not broad programs, and though a judge "legislates," he does so "interstitially." Id. at
305.
128. ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990). The court did not explain the
disconnect between that position and its reliance, two paragraphs later, on the attorney advertising cases,
which expressly rejected the idea that attorneys could be restricted in their speech because of the nobility
of their profession.
129. 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
130. Id. at 288 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also id. at 293 ("Voters are free to accept or reject
endorsements made on the basis of political beliefs, just as they are free to base their ultimate choice on
their own view of the judicial candidates's [sic] political or judicial philosophy.").
131. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
132. See id. at 228-29.
133. See id. at 227-28.
134. Seeid. at228.
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supporters or to others."'1 35 In the court's opinion,
only a fanatic would suppose that one of the principles should give way completely
to the other-that the principle of freedom of speech should be held to entitle a
candidate for judicial office to promise to vote for one side or another in a particular
case or class of cases or that the principle of impartial legal justice should be held to
prevent a candidate for such office from furnishing any information or opinion to
the electorate beyond his name, rank, and serial number.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit adopted a balancing test under which the
Illinois regulation was struck down as unnecessarily chilling protected speech,
but the court was careful not to call into question other regulations that were
more narrowly tailored to ensure "impartial legal justice."'137
The Third Circuit, in Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court, 38 took a different approach from the Seventh Circuit's by adopting a
narrow construction of Pennsylvania's announce clause, and upholding
restrictions written identically to the ones struck down in Buckley and A CL U v.
Florida Bar. In Stretton, the court determined that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would interpret its announce clause as prohibiting speech concerning
only those topics likely to come before the candidate should he be elected.'
39
As such, the court upheld the regulation as necessary to guard against the
possibility that the public would believe cases to be prejudged. Where cases are
prejudged during a campaign, according to the court, "the concept of impartial
justice becomes a mockery ... and the confidence of the public in the rule of
law would be undermined."' 14
0
According to the Third Circuit, a state's decision to elect its judges "does
not signify the abandonment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying out
its duties fairly and thoroughly."' 141 The court attempted to distinguish judges
from politicians, in that for the latter group of officials, "the public has the right
to know the details of the programs that candidates propose to enact into law
and administer."'142 Judges, on the other hand, make merely "individualized
decisions on challenged conduct and interpretations of law enacted by the other
branches of government."' 143 Having limited the reach of Pennsylvania's
announce clause to those issues likely to come before courts, the Third Circuit
held that the regulation inhibited only that speech likely to result in judicial
135. Id. at 227.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
139. Id. at 143-44. One commentator has noted that the Stretton court "interpret[ed] the 1972 [ABA
Canon 7] gag rule... as meaning what the 1990 version says." J. David Rowe, Note, A Constitutional
Alternative to the ABA 's Gag Rules on Judicial Campaign Speech, 73 TEX. L. REV. 597, 605 (1995).






partiality and was therefore constitutional. 144
The Sixth Circuit came closer than did any other circuit before White to
giving equal treatment under the First Amendment to all candidates for elective
office-judicial or otherwise. In Suster v. Marshall,145 the court considered two
rules in the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited judicial candidates
from spending more than a set dollar figure on a campaign (which figure
depended on the office sought), 146 and barred judicial candidates from using
any funds that had been raised in conjunction with a campaign for a non-
judicial office. 147 The unanimous Sixth Circuit panel struck down the first
limitation, noting "that an election candidate does not forego his or her First
Amendment rights simply because he or she decides to seek a judicial office,
rather than a non-judicial one."'148
Yet in examining the Canon forbidding use of money raised in a prior non-
judicial campaign, the Sixth Circuit relied on precisely the distinction it
appeared to eschew earlier. The court held that states may prohibit judicial
candidates from using the other campaign funds because those other funds may
have been given so that the candidate would pursue a substantive agenda once
in office.
By complying with Canon VII(C)(8), judicial candidates are prevented from using
funds which may potentially be "ideas-bought" funds, or funds which came
attached to a candidate's agreement to advance or take on some political issue or
cause. Thus, because it is very possible that the funds Suster (or any other
candidate) received during his non-judicial campaign may have resulted from the
advancement of a position or the endorsement of some political ideology, the state's
interest to ward against such corruption or such perceived corruption is indeed
compelling. 1
49
The court noted that candidates running for non-judicial office could make
use of previously received campaign funds,150 but, in the court's view, that
144. The court also upheld Pennsylvania's prohibition against personal fundraising by judicial
candidates, with the acknowledgment that the ban did not eliminate the corrupting influence of
campaign contributions. Contributing lawyers might still expect something in return for their
contribution, and the candidates themselves were aware of who contributed. The court held, however,
that the Constitution does not require the regulation to solve problems completely. Instead, states are
permitted to take small steps toward solving a problem, and because the ban addressed a compelling
interest (judicial impartiality) and was narrowly tailored, it complied with the First Amendment. See id.
at 145-46. On the constitutionality of personal fundraising restrictions, the Eleventh Circuit later came to
a different conclusion in Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1lth Cir. 2002). See infra text
accompanying notes 181-184.
145. 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998).
146. See OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon VII(C)(6).
147. See id. at Canon VII(C)(8).
148. Suster, 149 F.3d at 529; see also id. ("[T]he constitutionality of such [spending] limits was
based [in Buckley v. Valeo] upon the reasoning that any expenditure limitation-irrespective of the kind
of election involved (state, federal, judicial, non-judicial, civil penalties, criminal penalties, etc.)...
must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling government interest .. ") (emphases added).
149. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
150. See id; see also Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1427-29 (8th Cir. 1995)
(striking down a law barring candidates from carrying over contributions from one campaign to
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distinction between political officials and judicial ones served to show the
Canon's narrow tailoring, and therefore its constitutionality.
151
State courts, in contrast to some of the federal decisions discussed above,
have generally not been sympathetic to claims by their judges that judicial
regulations unconstitutionally inhibit the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution. They have instead focused on the compelling interest of the
states in the actuality and appearance of impartiality and independence of their
judiciaries. 52 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, for example, in Summe v.
Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission,153 affirmed the discipline of a
judge who had mailed a letter that criticized the incumbent judge as lenient on
child abusers, and implied that she would be more supportive of abuse victims
than the incumbent was. 5 4 The court determined that this was an impermissible
commitment to a position on a legal issue. Summe's argument that discipline
violated her right to free speech did not long detain the court, as it found a
compelling interest in upholding "the fundamental fairness and impartiality of
the legal system"' 55 and refused to take steps that would "allow judicial
campaigns to degenerate into a contest of which candidate can make more
commitments to the electorate on legal issues likely to come before him or
her."
156
The Supreme Court of Washington likewise took a dim view of a judge's
arguments that the Constitution protected his campaign speech. In In re
Kaiser,157 that court censured a judge for campaign tactics that, in the court's
view, called into question the integrity of the judiciary.' 58 In his campaign,
another); Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir.
1992) (striking down a law barring candidates from transferring funds between their own committees).
151. See Suster, 149 F.3d at 534.
152. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Hopewell, 507 N.W.2d 911, 916-17 (S.D. 1993) (suspending a
judicial candidate from the practice of law for various reckless and obnoxious campaign statements,
including defamatory statements concerning two sitting judges); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Ore. 1990)
(upholding Oregon's ban on personal fundraising by judicial candidates). Hopewell, however, did not
formally address the impact of the First Amendment on South Dakota's Code of Judicial Conduct. See
507 N.W.2d at 917 n.11.
153. 947 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1997).
154. The court also affirmed the commission's discipline of the judge for mailing campaign
literature in the form of a newsletter. In the court's view, this format was deceptive in that it encouraged
readers to believe that it was something other than campaign literature. See id at 44-45.
155. Id. at 47 (quoting Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Ky.
1994)). Deters upheld the censure of a judge who held himself out as pro-life. The court found that use
of the term "pro-life" was an impermissible statement on an issue likely to come before the candidate,
should he be elected. Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 205. According to the court, "[j]ustice can hardly be blind if
the judge has made a pre-election commitment or prejudgment which causes him or her to apply the
blindfold only as to one side of an issue." Id.
156. Summe, 947 S.W.2d at 47 (quoting Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 776 F.
Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991)).
157. 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
158. See id. at 400. Regulations prohibiting judges (or anyone else) from impugning the integrity or
reputation of the judiciary raise the troubling specter of viewpoint discrimination, making those
regulations equally, if not more, noxious to the First Amendment than is "silence coerced by law-the
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Judge Kaiser attempted to draw public attention to his tough record in DWI
cases, and made campaign statements pointing out the support his opponent (a
DWI defense attorney) had received from other DWI defense attorneys.159 The
court found that Judge Kaiser's statements promised harsh treatment of DWI
defendants, and thereby violated Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(c),
which prohibited promises of conduct in office and the announcement of one's
views on disputed legal or political issues. The court also found that Judge
Kaiser had improperly called into question the integrity of the judiciary by
implying that his opponent's acceptance of campaign contributions would
cause him to rule in favor of drunk drivers. 6 1 The court censured Judge Kaiser
for the statements, finding "[t]he State's interest in protecting the good
reputation of the judiciary [to be] compelling."'' 62
Some state courts have declined to discipline judicial candidates for
campaign statements that indicated the candidate's view of legal matters or that
called the current justice system into question, but many of those cases
involved relatively innocuous statements. 163 For example, the New York Court
of Appeals recently held that its State's Rules Governing Judicial Conduct'
64
did not permit the discipline of a judicial candidate for announcing that she was
a "[l]aw and order [c]andidate."'' 65 That case, however, did not rest on the First
argument of force in its worst form." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). The regulations permit conduct that praises the judiciary or holds it out as an impartial
arbiter of disputes, but prohibits the same form of conduct if it has the effect of calling into question the
extent to which judges fit the ideal. Such discrimination is blatantly unconstitutional, see, e.g., Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), but even if there were no
discrimination of that sort, prohibitions of "public discussion of an entire topic"-here, legal and
political issues that capture the interest of voters-are unconstitutional. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
159. See Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 394-95.
160. See id. at 396. The court also found that Judge Kaiser had improperly disclosed his party
affiliation when he sent a letter to party chairmen professing his long-term loyalty to the party. See id. at
395; cf. Haffey v. Taft, 803 F. Supp. 121, 125-26 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (upholding Ohio's requirement that
judicial candidates not disclose their party affiliations on the ballot). But cf Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d
280 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (invalidating California's ban on party endorsement of candidates in
nonpartisan elections).
161. See759P.2dat396.
162. Id. at 399.
163. See, e.g., In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701 (Kan. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that a candidate did not
violate ethical rles when he indicated that he was in better health than his opponent). Note, however,
that innocuous statements do not necessarily insulate a candidate from discipline. In fact, the first case to
challenge an announce clause resulted in a federal district court upholding the law, and rejecting the
candidate's plea that he be allowed to state that he would encourage divorcing couples to mediate their
disputes without the presence of their attorneys. See Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.
Ohio 1984), aff'd, 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988).
164. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i) & (ii) (2002).
165. In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736-37 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam). The court concluded that
"'[lI]aw and order' was "a phrase widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and election
campaigns," and therefore could not form the basis of a prohibited pledge or promise of conduct in
office. Id. at 737. The court's conclusion gains support from Oregon Justice Hans Linde's observation
that "[e]very judge's campaign slogan, in advertisements and on billboards, is some variation of 'tough
on crime.' The liberal candidate is the one who advertises: 'Tough but fair."' Hans A. Linde, Elective
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Amendment, and an earlier case made clear that the First Amendment does not
provide much protection to judicial candidates in New York. In Nicholson v.
State Commission on Judicial Conduct,166 the court disciplined a candidate for
appearing personally at fundraising events and soliciting contributions, as well
as for violating other ethical rules. The court was not sympathetic to the
argument that the speech and association rights of candidates and voters must
be protected most vigilantly during election season: "Misconduct by a Judge or
judicial candidate cannot be shielded from scrutiny merely because it takes
place in the political forum."
'1 67
An exception to the rule of state court validation of speech restrictions is
the Michigan Supreme Court case of In re Chmura.168 That case held
unconstitutional a provision in the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct that
prohibited judicial candidates from making any statement "that the candidate
knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or
which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading."'1 69 Though the campaign literature at issue was "'consistently
untruthful,"" 170 the court found the Canon facially unconstitutional because it
was not narrowly tailored "to serve the state's compelling interest in
maintaining the integrity of the election process and ensuring public confidence
in the judiciary."' 17 1 The Canon was overbroad, said the court, because its
prohibitions on all misleading or deceptive "statements [and omissions], not
just those statements that bear on the impartiality of the judiciary" encouraged
candidates to remain silent. 172 Accordingly, the court adopted the actual malice
Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1995, 2000 (1995). Though an extremely rare
occurrence, occasionally a tough-on-crime message will lose votes for a candidate. Frances Kahn
Zemans noted one example where a judge refused to reduce the sentence of a defendant convicted of a
brutal assault. "Supporters of the convicted felon reacted strongly, including shouting 'Down with
242'-the judge's number on the ballot in the retention election just eleven days away-and circulating
leaflets with the judge's name and 'Vote NO!' printed on them." Frances Kahn Zemans, The
Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 639 (1999).
166. 409 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 823.
168. 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000).
169. See MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(l)(d). The Canon also prohibited
statements that were "likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve."
Id. The court did not consider the constitutionality of Michigan's Canon prohibiting "'pledges or
promises of conduct in office."' See 608 N.W.2d at 42 n.9.
170. 608 N.W.2d at 36.
171. Id. at 38; see also id at 40 (opining that states have a compelling interest in "preserving the
integrity of the judiciary" and "protecting the reputation of the judiciary"). The Chmura court cautioned
that judicial elections are different from executive and legislative ones. See id. at 39-40. Though the
court did not specify which restrictions would be permitted in judicial campaigns but would be held
unconstitutional in other races, the court did express its conclusion that "the state's interest in preserving
the integrity of the judiciary supports the imposition of greater restrictions on a candidate's speech
during a campaign for judicial office than is permissible in other campaigns." Id at 42.
172. Id. at 42; see also id. at 43 ("The prohibition on misleading and deceptive statements quells
the exchange of ideas because the safest response to the risk of disciplinary action may sometimes be to
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standard from the defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan173 and
limited the Canon to prohibiting statements that the candidate knew were false
or were used by the candidate with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity.
174
The Alabama Supreme Court followed Michigan's lead and revised the
relevant Alabama Canon to prohibit only demonstrably false statements that
were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for
whether they were false or not.' 75 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia did the same in striking down Georgia's analogous
regulation.' 76 Those two courts, like the Michigan Supreme Court, concluded
that the regulations' beneficial effect of controlling falsehoods was overcome
by the chilling effect the regulations would have on protected speech. 1
77
Shortly after the White decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in Weaver v.
Bonner,178 became the first court to hold that the First Amendment treats
judicial elections exactly the same as it treats legislative and executive
elections.' 79 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit, like the Michigan Supreme
Court in Chmura and the Alabama Supreme Court in Butler, struck down
Georgia's rule prohibiting false or misleading campaign statements, and held
that rules governing campaign statements must conform to the "actual malice"
standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.180 The Eleventh Circuit went
further, however, and also struck down Georgia's prohibition on the personal
solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates.' 8 ' The court maintained
remain silent.").
173. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1982) (applying the
New York Times rule to misstatements in a legislative campaign). By striking down the ban on
"misleading statements," the Chmura court drew a distinction between commercial speech, where
misleading statements may be proscribed, and noncommercial speech, where the First Amendment bars
such a proscription. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (noting that misleading attorney
advertising may be prohibited as commercial speech); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977)
(same). See generally Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (noting that greater restrictions of
speech may be constitutional in a commercial context than in a noncommercial one).
174. See Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 43.
175. See Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001).
176. See Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341-43 (N.D. Ga. 2000), affd in relevant part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002).
177. See Weaver, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-43; Butler, 802 So. 2d at 217-18. The Alabama Supreme
Court also concluded that the restriction on conduct degrading the "'public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary"' did not apply to political speech. See 802 So. 2d at 219.
178. 309 F.3d 1312 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
179. See id. at 1321 ("[W]e believe that the Supreme Court's decision in White suggests that the
standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive
elections."). Judge Beam, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit opinion that was reversed in White, offered
strong language for treating judges and other officials equally under the First Amendment. Though he
agreed "that judges differ from other officials," he argued that "[i]n the eyes of the First Amendment,
they are the same." Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2001) (Beam, J.,
dissenting), rev 'd sub nom. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
180. See309F.3dat 1321.
181. See id. at 1322-23. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit recently rejected, on standing grounds, a due
process challenge to Texas's system of judicial elections, which does allow judicial candidates to solicit
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that there was no reason to believe candidates who solicited funds would be
biased,18 2 but even if there were cause for such a belief, the prohibition would
not serve the interest because the alternative-allowing a campaign committee
to solicit funds on the candidate's behalf-presented virtually the same risk of
favoritism. 183 The court therefore concluded that both regulations were
unconstitutional, as they suppressed candidate speech "while hardly advancing
the state's interest in judicial impartiality at all."'184
New York's judicial conduct rules have suffered a similar fate to Georgia's,
though the district court in Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct185 did not decide whether the First Amendment provides the same
rights to judicial, legislative, and executive candidates. The Spargo court struck
down New York regulations barring judicial candidates from participating in
political activity, 186 finding the restrictions unlikely to promote any interest the
state might have in the independence of its judiciary. 87 The court also struck
down provisions requiring judicial candidates to act in a manner promoting
confidence in, and the integrity of, the judiciary, finding those provisions
unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that it was not possible "for a
person of any level of intelligence to know what conduct would be
prohibited," 188 and as a result the restrictions unlawfully threatened to chill the
exercise of protected speech.1
89
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, recently undertook quite a
different analysis in upholding that state's speech restrictions against
constitutional challenge.' 90 The court found a "compelling state interest in
preserving the integrity of our judiciary" and in promoting public confidence in
that institution, as it proceeded to discipline a judicial candidate for
campaigning using a tough-on-crime message.' 9' The court determined that the
candidate's statements, which indicated her desire to see criminals behind bars
and police officers' testimony taken "seriously," pledged a pro-prosecution
"bias" and "brought the judiciary into disrepute by conveying the false and
and accept campaign funds. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001). The court
reasoned that the alleged appearance of partiality caused by the system of financing was too abstract a
concern to provide the plaintiff with a cognizable injury. See id at 218-19. As shown by Weaver and
Bomer, different litigants have argued that states must allow judicial candidates to solicit funds under the
First Amendment, and that states must forbid the practice under the Fourteenth.
182. See Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322; see also Bomer, 274 F.3d at 215 (citing cases rejecting
allegations that solicitations of funds by judicial candidates necessarily result in bias).
183. See Weaver at 1322-23.
184. Id. at 1323.
185. 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
186. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, §§ 100.5(A)(l)(c)-(g), (4)(a).
187. See Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
188. Id. at 90.
189. See id. at 91.




misleading impression of the judge's role, particularly in the handling of
criminal cases.' ' 92 For making such "promises" and for leading voters to think
that the Florida state courts are not "impartial tribunal[s] where justice is
dispensed without favor or bias,"'1 93 the court subjected the candidate to a
public reprimand and a $50,000 fine.' 94
As shown in the above summary of decisions, most courts, with the notable
exception of the Eleventh Circuit in Weaver, have been willing to uphold
restrictions on judicial campaign speech so long as the restrictions were limited
to forbidding commentary on issues a successful candidate would be likely to
face on the bench. 195 Where the restrictions go beyond that limit, and prohibit
candidates from discussing all issues of dispute in the legal or political realms,
however, courts have been more willing to strike down the offending
regulations. The explications of the state interests in limiting campaign speech
are almost invariably the same across the cases. Judges must refrain from
speaking, say the courts, to prevent the actuality and appearance of prejudging
cases. If judges were permitted to speak, then judges would campaign on the
basis of their substantive views (just like other elected politicians do), and the
voters would select judges by choosing those candidates who would effect the
voters' preferred substantive outcomes (just like voters select other candidates).
Because the judiciary is supposed to be independent of the populace, however,
and must occasionally rule against the popular will, courts upholding speech
restrictions argue that such issue-based elections threaten to undermine the
judicial role, i.e., the neutral weighing of argument and the application of law
to facts.
B. Commentators
In 1999, Justices Kennedy and Breyer, who ultimately took different sides
in White, jointly appeared on the PBS television program Frontline to discuss
the impact of financial contributions on judicial independence. Justice Kennedy
192. Id. at *34.
193. Id.
194. See id. at *38.
195. The circuits have split on whether to limit a speech restriction so as to prohibit only the speech
that would result in partiality. The Third Circuit adopted such a limiting construction in Stretton. See
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991). The Seventh
Circuit declined to adopt such a construction, believing that the result "would be a patchwork job
indeed, with the rule itself saying one thing and the judicial gloss on it another." Buckley v. Ill. Judicial
Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Weaver, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1343-44 (striking
down Georgia's Canon prohibiting misleading campaign speech, and declining to adopt a narrowing
construction). The Supreme Court in White held that Minnesota's announce clause could not be
construed to ban solely commitments, because the separate "pledges or promises" clause banned that
conduct. The Court's decision, however, rested on its determination that "announcing" something was
different from "pledging." Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002). It did not expressly
address whether a court, interpreting a campaign speech restriction, could limit the number of issues that
would come within the literal terms of a prohibition like Pennsylvania's, Illinois's, or Minnesota's.
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explained his view that it was not only campaign financing that was troubling
in the context of judicial elections, but "the campaign process itself."'1 96
"Democracy is raucous, hurly-burly, rough-and-tumble. This is a difficult
world for a jurist, a scholarly, detached neutral person to operate within." 197
Justice Breyer commented on the destructive force that interest group politics
could play in the judiciary: "[A clash of political interests is] fine for a
legislature. I mean that's one kind of a problem. But if you have that in the
court system, you will then destroy confidence that the judges are deciding
things on the merits." 198 Justice Kennedy agreed, pointing out his belief that
"we should [not] select judges based on a particular philosophy as opposed to
temperament, commitment to judicial neutrality and commitment to other more
constant values as to which there is a general consensus."1 99 Despite his own
feelings about the proper considerations in the selection of judges, Justice
Kennedy's White concurrence would have permitted voters to make the choices
he viewed as abhorrent in the Frontline interview. Voters might decide to vote
for a candidate "based on a particular philosophy," even though Justice
Kennedy would not, for "[d]eciding the relevance of candidate speech is the
right of the voters, not the State. 2 ° °
Justices Kennedy and Breyer are not the only members of the bench who
have commented on the problems that elections pose for judicial independence
and neutrality. Some members of state courts have also been vocal about the
need to control democratic excesses in order to maintain the prestige and
dignity of the judiciary. Many have noted the pressures elections place on
judges to conform to perceived public desires. For example, former Wisconsin
Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan has acknowledged that "[i]t is sometimes
difficult for a judge facing election to ignore the momentary popular will, and it
is difficult to campaign on 'justice' alone."20 1 Because applying the correct rule
of law may lead to unpopular results, "[a] 'just' judge is very likely to be
politically vulnerable for being legally right., 202 California Supreme Court
196. Frontline: Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1999), available at





200. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
201. Heffeman, supra note 8, at 1043.
202. Id; see also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 171
(1997); Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 367, 387 (2002) (noting that criticism of court rulings often stems not from
thoughtful disagreement with judges' application of law, but from dissatisfaction with the result,
"simply as a matter of political judgment"); The Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 28, 1991, at 31 ("[T]he law is now almost always spoken of popularly in terms of
outcomes that are indistinguishable from political ends.").
Vol. 21:301, 2003
Judges as Politicians
Justice Otto Kaus famously expressed the same sentiment by analogizing the
political impact of a judge's decisions to "a crocodile in your bathtub when you
go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you try not to think
about it, but it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving."
20 3
Current Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson also
noted her agreement, but urged judicial candidates to take hold of the
opportunity presented by elections to educate voters about the judiciary and its
function. 204 According to Chief Justice Abrahamson, "[j]udicial elections can
and should serve to educate the public about what judges do on a daily basis,
about case management, court powers, the general principles underlying court




Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde has echoed concerns about the
"appalling" idea of judges campaigning-and behaving-like other elected
officials. 20 6 Justice Linde, however, placed a large portion of the blame for the
public's result-oriented voting on judges' result-oriented decisions and
opinions: "[C]ourts give up their defense against the charge that law is nothing
more than politics when they explain their decisions as a choice of social policy
with little effort to attribute that choice to any law." 207 When judges reach
decisions on policy grounds and states impose speech restrictions reducing the
ability of voters to make decisions based on the judges' policy preferences, the
restrictions run the risk of being perceived as "sacrific[ing] ... free speech to
hypocrisy."20 8 Such restrictions, in Justice Linde's view, "do[] more harm to
203. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme
Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1997).
204. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973 (2001)
[hereinafter, Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench]; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Courtroom with a View:
Building Judicial Independence with Public Participation, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE REs.
13 (2000). Chief Justice Abrahamson's discussion closely parallels the work of Frances Kahn Zemans,
who has warned judges that their esteemed position may make it difficult to interact with the public and
educate them about the judicial function. See Zemans, supra note 165, at 637 ("Often judges' appeals to
the public to respect the importance of judicial independence appear arrogant. Also, unwillingness to
engage in debate because it is 'unseemly' or not in keeping with the 'dignity' of the court rings of
elitism."); see also Kevin M. Esterling, Public Outreach: The Cornerstone of Judicial Independence, 82
JUDICATURE 112 (1998) (arguing that programs inviting public involvement can serve to increase
judicial independence).
205. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, supra note 204, at 994-95.
206. Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 15 (1991).
207. Id. at 14; see also Stephen Markman, The Debate over the Judiciary, 35 SUFFOLK L. REv. 443,
451 (2001) (arguing that applying a consistent judicial philosophy-rather than a case-by-case sense of
justice-is the best way to achieve the institutional goals sought by speech restrictions); Zemans, supra
note 165, at 646 (hypothesizing that ensuring that the public benefits from judicial independence might
require courts "to avoid terms such as 'fair' and 'good' unless tempered by reference to restrictions
imposed by the written law. The impression that the judge relies on fairness as the standard against
which to measure decisions can have dangerous implications that the judge is free to follow her
conscience despite the law"); cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the Court's opinion as "so long on emotive utterance and so short on relevant legal
citation"); id. at 636 (describing the majority "opinion's heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness
rather than judicial holdings").
208. Linde, supra note 206, at 16. Justice Linde emphasized the importance of keeping a distinction
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principles of free speech than any good that the restrictions can accomplish. 2 °9
Instead, he offered numerous suggestions to maintain judicial independence in
a system of judicial elections, notably including a recommendation that judges
not engage in lawmaking, that the academy not express enthusiasm for opinions
that are legislation under a different title, and that other state officials take the
lead in law reform, so that judges do not feel the need to legislate where
legislators have failed. El °
Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Randall Shepard took a somewhat
different tack, urging courts and scholars to focus not simply on the conflict
between the dignity of the judiciary and the free speech rights of judges and
voters, but also to weigh heavily the "due process" rights of future litigants who
would be prejudiced by a candidate's announcement of his views.E l According
to Chief Justice Shepard, because the impartiality of judges has its "foundations
between legislatures and judges-between politics and law-but disagreed with the movement to
accomplish that goal by restricting speech beyond what is "essential to avoid a judge's disqualification
in future cases." Id. at 17. He did not explore exactly what kinds of commitments would necessarily
result in recusal. For discussions on the topic, see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned, " 14 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 55, 98-102 (2000) (discussing disqualification cases); Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism
Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 692-95 (2001) (discussing recusal
standards); Minzner, supra note 81, at 226-27, 235-37 (suggesting recusal for judges who have
committed themselves on issues); Symposium, Judicial Elections and Free Speech: Ethics and a
Judge's Campaign Rhetoric, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 315, 330-32 (2002) (same); Stuart Banner, Note,
Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449
(1988); Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and
Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign
Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 406-10 (1987) (suggesting recusal for judges who
have received contributions from attorneys); and Bradley A. Siciliano, Note, Attorney Contributions in
Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 234-39 (1991)
(discussing when recusal would be appropriate. Recusal has even been suggested as a possibility for
legislators when considering matters that would directly impact campaign contributors. See John
Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 69
(2000). Though recusal appears superficially to eliminate bias, its effect is to abridge the same free
speech rights that are abridged through a speech ban. If judges may discuss cases and voters contribute
funds and resources only if the judge they support will be disqualified from hearing cases on the relevant
subjects, there is actually a disincentive to speak. Additionally, a broad disqualification rule is subject to
abuse by lawyers who wish to recuse judges inhospitable to their clients' positions. Cf. In re Palmisano,
70 F.3d 483, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1995) (relating an attorney's accusations of "almost every judge who had
participated in any of his cases"); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th
Cir. 1995) (noting a judge's belief that an attorney's attacks on him were "motivated by [the attorney's]
desire to create a basis for recusing me in any future proceeding").
209. Linde, supra note 206, at 17.
210. Id. at 16.
211. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1076 (1996) [hereinafter Shepard, Campaign Speech]; see also Schotland, supra
note 56, at 665-66 (adopting the "due process" argument). Chief Justice Shepard has also suggested that
judicial candidates have helped to denigrate the profession by engaging in negative campaigning. See
Randall T. Shepard, Judicial Independence and the Problem of Elections: "We Have Met the Enemy and
He Is Us," 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 753, 760-65 (2001). But see Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d
854, 899 (8th Cir. 2001) (Beam, J., dissenting) ("I see little difference between truthful criticisms
leveled at a judge by a newspaper editor or elected official on one hand, and a judicial candidate on the
other."), rev'dsub nom. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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in due process," 212 a "policy choice" must be made between protecting those
due process rights and protecting the rights of judicial candidates to speak and
the rights of voters to hear.213 Chief Justice Shepard then suggested that, instead
of adjudicating facial challenges to ethical canons or announcing blanket rules
declaring that either the speech rights or the due process rights should prevail,
courts would be better advised to consider each candidate statement
individually. 214 The court would evaluate "which of these statements represent
a threat to due process and which do not.' 2 15 Although he was unable to cite a
single case finding a due process violation where the judge had merely declared
opposition to a litigant's position 216 (as opposed to expressing some antagonism
212. Shepard, Campaign Speech, supra note 21 , at 1060; see also Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms
of Judicial Behavior: Understanding Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack
Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1056-57 (2001) (arguing that "impartiality" is required as a matter
of due process).
213. Shepard, Campaign Speech, supra note 21 1, at 1060, 1090-91; cf Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]his is a case where constitutionally
protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation."); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 748 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("In these cases, the imperative of a free and unfettered
press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modem
government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive.").
214. See Shepard, Campaign Speech, supra note 211, at 1091-92.
215. Id. at 1091. Chief Justice Shepard then went on to give examples of the types of speech and
associational rights likely to be constitutionally protected, and those likely to be prohibited as protection
of litigants' due process rights. The examples are simple balancing tests with nothing to substantiate the
outcomes other than Chief Justice Shepard's personal policy preferences. See id. at 1093 ("Surely, the
judge's interest in the effectiveness of his campaign does not so clearly outweigh the defendant's
interest in a just and fair adjudication that the canon restraining the judge's speech must be voided."); id
at 1094 ("Balancing these interests, it seems that the rule against making commitments on cases likely to
come before the court and the rule against misrepresentations should prevail."); id. at 1096 ("The
constitutional balance thus seems less favorable to the restraint where the choice made by the judge [of
which social club to join] was largely unrelated to [a discriminatory motive, in this case] gender."); id. at
1098 ("[T]he balancing of interests suggests that except where recusal would become an extremely
common occurrence, the spouse can accept the employment [with a government department regularly
involved in litigation in the judge's court] .. "); id. at 1099 ("[T]he balancing of interests seems to
weigh in favor of the spouse investing as the spouse sees fit,... [unless] the business was a common
litigant in the judge's court."). Chief Justice Shepard's analysis is reminiscent, in its capacity for result-
oriented judicial manipulation, of the Casey plurality's unsupportable pronouncements of which
abortion restrictions constituted "undue burden[s]," and Justice Stewart's infamous comment regarding
obscenity that "I know it when I see it." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 991 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing the plurality opinion at 880, 884-85, 887, 893-94, 895, 901); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
216. See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a criminal defendant did
not state a due process violation when the trial judge later campaigned in part on having given the
defendant the maximum sentence allowed). Subsequent to the publication of Chief Justice Shepard's
article, his court, with the Chief Justice participating, decided In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. 1999)
(per curiam), in which the court found that the judge at issue had knowingly misrepresented her
opponent's judicial record, and therefore deserved a public reprimand. In dicta, the court adopted Chief
Justice Shepard's concerns that due process would be compromised if judges campaigned by making
promises of conduct in office. See id at 959-60; see also Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal
Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (citing concerns about judicial candidate speech
"tend[ing] to undermine the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system"). See generally
Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial
Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1999);
Minzner, supra note 81, at 228-31; Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and
Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187 (1996). Chief Justice Shepard did not explain
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 21:301, 2003
to the litigant personally 27), Chief Justice Shepard nevertheless would sharply
limit judicial campaign promises, calling them "arguably. . . bribe[s] offered to
voters, paid with rulings consistent with that promise, in return for continued
employment as a judge."218
Professor Roy Schotland has been at the forefront of defending speech
restrictions on judicial candidates from constitutional challenge. He has
justified restrictions on judicial candidate speech by pointing to distinctions
between the positions of judge and legislator. In a recent article, for example,
Professor Schotland pointed to such differences as the ban on judges making ex
parte contacts with litigants; the prohibition against judges making promises of
service in office; the necessity of judges remaining neutral and not acting as
"advocates"; constraints on judges' ability to change the law; judges' insulation
from the clash of competing, represented interests; the "usual[]" effect of
judicial decisions as pertaining only to the parties before the court; and the
inability of judges to gain support through casework or by benefitting their
communities. 219 Schotland concludes that these differences allow restrictions
on judicial candidate speech to be upheld as constitutional, though it would be
why his participation in the Bybee case did not violate the due process rights of Ms. Bybee. She might
reasonably think that Chief Justice Shepard was not the most "impartial" of judges, in the sense in which
his articles use the term, given that he had already spoken and taken a position on an issue in the case.
217. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 781-82 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding an appearance of
impropriety where a judge attended a conference sponsored by a plaintiff in an action before him, and
was shown a "Hollywood-style 'pre-screening"' of the plaintiffs expert witness testimony); State ex rel.
La Russa v. Himes, 197 So. 762, 762-63 (Fla. 1940) (requiring recusal where the judge's campaign
statements disclosed a bias against the defendant). La Russa, a criminal defendant, successfully moved
for Judge Himes's recusal due to the judge's earlier campaign speech announcing that "what the people
want is a judge who will put people like Philip La Russa and his associates away." 197 So. at 762; see
also Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (noting that cases holding that an impartial
judge is essential for due process use "impartial" in the sense of "lack of bias for or against either party
to the proceeding").
218. See Shepard, supra note 211, at 1088. In light of the Supreme Court's holding that a
misleading promise by a legislative candidate to reduce government spending (and concomitantly taxes)
is not akin to a bribe of voters, see Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 57-59 (1982), Chief Justice
Shepard's claim that a judicial ruling consistent with campaign promises does constitute payment of a
bribe is simply incredible. A legislative candidate's promise to lower taxes at least offers the possibility
that voters will consider the monetary incentive in voting for the candidate. The possibility of such a
reaction happening in judicial races is more remote, even assuming the monetary incentive to be present,
because a case must be presented to a judge before he can implement the promised reform.
More directly to the point of this Article, Chief Justice Shepard's analysis turns on his conclusion
that there is something unseemly, immoral, and perhaps even criminal, about voting in accordance with
campaign promises, even when such a decision is an entirely reasonable application of law. Quite
obviously, he provides no support for that conclusion. "A mere promise to change the law or alter social
policy is neither a bribe nor unethical in a democracy. Such pledges to the people are at the core of the
free expression the First Amendment was designed to secure." 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:32, at 16-85 (2002). Likewise, Chief Justice Shepard appears to
criticize voters who have the audacity to vote consistent with their policy preferences. As I explain in
Subsection IV.A.2, however, policy-oriented voting is part of every popular election system, including
ones for judicial office.
219. See Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1489,
1490-94 (2001); Schotland, supra note 22, at 859-61.
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"inconceivable" to allow such restrictions in races for other offices.220
Professor Lloyd Snyder, on the other hand, has argued that most candidate
speech restrictions violate the First Amendment.221 In Snyder's view, "[t]he
rule does nothing to stop the election of prejudiced judges to the bench. On the
contrary, the restriction on campaign speech requires judicial candidates to hide
their prejudices behind a facade of forced silence., 22
2
Snyder compared judges to politicians, finding that the differences, though
"significant," are "ultimately ... a matter of degree rather than kind" and
accordingly "do not justify distinctions between the first amendment rights of
judicial candidates and candidates for other elected office." 223 Specifically,
Snyder noted that both judges and other officials are restrained in the
implementation of their policy objectives-legislators because of their service
on a multi-member body, executives by their obligation to apply the law
irrespective of personal views, and appellate judges by both-and that although
judges may be the most restrained of the three branches, that difference is a
minuscule reed on which to base a denial of First Amendment freedoms.
224
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has added a more practical dimension to the
debate by arguing that judges' views affect how they exercise their discretion
and ultimately how they decide cases.225 He accordingly finds no justification
for denying the public access to information about a prospective judge's views,
when it is those views that will play a role in shaping the policy coming from
the court.2 26 Professor Chemerinsky argues that the restrictions fail strict
scrutiny, reasoning that a judge who has announced his positions on disputed
issues is not "biased" in any way violative of due process,227 and "the
appearance of impartiality is [not] a constitutional mandate., 228 He would
therefore strike down the restrictions on judicial candidate speech.229
220. Schotland, supra note 22, at 857; see also Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts:
Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701 (2002) (echoing Schotland's arguments).
221. See Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1987).
222. Id. at 235; see also id. at 229-33 (arguing that a judge may express an opinion on a disputed
legal or political question without jeopardizing his impartiality).
223. Id. at 244.
224. See id, at 245.
225. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 736 (2002).
226. See id at 737-38. Professor Chemerinsky notes that where judges are appointed, their
ideologies have always played a considerable role in the appointment process. See id at 738.
227. See id. at 743-45.
228. Id. at 745.
229. Professor Chemerinsky would, however, allow greater restriction of judicial candidates than
legislative candidates in areas of campaign finance. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent
Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 133 (1998); see also Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning up Judicial Elections:
Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y
REV. 71 (1997) (arguing for the constitutionality ofjudicial campaign finance restrictions).
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IV. ASSESSING THE "COMPELLING" INTERESTS IN LIMITING SPEECH
Perhaps it should come as little surprise that judges view protection of the
reputation of the judiciary as a "compelling" interest. Respect for our judicial
institutions is invaluable (and in judges' personal and professional self-interest
to maintain), permitting courts to make their decisions binding on individuals
and entities, including other branches of government. 230 And at a time when the
political branches are continually maligned as platforms for long-winded,
small-minded demagogues, 231 respect for the courts continues to persist.232 In
light of this, why would anyone wish to adopt an interpretation of the First
Amendment that could wreck the dignity of the only aspect of American
government that the country sees as respectable? My answer is to allow the
people of each state to determine whether they wish to maintain an aloof,
230. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that the judiciary "may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment").
Merely noting the importance of an interest served by an abridgment of speech, however, is not enough
to save the abridgment from unconstitutionality. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (concluding that restraint on publication of the Pentagon Papers
would violate the First Amendment, and implicitly rejecting Justice Blackmun's warning, see id. at 762-
63 (dissenting opinion), that publication could result in the death of soldiers and geopolitical difficulties
of unquestionable severity). In addition to requiring a strong reason for the suppression of speech (made
more difficult in the case of judicial campaign restrictions because the reputation of the judiciary as
"neutral" is undeserved, see infra Section IV.B), the Constitution requires such suppression to be a
narrowly tailored response to that justification-a test campaign restrictions cannot meet. See Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("[A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of
preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much
more than it would enhance respect.").
231. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 383 (2001) ("Two branches, the legislative and
executive, have fallen into such disrepute that they lack any perceived vestiges of integrity.").
232. See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Regard, 77
JUDICATURE 273 (1994). Interestingly, a recent poll commissioned by the American Bar Association
indicates that Americans, by a three-to-one margin, have more confidence in judges they elect than in
appointed judges. The poll also found that Americans believe that raising money compromises the
integrity of the judiciary. Sixty-one percent of those surveyed, however, believe that a judge who voices
his opinions can be fair and impartial in a later case. See Harris Interactive, A Study About Judicial
Impartiality (Aug. 2-5, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/media/aug02/shell.ppt (last visited May 5,
2003); see also Stan Greenberg & Linda A. DiVall, "Courts Under Pressure"-A Wake-Up Call from
State Judges, JUDGES' J., Summer 2002, at 11 (analyzing survey results indicating that judges and voters
believe that money influences judicial campaigns and judicial independence, and that voters lack enough
information to make informed choices between candidates); David B. Rottman, The White Decision in
the Court of Opinion: Views of Judges and the General Public, 39 COURT REv. 16, 19-22 (2002)
(finding the public to be concerned with the effect of campaign funding, but also desirous of retaining
judicial elections); Task Force on Selecting State Court Judges, Choosing Justice: Reforming the
Selection of State Judges, in TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 87 (2000) (noting a growing concern about the
independence of elected state court judges, and attributing the concern to the influence of "individuals
and special interests that finance [judges'] campaigns").
It remains to be seen whether courts' increased involvement in political disputes will cause public
esteem for the judiciary to diminish. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Early polls indicate, however, that the public continues to hold respect for the Supreme Court, even
following Bush v. Gore. See Jeff Polet, The Imperiousness of Bush v. Gore, in THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 263, 264 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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independent, and relatively unaccountable judiciary, or whether they wish to
have a more responsive, accountable, and politically aware bench.2 33 When
they forbid discussion of a judge's performance on the bench, campaign
restrictions effectively deprive voters234 of the ability to set the balance
between judicial independence and accountability.2 35 Voters will have an
independent judiciary whether they like it or not, regardless of the state's
previous decision to adopt judicial elections. 236
Without the restrictions, however, there is still the opportunity for voters to
elect dignified candidates. The people can choose to elect only those judicial
candidates who refuse to answer questions about judicial philosophy,
previously decided cases, and the like, and thereby encourage judges not to
give the impression that they have pre-decided legal questions. 237 Alternatively,
the voters can decide that they want only those judges who will decide cases in
ways consistent with the voters' beliefs and philosophies. If the voters adopt
this second approach, and if judicial candidates see fit to accommodate the
desires of the voters, judicial campaigns will become more issue-oriented and
courts will likely become more attuned to the concerns of the voting public, for
233. See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J.
POL. 427, 443 (1992) ("Subjecting justices to electoral processes may produce behavior consistent with
the accountability model .... Individual states must decide whether such responses are desirable from
judicial actors or whether more of an independent role is preferred .... ").
234. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("[T]he rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least
some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.").
235. See Radosevich, supra note 74, at 140 ("Voters cannot make wise choices between candidates
unless they know how the candidates differ from each other."),
236. States are, of course, free to repeal their provisions authorizing judicial elections. They may
not, however, attempt the same by subterfuge, no more than they could have judicial elections but deny
the vote to certain racial groups, or permit candidates to run only if they affiliate with the Independent
Judiciary Party. See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he greater
power to dispense with elections altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct elections under
conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance."); cf Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) ("[T]he power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not
necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct."); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (holding unconstitutional a statute that would prohibit orderly
protest against a party in power by another "equally high minded and patriotic" party); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (holding that a state may not, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, limit party primary participation to whites). The failure of the "greater includes the lesser"
argument, pressed by those who claim states need not adopt the side effects of politics when they adopt
judicial elections, see Schotland, supra note 56; O'Neil, supra note 220, at 719, is made even more clear
when judicial elections are analogized to senatorial and presidential elections. See supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text. Though states remain free to dispense with presidential elections, and were under no
obligation, before the Seventeenth Amendment, to conduct senatorial ones, the right of senatorial and
presidential candidates to speak on all matters of public concern is unquestioned.
237. This is not simply fanciful theorizing. A recent study found that "89 percent of judicial
candidates focused their campaigns on their image or qualifications rather than issues .... [and] [o]nly 8
percent of judicial candidates reported that issues were the primary focus of their campaign." Owen G.
Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 292
(2002). To be sure, the study included candidates whose campaigns were governed by speech
limitations, but notwithstanding that unavoidable defect, it still should give an analyst pause before
predicting that judicial campaigns will immediately become issue-based brawls.
Yale Law & Policy Review
better or worse.
In this Part, I discuss the two preeminent rationales for speech restrictions. I
first discuss the category of rationales centered on protecting future litigants.
Commentators and courts are promoting this interest when they speak of
preserving the independence and impartiality of the judiciary from the
influence of the political process. Next I address the more systemic concerns of
those who would restrict candidate speech. Those concerns focus on the
damage to the judiciary caused by the public's loss of confidence in courts.
Restrictions, to serve this interest, must make courts appear to be impartial and
independent.
A. Preserving Actual Impartiality and Independence
1. What's Wrong with Closed-Minded Judges? (or, The Myth of Due
Process)
Conceding that judicial candidates have an interest in free discussion of
ideas during campaigns, some courts and commentators-notably, Indiana
Chief Justice Randall Shepard and Professor Roy Schotland-have concluded
that the candidates' interest is often outweighed by future litigants' interest in
impartial adjudications.2 38 White held that litigants have no right to judges who
have no views on the issues presented in their cases, but it did not address
whether litigants have a right to judges who are open-minded. The second
formulation, if adopted, would give litigants the right to judges who have not
made up their minds on the issues presented in the cases, although judges may
have some initial inclinations about those issues.
A proper understanding of the Constitution, however, gives litigants no
right even to an open-minded judge. Unquestionably, a judge must be impartial
in the sense of being free to decide a case irrespective of the parties before
him.239 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a judge must disqualify
238. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text; In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ind.
1999) (per curiam); Schotland, supra note 56, at 665-66; Shepard, Campaign Speech, supra note 211.
239. This fact may provide a distinction between restrictions on what a judicial candidate may say
and restrictions on what a lawyer or litigant may contribute to a judge's campaign. The ABA's Model
Code does limit the ways a judge may raise campaign funds, in ways that would almost certainly be
unconstitutional if applied to other types of campaigns. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(C)(2) (1990) (disallowing personal solicitation or reception of campaign contributions by judicial
candidates). In their limitation of a judge's dependence on lawyers or litigants who appear before him,
the restrictions may arguably be constitutional as ensuring that the judge not be biased in favor of
contributors. On the other hand, the long acceptance of the practice of judges adjudicating cases
involving contributors makes it unlikely that judicial disqualification is required as a matter of due
process. Additionally, as the Eleventh Circuit held, bans on the personal solicitation of campaign
expenditures only marginally, if at all, protect the interest of judicial impartiality, because the indirect
method of solicitation that is often used as a substitute presents similar risks of favoritism. See Weaver
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (1 1th Cir. 2002). The impact of the First Amendment on judicial
campaign contribution restrictions is a subject to be discussed more thoroughly in another article.
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himself where he has a demonstrated bias for or against one of the litigants.2
40
It is a fundamental tenet of our society-and of the rule of law-that judges
may not decide cases in which they have a "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the litigation. 24  For that reason, the
Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio held that it violated due process for a
magistrate to be paid differing amounts depending on his decision. 242 The Court
extended Tumey in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,24 3 concluding that a
magistrate's pecuniary interest in keeping the village's treasury solvent was
enough to violate the due process rights of the litigant who was forced to pay a
fine into that treasury. 244 Other cases continued to find constitutional violations
where the magistrate had a personal incentive to rule against one of the parties
before him.
245
Cases invoking the Due Process Clause, such as the ones noted above,
confirm that a judge who has an interest in the litigation may not preside over
it. Where the judge does not have a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest," however, but instead has a mere philosophical bias concerning the
case, the Supreme Court has been much more reluctant to force
disqualification. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, for example, the Court
specifically held that the Due Process Clause did not protect an insurance
company from having its case heard by a judge who had expressed prejudice
against insurance companies and who sued two insurance companies for bad
246faith failure to pay a claim. Although the Court left open the possibility thatsome instances of bias could offend due process, the opinion was quite clear
240. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) ("Trial before 'an unbiased judge'
is essential to due process.") (citation omitted); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1921).
241. Tumey, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
242. Id.
243. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
244. See id. at 60.
245. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25 (1986) (holding that a judge's
participation in a case that could increase the settlement value of his own lawsuits deprived the litigant
of due process); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250 (1977) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a
search warrant issued by a magistrate who was paid for every issued search warrant, but who was not
paid if he declined to sign the warrant application); cf Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988) (holding that a judge personally and pecuniarily interested in a case must be
disqualified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 445(a), notwithstanding the judge's ignorance of the interest).
246. See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820-21. As a matter of statutory law, however, the Court, in Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), enforced Congress's desire that judges inclined to rule against certain
litigants recuse themselves. Berger mandated the recusal of Judge (later Commissioner of Baseball)
Kenesaw Mountain Landis from a case involving German defendants. In addition to making
innumerable other indelicate comments, Judge Landis had said that German-Americans' "hearts are
reeking with disloyalty" and "[ilf anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I
would like to know it so I can use it." Id. at 28. Judge Landis also made disparaging comments about the
loyalty of "this defendant." Id. at 28-29. The Court held that the applicable provision of the judicial code
required Judge Landis's disqualification, id. at 35, because there were "substantial and formidable"
allegations of Judge Landis's bias "toward [these] defendants." Id. at 34 (emphasis added); see also In
re IBM, 45 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1995) (directing recusal because of the trial judge's apparent bias
against IBM).
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that only "the most extreme of cases" would require disqualification, and that
the Lavoie judge's comments "fall well below that level. 247
Where a judge is not biased as to the party, but only as to the issue, the Due
248Process Clause does not require his recusal.   While the Supreme Court in
White did not specifically decide whether litigants have a right to open-minded
judges, such a rule is indefensible in theory and would be impossible to
administer in practice. It would create a heretofore unheard of due process right
and would disqualify precisely the judges who should decide cases-those who
are scholarly enough to take an interest in an area of the law and to study it
prior to litigation. The only "impartiality" required by the Due Process Clause
is that "[t]he judge ... apply[] the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly." 249 As
Judge Jerome Frank noted in a case where a litigant alleged bias on the part of a
special master, if "'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of
preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial
and no one ever will.
250
If litigants have the right to an open-minded judge as a matter of due
process, it is the actuality of open-mindedness, and not the judge's appearance
as open-minded, that matters. 25 As such, if open-minded judges are necessary
for due process, then any judge who has made up his mind on an issue facing
the court (regardless of whether there has been any external manifestation of
his "bias, 252) would be precluded from hearing the case. 253 The Supreme Court,
247. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821.
248. Admittedly, the line between parties and issues may become blurry. For example, a judge who
expresses prejudice against "the ACLU" may need to be disqualified from a case brought by that
organization. A judge who merely expresses distaste for arguments made by "ACLU-types" may, in
contrast, simply be expressing an opinion about over-reaching civil liberties claims. Similarly, a judge
who campaigns on a platform of harsh treatment of "criminal defendants" or "child abusers" or
"slumlords," but not of a specific individual, see State ex rel. La Russa v. Himes, 197 So. 762, 762-63
(Fla. 1940)), should not be considered biased against individual criminal defendants, or other particular
litigants, but rather as legitimately having expressed an opinion about an issue. See United States v.
Cooley, I F.3d 985, 993 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Judges take an oath to uphold the law; they are expected
to disfavor its violation."). Thus, where a class of litigants is identified precisely because of its stance on
a legal or political issue, a comment about that group should, in most cases, be treated as being directed
at the issue and not the class itself.
249. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777 (2002).
250. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943); see also Shaffer v. Jones, 650 P.2d
918, 921 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) ("Judges are, and always will be, prejudiced and biased to some extent
on occasion. Trial judges are people, too, and share the same cross-section of feelings and human
frailties as the rest of us.").
251. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES 108-10 (1996); Michael Kinsley, Estrada's OmertA, (Feb. 13, 2003), at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2078513/ (last visited May 5, 2003). Because it is so difficult to prove a judge's
bias, motions for recusal tend to focus on the appearance of bias. See FLAMM, supra, at 110.
252. Cf Warren Burnett, Observations on the Direct-Election Method of Judicial Selection, 44
TEX. L. REv. 1098, 1100 (1966) ("[Tlhe integrity of no man is strengthened by artificial removal from
temptation."). Likewise, judicial impartiality is not strengthened simply by prohibiting advertising of a
judge's "bias."
253. Speech restrictions that are concerned only with pomp-ostensibly enacted to protect
litigants-fail to protect any interest that litigants value. No litigant who is promised an open-minded
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however, wisely has never suggested that open-mindedness is a requirement of
the Due Process Clause.
The impact of such a requirement would be astounding. No judge-whether
in a state with judicial elections, the federal system, or a state that uses
appointments to select its judges-could participate in a decision where he has
considered a legal issue and come to a conclusion. This is not the way the legal
system works.254 A criminal defendant arguing before the Supreme Court that
police violation of Miranda v. Arizona 255 requires the Court to suppress his
voluntary confession will encounter the closed-minded Justices Scalia and
256Thomas. A litigant arguing before the same Court that Congress lacks the
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity through the exercise of its
Article I powers257 will encounter the similarly closed-minded Justices Stevens,
258Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Lastly, a litigant arguing that Congress's
power to legislate allows regulation of state employment in the same manner
that Congress is allowed to regulate private employment will encounter the
closed-minded opposition of Chief Justice Rehnquist 59  and Justice
O'Connor.260 All of these examples involve Justices who have decided issues
that are likely to recur, and they give no indication of a willingness to
reconsider their commitments.
What is more, each of these examples involves the Justices' decisions to
ignore precedent; these are not determined decisions to follow past cases in the
face of arguments for overruling them,261 but instead decisions to cast aside
those past cases when given the opportunity. A more closed-minded judicial
judge would take comfort in knowing that his judge appears neutral, though the judge has prejudged the
case.
254. See generally FLAMM, supra note 251, §§ 10.1-10.11 (noting that expressions of judicial
views about law or policy rarely trigger disqualification).
255. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
256. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("I dissent from today's decision, and, until [18 U.S.C.] § 3501 is repealed, will continue to
apply it in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was
voluntary.").
257. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,59-73 (1996).
258. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept
Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.").
259. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that the previous standard, as elucidated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), "will, I am confident, again command the support of a majority of this Court").
260. See id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I share JUSTICE REHNQUIST's belief that this Court
will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility.").
261. It seems to me that a commitment to follow precedent is as closed-minded as a commitment to
overrule precedent. Nevertheless, those who would restrict judicial candidate speech by claiming that
judges merely apply existing law could not possibly consider such a commitment improper. To do so
would be to admit that the law is fluid, and that the individual judge has a somewhat unconstrained
choice to follow precedent or not. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 64-69 (1951)
(arguing that judges apply precedent with varying degrees of strength, depending on their agreement
with the precedent).
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mentality can hardly be imagined, and yet their participation in future cases
does not even raise the slightest due process concern. 262 Furthermore, the very
existence of stare decisis is itself a "commitment" by the court and the judicial
263
system as institutions-after all, that is the point of the doctrine. To the
extent that stare decisis commands judges to follow precedent, a judge asked to
ignore the precedent will not be "impartial." Proponents of speech restrictions
will no doubt respond that a judge applying precedent is simply applying the
law, and that he must remain open-minded on the question whether the
precedent fits the current case. The fact remains, however, that the precedent
will have conclusively decided the legal issue, and assuming the new case to be
indistinguishable from the prior one, the decision in the new case for the
precedent-adherent is foreordained.
The lesson from this recitation of recent forceful dissents and due process
cases is the simple proposition that a judge who has decided a legal issue is
fully qualified to sit in judgment of a case that turns on that legal issue.21 Thus,
despite the claims of Chief Justice Shepard, Professor Schotland, and others
that judicial campaign speech restrictions "have their foundations in due
262. See Chemerinsky, supra note 225, at 745 ("1 cannot imagine a credible argument that it
violates due process for Justice Scalia to sit on abortion cases, though it is absolutely clear as to how he
will vote."). Need anyone be reminded, he would vote to overrule Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), and what remains of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihose who believe that a 5-to-4 vote on a policy
matter by unelected lawyers should not overcome the judgment of 30 state legislatures have a problem,
not with the application of Casey, but with its existence. Casey must be overruled.") (emphases in
original). Lest any reader remain the slightest bit uncertain of Justice Scalia's position, he repeated only
a single page later that "Casey must be overruled." Id. at 956. There is also no credible argument that
Justice Scalia should recuse himself from Establishment Clause cases, though church-state separationists
have claimed that he lacks the requisite "impartiality." See Tony Mauro, Future High Court Sessions
Bring Changes, Concern (Jan. 27, 2003), at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1042568701360 (last
visited May 5, 2003). On the propriety of hearing cases in which a judge has formed an opinion, see also
Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword to PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT
BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION BATrLES 13, 18 (1992)
("No one would dream of suggesting that sitting Justices must recuse themselves on matters as to which
their own prior writings, in Supreme Court opinions or elsewhere, have revealed their initial views.").
Other examples of closed-minded Justices abound. Then-Justice Rehnquist noted several of them in
his Laird v. Tatum memorandum, including, inter alia, Justice Frankfurter's drafting, and later
interpreting, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Chief
Justice Hughes's participation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which overruled
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a case Hughes had earlier criticized in a book; and
Justice Black's sponsorship of the Fair Labor Standards Act and later participation in the case that held
it constitutional, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra
note 95, at 831-34.
263. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The whole function of the
doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be
held to be true, all in the interest of stability.").
264. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (noting that a "view of the law acquired
in scholarly reading" will not suffice to make out a claim of judicial bias or prejudice); United States v.
Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A judge's view on legal issues may not serve as the basis
for motions to disqualify.") (quoting United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 882 (9th Cir. 1980));
United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 1994).
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process, '265 the "impartiality" that is compromised by campaign speech is not a
necessary component of constitutional due process. As such, the speech rights
of candidates and voters (which are protected by the First Amendment) should,
even if the interests are "balanced," trump state desires for heightened due
process protections for litigants (which cannot claim the "compelling" interest
of complying with the United States Constitution).266 This is so despite the fact
that as a general matter states are permitted to extend their citizens greater due
process protections than those provided in the national charter. 2 6 7 Those who
have used a due process rationale to assail free speech during campaigns have
sought to create a heretofore nonexistent constitutional right, and have
ironically done so for the purpose of curtailing the right most cherished in the
Constitution, upon which democracy depends.
Having a knowledgeable but closed-minded judge on a case is not only
265. Shepard, Campaign Speech, supra note 211, at 1060; see also Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. &
Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (noting concerns that judicial campaign
speech could undermine "fundamental fairness"); In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999)
(arguing that due process could be compromised by judicial campaign speech); O'Neil, supra note 220,
at 715-16 (same); Schotland, supra note 56, at 665 (same); Wiener, supra note 216 (same).
266. Cf Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (permitting restrictions of attorney
speech about his pending cases when the speaker knows or should know that his message creates a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to an adjudicative proceeding by biasing the jury venire or
affecting the outcome of the proceeding); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1981) (holding that
a state university was required to provide religious groups access to money and facilities equal to the
access of sectarian groups, despite the Missouri State Constitution's requirement of the strict separation
of church and state). But cf Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1120, 1123 (Wash.
1989) (holding that the Washington Constitution provides greater separation than does the national
Constitution, and that refusing to fund a student who wished to study at a religious institution did not
violate his free exercise rights, possibly because of the "compelling" interest of complying with the state
constitution's separation requirement). A legislative preference (either at the state or federal level) for
the heightened due process standard championed by Chief Justice Shepard and others, even if
forthcoming, would therefore appear to be irrelevant because violation of the heightened due process
standard would not "prejudice" judicial proceedings in any relevant federal constitutional sense. See Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (striking down New Jersey's public accommodations law as
inconsistent with the associational guarantees of the First Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as an unconstitutional
attempt to enforce the First and Fourteenth Amendments, given that RFRA was not congruent and
proportional to the extent of the Free Exercise Clause, as construed by the Supreme Court in
Employment Div., Dep 't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); see also INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 941 (1983) ("Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative
jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional
restriction.") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
267. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927). Justice Kennedy suggested that states may require recusal to protect their heightened due
process standards, see Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring),
and shortly after the White decision, Missouri adopted just such a requirement. See Roy A. Schotland,
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, JUDGES' J., Summer
2002, at 7. The recusal requirement is also troubling, however, as it penalizes the speech of the
candidate by eliminating his authority to serve in cases that matter to him. It also penalizes voters who
have elected a judicial candidate precisely because of his views on the issue he will be precluded from
adjudicating. These penalties would be justified by the same interests-judicial impartiality and
independence-that are insufficient to justify bans on speech, so it is unclear why the recusal rule would
necessarily be constitutional. But see Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (enforcing higher
statutory standards of recusal than constitutionally required).
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perfectly constitutional, but often preferable to having an open-minded one. Of
course, the litigant who happens to be urging the outcome disfavored by the
judge will not be pleased by the judge or his (likely) 268 decision.269
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the judicial system, a judge who knows
enough about a subject to have an opinion is more likely to render a thoughtful
decision than one who has not thought about the issue until reading the parties'
270briefs. Speech restrictions are designed to combat not only the judge who
seeks to declare a particular party victorious, but also the judge who seeks to
construct a particular view of the law. The restrictions react with hostility to
judges who wish to say, "I have studied this issue, and I am convinced that this
provision of law should be interpreted to mean X." But what possible reason
could there be to cast aside that judge as "biased" or an "ideologue 271 and
replace him with a judge who says, "Gee, I've never thought about that before.
I guess I'll decide the issue when it's presented to me"?
272
In his Laird v. Tatum memorandum, then-Justice Rehnquist explained the
disadvantages of requiring open-minded judges.
Since most judges come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be
unusual if they had not by that time formulated at least some tentative notions that
would influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the
Constitution and their interaction with one another. It would not be merely unusual,
but extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues
in their previous legal careers. Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the
268. Judges may change their minds upon reflecting on issues during litigation. Perhaps the most
famous example of a judge switching sides is Justice Jackson's contradiction between his opinions as
Attorney General, see 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 504 (1940), and as a Justice, see McGrath v. Kristensen, 340
U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring), on whether an alien taking a temporary, overnight stay in
the United States was "residing" here. Justice Jackson explained his switch by quoting Lord Westbury as
saying, "I am amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an opinion."
Id. at 178. For a more recent example, see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 611 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Since Walton [v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)], I have acquired new wisdom.., or, to
put it more critically, have discarded old ignorance.").
269. See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 95, at 833-34.
270. See Michael Kinsley, Liar or Boob?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1991, at 4 (discussing the
Thomas confirmation hearings and arguing that "someone so heroically unreflective about the
Constitution" as not to have an opinion on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would be unqualified for
the Supreme Court); see also Tribe, Foreword, supra note 262, at 19 ("A nominee whose record is too
pale to read with the naked eye or whose views are shrouded in fog too dense for anything but the klieg
lights of national television to pierce is probably ill-suited for a lifetime seat on the Supreme Court in
any event.").
271. Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judicial Nominations, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1092, 1100 (1991). As Judge Silberman explained, "[o]ften judges or prospective judges
are criticized for being ideologues because they have a relatively-and I emphasize relatively-coherent
view of the law's role in our society .... This so-called 'ideological' judge is juxtaposed to ... the judge
who decides each case on its merits .... [But] too often 'merits' means nonlegal merits." Id
272. Prospective Supreme Court nominee Herschel Friday apparently responded similarly when
questioned by Nixon administration officials about his legal views. According to John Dean, who was
then Counsel to the President, "[o]ften, [Friday] didn't have a clue what we were talking about, and
when he did, he didn't know how he felt about the matter because he'd never thought about it." JOHN W.
DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED
THE SUPREME COURT 159 (2001). Dean further quoted Friday as saying, "John, you're going to have to
tell me what I should say on these issues. I want to be with the president." Id. at 160.
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Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would
be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.
273
Judge Frank earlier expressed the same sentiment: "An 'open mind,' in the
sense of a mind containing no preconceptions whatever, would be a mind
incapable of learning anything, would be that of an utterly emotionless human
being, corresponding roughly to the psychiatrist's descriptions of the feeble-
minded.,
274
All this assumes that the candidate is confessing ignorance honestly. Surely
we can all agree that it would be better to have a judicial candidate who
forthrightly states his views than to have one who holds the same views but
falsely says he has none.275 But the effect of candidate speech restrictions is to
make all candidates appear not to hold views on legal issues, lessening the
possibility that voters will be able to distinguish the truly ignorant candidate
from the open-minded candidate, or from the fraud, or from the candidate who
would discuss his well-considered legal views if only he were allowed to do
so. 2 76 As one commentator has opined, "[w]e should be wary of a regime of
rules that encourages evasiveness and double-talk in public discourse about
government affairs.
277
A judge whose thoughts on legal issues are known can be confronted and
perhaps convinced by attorneys who can focus on the arguments likely to be
278relevant to the judge. And where no amount of persuasion will do the trick,
perhaps the judge was right all along, and the issue was open-and-shut. To
carry the point to its extreme, a judge need not be open-minded on the question
whether the President may be elected at age twenty-two. Indeed, it would be far
273. Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 95, at 835 (emphasis added).
274. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943).
275. See Tribe, supra note 262, at 18 ("It hardly fosters fairness to claim that a mind is completely
neutral when in fact a lifetime of experiences has unavoidably inclined it one way or the other .... );
Thomas Penfield Jackson, Don't Gag the Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View&c=LawArticle&ci
d=1032128672961&t=LawArticle (last visited May 5, 2003) ("The only genuine determinant ofjudicial
impartiality is the integrity of the judge himself, not appearances, and a reputation for candor is a better
gauge of integrity than a reputation for silence."); Kinsley, supra note 270 (arguing that then-Judge
Thomas was either being deceptive when he denied discussing Roe v. Wade, thereby rendering him
unqualified for the Court as an "outright liar[]," or he was telling the truth and thereby exhibiting a lack
of knowledge about the Constitution that rendered him unqualified). Justice Thomas continues to receive
criticism for his allegedly false statements that he had never taken positions on controversial legal
issues. See, e.g., ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 355-56, 370-71, 374-
75 (2001) (analyzing Justice (then-Judge) Thomas's denials of engaging in discussions concerning
abortion, and concluding that the denials were false).
276. See Plymouth Nelson, Note, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota's Canon 5 Keeps Incumbents
High and Dry While Voters Flounder in a Sea of Ignorance, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1607, 1640
(2002) ("[I]sn't there great[] harm in the candidate in fact harboring partisan feelings of which the voter
knows and can know nothing? If a particular partisan candidate wanted to deceptively 'play'
independent as an election strategy, he could hide behind Canon 5, citing it as the reason he 'can't
answer that question."').
277. W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial Election
Campaigns, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 99 (2001).
278. See Chemerinsky, supra note 225, at 745.
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better to select a judge who has actually read the Constitution and discovered
the incontrovertible answer to the question. 279 Nothing "guarantees a litigant
that each judge will start off from dead center in his willingness or ability to
reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with his understanding of the
Constitution and the law." 280 In other words, while there may be no "higher
governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary, ' 281
judicial quality is not impaired (indeed, it is improved) by judges who have
given thought to legal issues prior to their ascension to the bench or outside of
the narrow context of case adjudication. 282 Accordingly, speech restrictions fail
the narrow tailoring test of strict scrutiny.
Because speech restrictions do not root out actual bias, but only outward
manifestations of it, a judge with predetermined views on legal issues may be
selected to serve in a state with restrictions, just as he might be selected in a
state without them, or in one with an entirely appointive judiciary. The
difference, then, is that lawyers and litigants in states with restrictions will be
unaware of the judge's predilections-the predilections themselves will always
be present. 283 The candidate speech restrictions, therefore, insofar as they
merely mask preexisting biases, do not even serve the phony due process
interest of open-mindedness cited by the restrictions' supporters.
2. "We Want No Judiciary Independent of the People"284
The next question in evaluating whether judicial candidate speech
restrictions are constitutional is whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest in allowing the candidate to act independently as a
judge. There appear to be two forms of independence that speech restrictions
279. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that the minimum age of the President is thirty-five).
This hypothetical assumes away any issues of legitimate dispute, including, for example, a litigant's
standing to raise a claim based on the president's immaturity.
280. Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 95, at 839; see also Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398
U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional
spectrum; and a particular judge's emphasis may make a world of difference ...."); Nelson, supra note
276, at 1634 ("Each side's goal is to select a judge who, though fair and impartial, has an underlying
value system that more or less represents that side's views and will be used to interpret existing laws.").
281. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in judgment).
282. See United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying motion for recusal)
("[A] judge's interest or expertise in a given area, or his methods of informing himself as to a given area
of the law, do not constitute grounds for recusal unless they come within some other specific grounds for
recusal."); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Passengers of Palsgraf, in THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN
JUDICIAL ETHICS 22, 33 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston eds., 1993) ("It is not considered
improper for a judge to hear argument about the governing law outside of the interested lawyers'
presence, for in hearing others debate the rule applicable in a real case the judge is supposed to be
looking at principles larger than particular litigants.").
283. See Chemerinsky, supra note 225, at 744-45.
284. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849-50, at 268 (1850) (statement of James Guthrie),
quoted in Nelson, supra note 70, at 218 (capitalization added).
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seek to protect. First, according to the restrictions, judges should feel free to
decide cases according to the law without fear that application of an unpopular
law will cost them their jobs. Second, judges must feel free to decide cases
based on the law, regardless of what they may have said in an earlier campaign.
The second form of independence relates closely to the argument about the
"impartiality" of a judge who has committed himself on an issue. It, therefore,
will not be covered in this section, but will be analyzed later in Subsection
IV.B.2, when the appearance of judicial independence is considered against the
demands of an elected and accountable judiciary.
The first form of judicial independence will be the subject of this section.
Tocqueville, in his classic Democracy in America, recognized judicial elections
as a threat to independence, and predicted that the result would be an "attack[]"
on "the democratic republic itself., 285 Tocqueville and scores of commentators
since his time have sought to preserve judicial independence from the fancy of
majority will. Under this traditional view, independence must be ensured
because a judge will not be free to adhere to unpopular laws if an opposing
candidate can attack the judge in a campaign, blaming him for actions that are
required as part of his profession. But states that have adopted judicial elections
have accepted a different paradigm by rejecting single-minded pursuit of
independence in favor of a system forcing judges to be accountable to the
public.
Such a focus on accountability may be entirely appropriate, given the range
of decisions available to judges, and the concomitant ability of judges to exert
influence over policy. By eliminating from campaigns any conflict over cases
or legal issues, speech restrictions seek to insulate judges from criticism and
minimize the extent to which a judge has a choice in deciding cases. Speech
restrictions thus promote the view that judges merely follow the law, and, for
that reason, the choice of judge makes little difference. They also promote the
notion of a judiciary as high-minded and above playing to the electorate. 286 In
short, judicial speech restrictions are justified on the ground that judges are not
politicians, and should not have to justify their substantive decisions the way a
politician should justify his decisions to the voters.
Political science, however, has demonstrated this model of independent
judicial decisionmaking to be false, at least in the high-profile cases that have
285. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
286. See Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers of
Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861-1899, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-
CIVIL WAR AMERICA 29, 34 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) ("If the function of appellate judging is
considered essentially technical, then popular election and limited tenure in office thrust unwanted and
undesirable political considerations into the selection process and, ultimately, into the performance of
the judicial role."). If, however, this "technical" conception is rejected for one more realistic, "then
popular election offers a legitimate means of ensuring judicial accountability through the political
process." Id.
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been the subject of studies, and has shown that judges in fact often behave like
politicians. Scholarship, summarized below, shows that elected judges, just like
other politicians, tailor their decisionmaking to the necessities of campaigns,
changing their behavior in response to the expected reaction of the electorate.
287
A reasonable response to these studies might be to lengthen judicial tenure and
provide more independence to judges. 288 Such a reform would allow judges to
make decisions further removed from a specific campaign and specific
campaign promises, while still allowing the public to influence judicial policy
through their votes. But silencing critics who wish to campaign on legal issues
gives voters the false impression that judges are not politicians, or that policy
will be unaffected by the results of judicial elections. Moreover, silencing
candidates will increase the impact of independent advocates, for whom speech
limitations are all but certainly unconstitutional-an effect that may distort
voters' information and ultimately may distort the outcomes of elections.
Political scientist Melinda Gann Hall has shown repeatedly that judges alter
their behavior depending on the judicial selection system used for their
courts.289 Professor Hall analyzed state court decisions in four states to
determine the conditions under which judges would be willing to express
dissent from decisions affirming death sentences. She found that judges who
felt the need to appease conservative voters were less likely to dissent than
were judges who were more removed from electoral pressures. 29 Specifically,
Professor Hall discovered that "voting with the majority in conservative death
penalty cases is associated with a district-based electoral system, obtaining a
smaller percentage of the vote in the election preceding the decision, being in
the last two years of a term, having prior representational experience and
having participated in judicial reelection campaigns." 29 1 Her additional studies
confirmed the force of those factors, and found additionally that judges were
more likely to vote to uphold death sentences where they had previous
prosecutorial experience, where their states' murder rates were high, and where
their terms were short.29 2 Professor Hall's research provides additional
287. This is not to say that electoral politics is the sole, or even the strongest, factor in judicial
decisionmaking. It does, however, influence decisions to a statistically significant degree, as shown by
the studies discussed below.
288. See Schotland, Comment, supra note 77, at 153 ("Unduly short terms.., do not merely
challenge judicial independence-they are inconsistent with it.").
289. See Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and
a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1123 (1987).
290. State supreme courts (as opposed to individual judges), however, do not appear to vary their
decisions to benefit discernible classes of litigants depending on the system of judicial selection
employed. See Burton M. Atkins & Henry Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State Supreme Court
Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974).
291. Hall, supra note 233, at 438-39.
292. See Hall, Justices as Representatives, supra note 79, at 497; Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace,
The Vicissitudes of Death by Decree: Forces Influencing Capital Punishment Decision Making in State
Supreme Courts, 75 Soc. ScI. Q. 136, 148 (1994); see also John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial
Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 500-
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evidence that lengthier terms of office promote judicial independence and may
do a better job in achieving that goal than do speech restrictions.
Not only is the act of judging inextricably tied to politics, but the process of
selecting judges is inherently political, in the sense that competing interests will
understand the impact that a particular judge will have on decisions, and will
act accordingly to seat judges with whom they agree and prevent the election or
appointment of judges with different views. Particularly as courts increasingly
involve themselves in divisive political issues and decline to leave questions of
policy to legislatures,293 every observer knows that a potential judge's judicial
philosophy can impact the lives of everyone under the jurisdiction of the
court. For that reason, public involvement in issues confronting courts-
particularly state courts, for which their duties are unquestionably to shape the
law and not merely interpret it-should be accepted as part of popular
sovereignty, not shunned as part of mob rule.295
The role of politics in judicial selection is not a new discovery, and even in
the federal system, where impartiality and independence are at their apexes,
presidents from Washington forward have chosen nominees based on their
judicial philosophies. 296 The Senate has confirmed and rejected nominees for
02 (1999) (concluding that politics plays a part in appellate adjudication of appeals from death
sentences).
293. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 126 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
Mentor Books 1956) (1835) ("Scarcely any political question arises in the United States which is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?: The
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237
(2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court has become less willing to invoke the political question doctrine
and accordingly is involving itself in decisions that otherwise would be left to the other two branches).
See generally WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 161-245 (1988); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (5th ed. 2000).
294. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 138-41 (1985).
295. See EDWIN ARTHUR MILES, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN MISSISSIPPI 42 (1960) (quoting a
nineteenth century Missippian as stating that his state's constitution, in providing for the election of
appellate judges, "is the subject of ridicule in all the States where it is known. It is referred to as a full
definition of mobocracy").
296. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (4th ed. 1999); 1 LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-08 (3d ed. 2000) ("The process of appointment... is
entirely political."); John Anthony Maltese, The Presidency and the Judiciary, in THE PRESIDENCY AND
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 499 (Michael Nelson ed., 5th ed., 1998). The most notorious episode of
outcome-oriented judicial selection was President Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, which
would have allowed him to appoint six Justices who would have upheld the New Deal against
constitutional challenge. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-162 (1995); Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Fireside Chat on Plan (Mar. 9, 1937), 1937 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 122 (1941), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL
HISTORY 182, 183 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989). Although the Court-packing plan failed to become
law, Roosevelt was eventually able to appoint nine Justices, who upheld the New Deal against
constitutional challenge despite troublesome precedent.
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the same reason. 297 Politics is not excluded from an appointive selection
system; it is at the forefront. 298 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has written, "it is...
both normal and desirable for presidents to attempt to pack the Court" so that
some measure of public input might influence the Court's direction.
299
If it is impossible to remove politics from appointive selection systems, it is
positively ludicrous to think that politics can be removed from elective systems,
even were such a result desirable. As the recitation of history in Part II
demonstrated, however, removing politics from the judiciary was not the goal
of those who established judicial elections. States adopted judicial elections
largely as a way of freeing their judges from dependence on other politicians.
Allowing the people of a state, rather than the governor or the legislature, to
assess the political acceptability of a potential judge permitted the elected judge
to make rulings that were unpopular with mayors, governors, and legislators
(though perhaps not with party bosses), confident that he could retain his job
without winning over those politicians.300 Elections did not eliminate the
capacity for influence on a judge's decisions-they merely changed the group
most likely to do the influencing from government officials to the electorate.
30
'
With the concept of reelection, however, there was an additional threat to
independence that was (and is) absent from the federal system and all systems
297. See generally JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
(1995); MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATIONS 129-59 (1994); SIMON, supra note 262; TRIBE, supra note 294, at 77-92. Professor
Abraham's alteration of the title of his work to Justices, Presidents, and Senators from Justices and
Presidents may reflect an increasingly acute recognition of the role of the upper house in the
consideration of nominees. See ABRAHAM, supra note 296.
298. See, e.g., JACK W. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 29-31 (1955);
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 9-10 (1955); Michael Gerhardt, The
Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 397 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)) ("[P]olitics drives
the confirmation process by constitutional design."); see also, e.g., Julius Uehlein & David H.
Wilderman, Why Merit Selection Is Inconsistent with Democracy, 106 DICK. L. REV. 769, 770 (2002)
("[lI]t cannot be seriously argued that appointment by a commission or governor is less political [than
popular election]; it is simply less public."). See generally, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); JOHN MASSARO,
SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS (1990); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988) (describing the Reagan administration's system of
selecting judicial nominees); JAMES F. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD
NIXON'S AMERICA (1973); TRIBE, supra note 294; DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (describing the
selection of Justices since the beginning of the Truman administration).
299. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 236 (1987). Chief
Justice Rehnquist himself was appointed to the Court in part due to his philosophy. See DEAN, supra
note 272; RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 424 (1978) (noting Rehnquist's
"moderately conservative philosophy" as a factor weighing in Nixon's decision to nominate him to the
Court).
300. See Nelson, supra note 70, at 205-07.
301. See id. at 217 ("[S]upporters of the elective system tended to believe that influences of some




giving judges life tenure. The possibility of a reelection challenge meant that
judges would be vulnerable if a decision met with public disfavor. A judge was
therefore no longer free to make decisions in accordance with his view of the
law, if he thought such a decision would cost him his job.3°2
A similar threat to independence would present itself, however, in an
appointive system where judges were subject to periodic reappointment. 30 3 In
such a system, there would be the same danger that judges would tailor their
decisions to appease the appointing authority 304 the same way judges now are
feared to tailor their decisions to appease the electorate. 30 5 Thus, the threat to
judicial independence, in the sense of subservience to the authority that can
remove the judge from the bench, is only marginally more present in a system
306
of judicial elections than in one with appointments. The threat to
independence is generated primarily by short judicial tenures-not by the
selection system or the discussion of legal issues during campaigns-and even
tenure "during good Behaviour" can occasionally be an insufficient safeguard
of independence from political attacks.
30 7
302. See generally Karlan, supra note 28, at 538-40 (describing the coercive force of threats to a
judge's wealth and job).
303. The presence of an opponent may result in heightened political pressure on a candidate in an
election compared to the political pressure on a prospective judge in an appointive system. Additionally,
there is the possibility that the public will be more easily fooled by caricatures of (and lies about) a
judge's record than would a legislature or governor making a reappointment. On the other hand,
however, members of the public in a state with appointed judges could be inspired by deceptive
advertising to contact the legislature or governor, and demand the judge's retention or rejection, in
which case the effect of insulating judges from the direct influence of the electorate would be
minimized.
304. See Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, State Supreme Courts and Their Environments:
Avenues to General Theories of Judicial Choice, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 284 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) ("Judges
required to win reappointment pursue strategies to enhance their chances for reappointment, such as not
taking on the other branches of government in the game of separation of powers and being far more
attentive to elite political preferences than judges selected under different institutional arrangements.").
305. These fears appear to be well justified. See supra notes 287-292 and accompanying text.
306. In fashioning the Constitution's plan for presidential selection, the Framers recognized that
periodic reappointment constitutes a serious threat to the independence of the appointed official. They
therefore considered the idea of having the President initially appointed by the national legislature and
reappointed by an electoral college, before they concluded that even that design would make the
President too dependent on the will of the legislature. See McDONALD, supra note 4, at 169.
307. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV.
POL. 369 (1992) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court does not consistently exercise independence
when faced with intense congressional opposition). The fiasco surrounding U.S. District Judge Harold
Baer, Jr. would appear particularly instructive on the incomplete "independence" of appointed judges.
Judge Baer excluded evidence of a criminal defendant's drug running, concluding that the defendant's
flight from police was reasonable and therefore did not give police sufficient cause to stop the suspect.
See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In part, the ruling was based on Judge
Baer's conclusion that residents in Washington Heights, Manhattan, where the incident occurred,
"tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent." Id. at 242. Political reaction was swift
and harsh. Legislative leaders called for Judge Baer's impeachment, and Mike McCurry, President
Clinton's press secretary, suggested that the President might ask for Judge Baer's resignation. See
Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge To Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al. Other judges
stood behind Judge Baer, defending the "independence" of the judiciary from this "extraordinary
intimidation," Don Van Natta Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996,
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In states with judicial elections and periodic reelections, the imposition of
judicial "independence" through speech restrictions effectively results in the
undermining of the elections themselves. Any system of reelections makes the
candidates dependent on the approval of voters, something inconsistent with
the political insulation often thought to be synonymous with judicial
independence. 3° 8 As demonstrated above, 30 9 however, reformers were not so
hopelessly naYve as to believe that they could replace appointment with election
and eliminate, rather than change the recipients of, judicial genuflecting. A
substantial portion of the class of reformers pushed for judicial elections
expressly for the purpose of making judges accountable to the masses, rather
than the political elites, and the others who concurred in the adoption of judicial
elections realized that there was the potential for the public to exert political
influence through the ballot box. Voters may not constitutionally be limited to
voting for or against candidates on the basis of only certain characteristics;
judicial elections make judges "accountab[le] for whatever the public bloody
well wants." 310 Accordingly, speech restrictions, inconsistent as they are with
at B 1, but Judge Baer reversed his prior decision and decided not to suppress the evidence. See United
States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Joyce Price & Warren Strobel, Judge Bows to
Critics, Reverses Drug Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al. As the title of the Price and Strobel
article suggests, the reversal led many in the country, including counsel for the defendant, to hypothesize
that the political pressure facing Judge Baer affected his decision. See, e.g., Price & Strobel, supra
(quoting Bayless's counsel as stating his belief that "[t]he outside pressure ... influenced him [Judge
Baer]").
Whether anyone-be it the electorate or an appointing authority-should be able to replace a judge,
such as Judge Baer, whose decisions are far out-of-step with the preferences of the public, may depend
on whether one believes that the political officials were wrong for challenging Judge Baer's ruling, or
whether Judge Baer brought the criticism on himself for delivering such a questionable decision.
Compare Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done amid Efforts To
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308 (1997), and
David Broder, Editorial, Politicians Shouldn't Threaten Judges, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Apr. 16,
1996, at B6, with ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 115 (1996) ("It has been the judiciary, and not its critics, that has misled the public
as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy."), James L. Buckley, The Constitution and the
Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 190 (criticizing the ABA's
Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence for "largely ignor[ing] the part
played by judicial overreaching in sparking the court-bashing it decried"), Edwin Meese III & Rhett
DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178 (1997), and William F. Buckley Jr., The
Phony Threat to Independence, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 17, 1996, at B3; see also supra notes 206-210 and
accompanying text. Put more generally, "[t]here may be some difficulty... ascertaining whether public
confidence in the judiciary eroded because of campaign activity, or whether both the public's lack of
confidence and the campaign activity are responses to the roles judges have been playing." Federalist
Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, House of Delegates Preview: Summary of New Policy
Positions To Be Considered in August, ABA WATCH, Aug. 2002, at 3.
308. See, e.g., Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary:
An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 843-44 (1994).
309. See supra Part II.
310. Symposium, supra note 208, at 325 (statement of panelist Erik Jaffe); see also id. at 327
("When the public votes, there is no such thing as bad reasons."). States with judicial elections have
already accepted that irrelevant "reasons" govern a substantial number of votes in judicial elections.
Voters rely on information as useless as ballot position and as controversial as ethnic and gender
stereotyping when making their selections. If voting for a judge on the basis of race is permitted (one
might say encouraged, given the lack of other available data, see Howard A. Scarrow, Vote Dilution,
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the periodic assessment of judicial performance, cannot stand.
Simply put, states adopting judicial elections have rejected an
"independent" judiciary. 311 The superiority of an independent judiciary,
championed by policymakers and commentators defending speech restrictions,
is a political theory with an impressive pedigree, but the First Amendment
protects Americans who wish to evaluate its continued performance. 31 2 And
while an independent judiciary can boast of its protections for minority
interests against the sometimes tyrannical majority, 31 3 such independence is not
constitutionally mandated. (If it were, judicial elections would be
unconstitutional interferences with that independence, whether accompanied by
speech restrictions or not.) Invocation of judicial independence in justification
of campaign limitations therefore fails to explain why that independence is a
sufficiently grave interest to override claims to engage in political speech.
"[G]overnmental abridgment of liberty is always undertaken with the very
best of announced objectives ... and often with the very best of genuinely
intended objectives., 314 Speech restrictions are undoubtedly enacted with the
best intentions of ensuring that courts promote justice for all litigants, but the
desirability of an independent judiciary does not allow the government to
silence those with an alternate view.315 Indeed, the very concept of an
Party Dilution, and the Voting Rights Act: The Search for "Fair and Effective Representation, " in THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 232, at 51 ("In [nonpartisan or
primary] elections, voters could not distinguish candidates by their party labels; instead, candidates
could be identified only by their personal characteristics, such as race.")), a state's plea to keep issues
out of its elections borders on the incredible. Indeed, studies show that not only voter choices, but voter
turnout is affected by the presence of a minority candidate. See Burton Atkins et al., State Supreme
Court Elections: The Significance of Racial Cues, 12 AM. POL. Q. 211, 221-22 (1976). If issues were
made a part of campaigns, perhaps candidates could find another, less noxious, way of identifying with
voters than by using race. See Symposium, Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform, 33 U.
TOL. L. REv. 335, 350-51 (2002) (statement of Roy A. Schotland) (decrying (and giving examples of)
racist pandering in judicial campaigns).
311. See D.J. Tice, Judges' Bush-League Elections Face Big-League Challenge, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Feb. 6, 2002 ("Every argument for restricting how candidates for judgeships can campaign is an
argument as to why judges shouldn't be elected at all."), quoted in Katherine A. Moerke, Sacrificing
Judicial Power on an Altar of Judicial Independence: Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 47, 69 (2001).
312. There continues to be criticism of the independence of appointed, life-tenured judges. See,
e.g., BORK, supra note 307, at 117; Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REv. 397 (1999).
313. See Penny J. White, An America Without Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 174, 177
(1997) ("[T]hose who want judges to rule based on majority public opinion have never been in the
minority."). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (noting that unaccountable courts act in a countermajoritarian
fashion, and arguing that such action makes courts susceptible to charges of illegitimacy).
314. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also id ("[D]ictators promise to bring order, not tyranny."); Fla. Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Self-assurance has always been the hallmark of a
censor. That is why under the First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to
decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence.").
315. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The suggestion that the government
has an interest in shaping the political debate by insulating the electorate from too much exposure to
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individual right requires government to allow an individual to exercise that
right "even when the majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when
the majority would be worse off for having it done." 316
For states that reject judicial independence and instead opt for an
accountable judiciary, there is no constitutional way for political elites to limit
the items of discussion during judicial elections, and thereby ram judicial
independence down the throats of an unwilling public and unwilling
candidates. Speech restrictions should not be permitted to take away rights
necessary to the fulfillment of judicial accountability, where states have chosen
accountability as a goal.
From the foregoing* discussion, it is clear that issue-based judicial
campaigns do not necessarily impinge on a litigant's constitutional right to an
impartial adjudicator, and do not detract from the independence of the judiciary
appreciably more than does a system of periodic reappointment. Moreover,
issue-based campaigns may benefit future litigants, in that thoughtful and
learned judicial candidates would be able to exhibit their knowledge during
campaigns and thereby attract votes. Even if issue-based elections do not attract
(or result in the selection of) more knowledgeable candidates, litigants arguing
before judges will know the inclinations of the judges, and will be able to plan
their arguments accordingly. Protecting litigants, therefore, provides an
insufficient constitutional justification for limiting the speech of judicial
candidates.
As public knowledge of a judge's predetermined views may impact public
esteem for the court system, however, even if those statements do not impact
litigants' rights, I next turn to the question whether speech restrictions can
claim a compelling interest in preserving the appearance of judicial
impartiality and independence.
certain views is incompatible with the First Amendment."); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 51 (1988) ("The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea."); cf Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that vote dilution claims
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have improperly engaged courts in the "hopeless project of
weighing questions of political theory" in establishing the baseline effectiveness of an "undiluted" vote).
Just as judges should not be in the business of choosing representational structures based on their ideals
of political participation, neither should they force states to choose an independent judiciary to maintain
fidelity to the judges' ideals of constraining majority rule.
316. RONALD DwORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194 (1977); see also, e.g., Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.").
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B. Preserving the Appearance of Independence and Impartiality
Buckley v. Valeo3 17 recognized a compelling interest in quelling both
corruption and the appearance of corruption,3 18 and the Court has elsewhere
recognized that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice., 319 One
commentator has suggested that "[b]ecause public confidence is so essential to
maintaining the integrity of the bench, even the appearance of bias,
parochialism, or favoritism can threaten the judicial function." 320  Justice
Stevens echoed these sentiments in his Bush v. Gore dissent, stating that "the
true backbone of the rule of law" was "confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system,"321 which he believed was being eroded by
calling into question the objectivity of courts.322
Those who would restrict speech in judicial elections have focused intently
on the importance of maintaining the appearance of courts as impartial centers
for dispute resolution, free of the corrupting influence of "special interests" and
their money.323 Mere loss of faith in the independence of the judiciary, theysay, even without actual bias, can lead to a rejection of the rule of law, because
317. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
318. See id. at 26, 66-67.
319. Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
320. Sherrilyn A. Ifil, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REv. 606, 611 (2002); see also, e.g., Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial
Independence-An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835, 839 (2002) ("[I]f the public ever perceives
that the court bases its decisions on factors other than the evidence, the laws, and the Constitution, it will
lose its respect for the law. And when the public loses its respect for the law, we lose the centripetal
force that binds us to our nationhood.").
321. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322. See id. at 128-29. The alternative argument is, of course, that the courts issuing result-oriented
decisions have called their own objectivity into question, and stifling critics serves only to perpetuate
lawless judging. See supra notes 206-210, 307, and accompanying text; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution."). One need not place the blame on either courts or critics, however, to recognize that the
public has lost confidence in judges as pure expositors of the law. Very few observers, for example, saw
as the least bit objective the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc.
v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J.) (allowing the ballot substitution of Democratic candidates for the U.S.
Senate under an admittedly "liberal[] constru[ction]" of the relevant statute), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 673
(2002), or the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772
So. 2d 1220, 1227 (Fla. 2000) (explicitly eschewing "hyper-technical reliance upon statutory
provisions"), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), and
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev'dsub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
323. See, e.g., In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 399-400 (Wash. 1988); cf SMITH, supra note 7, at 52
(noting that "many [campaign finance] reform advocates seem to consider it 'corruption' if a lawmaker
merely votes in a manner consistent with the desires of those groups or individuals that have contributed
to his or her campaign-unless, of course, the reform-minded advocate thinks that the position is
correct, in which case it becomes a vote on principle"). Professor David Barnhizer, who favors the
abolition ofjudicial election speech restrictions, would allow free candidate speech so as to minimize the
influence of special interests. According to him, the current "muzzling of judicial candidates" favors
special interests by denying everyone else relevant information. See Barnhizer, supra note 231, at 420-
21.
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litigants will settle their disputes in other, less socially desirable fora. 32 4 Thus
have courts and writers cautioned that the sky is falling: "To distrust the
judiciary marks the beginning of the end of society." 325 In my view, however,
states that have rejected the federal model of judicial independence have
necessarily accepted (if not celebrated) that some level of electoral
accountability will play a part in their judges' decisions. Accordingly, because
there is nothing "corrupt" about the functioning of democracy, limiting speech
so as to conceal the part that electoral politics does play in judicial decisions
cannot be constitutionally justified.
1. Judges as "Representatives" and Policymakers
In her White dissent, Justice Ginsburg drew a sharp distinction between the
representative function of politicians and the independent, deliberative role of
courts: "Legislative and executive officials act on behalf of the voters who
placed them in office; 'judges represent the Law."' 326 According to Justice
Ginsburg, "[e]ven when they develop common law or give concrete meaning to
constitutional text, judges act only in the context of individual cases, the
outcome of which cannot depend on the will of the public." 327 Justice
Ginsburg's ideal of independent judging undergirds the rationale for speech
restrictions that insulate judges from the public, but it vastly underestimates the
judicial capacity for policymaking and the role played by public opinion in
influencing judicial decisions.
In fact, in another context, the Court itself held that judges act as
"representatives." In Chisom v. Romer328 it was Justice Stevens (a dissenter in
White) who authored the opinion of the Court holding that judges were
"representatives" for purposes of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.329
324. See The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct
and the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649, 657 (2002). See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE
APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974) (stressing the importance of public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary)
325. HONORk DE BALZAC, SPLENDEURS ET MIStRES, quoted in OTTO KIRCHEIMER, POLITICAL
JUSTICE, in THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE, supra note 282, at 51. There is no empirical support, however, for
the proposition that public support for the judiciary depends on the public seeing judges as impartially
finding the law. See Mark Kozlowski, Should the Regulation of Judicial Candidate Speech Regarding
Legal and Political Issues Be Reconsidered?, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 161, 172 (2001); Snyder, supra note
221, at 241-43 (noting the lack of empirical support for the proposition that public support for the
judiciary depends on the public seeing judges as impartially finding the law); Wendel, supra note 277, at
85. This is to be distinguished from private fundraising for judicial campaigns, which does concern a
substantial portion of the public. See supra note 232; Kozlowski, supra, at 172.
326. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Chisom v. Romer, 501 U.S. 380, 411 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also, e.g., E. Norman Veasey,
The Many Facets of Judicial Independence, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 779, 790 (2001) ("The only
constituent a judge should have is the rule of law.").
327. White, 536 U.S. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also would treat judges
differently from legislative and executive officials. See id at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2002). The Chisom opinion did not consider the constitutionality of
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According to the Court, "[t]he fundamental tension between the ideal character
of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved
by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while
simultaneously requiring them to run for elective office." 330 Justice Scalia, in
dissent, protested that "it is the prosecutor who represents 'the People'; the
judge represents the Law-which often requires him to rule against the
People."
33 1
332Yet in White the roles were reversed. Justice Scalia wrote for a Court that
included the two other Chisom dissenters, and Justice Stevens was in dissent,
joined by Justice Souter, who had joined him in the Chisom majority.333 It was
Justice Scalia in White who criticized the "complete separation of the judiciary
from the enterprise of 'representative government,"' 334 and Justice Stevens who
termed the judicial office "fundamentally different from that occupied by
policymaking officials."
335
Whether judges "represent" constituencies or not, 3 36 however, a century of
scholarship shows there is surely no "fundamental[] differen[ce]" between their
position and the position of "policymaking officials." 337 Nearly forty years ago,
famed political scientist Walter Murphy declared that "[a]s long as law remains
one of the most common means of formalizing public policy, the judicial office
in the United States will involve political, i.e., policy-making power. ' 338 In the
years since his path-breaking Elements of Judicial Strategy, Murphy's
section 2; the Court merely construed the statute. See 501 U.S. at 390 & n.10.
330. Id. at 400-01. The Court held that voters whose votes in judicial elections were diluted could
maintain an action under section 2, because "'representatives' describes the winners of representative,
popular elections," 501 U.S. at 399, including elected judges. On the principles and doctrine underlying
vote dilution claims, see generally Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-51 (1986); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973); BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REv. 1663 (2001); Scarrow, supra note 310, at 42.
331. 501 U.S. at 411 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
332. My point here is not to imply that either Justice Stevens or Justice Scalia was being
inconsistent. Both Justices' positions in both cases are reconcilable. Justice Stevens evidently believes
that the Voting Rights Act used the term "representative" in a manner inconsistent with his personal
understanding of the term. The Constitution, in his view, protects rights to participate in the political
process for a category of elections (i.e., non-judicial) smaller than that protected by the Voting Rights
Act. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, evidently believes that the Voting Rights Act protects the right to
elect non-judicial "representatives," but that the First Amendment protects the rights to speak in
elections regardless of the office for which the candidates are competing.
333. Only Justice O'Connor was in the majority in both cases. Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer were appointed after the Chisom decision.
334. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002).
335. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. The analogy to U.S. senators and the electoral college (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 41-45), as independent-minded policymakers with a quasi-representative role, seems apt. An
individual senator or judge may be more or less representative of his constituency than his colleagues,
but there is little inherent in either position that makes it "representative" or not.
337. See Hall, supra note 233, at 444 ("[T]his research suggests that differences between judicial
institutions and other political institutions may not be as great as legal theory suggests.").
338. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 1 (1964).
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statement has been proven correct. Proponents of greater speech restrictions for
judicial candidates than would be constitutional in elections for other offices
must demonstrate that there are differences between the two types of positions
that result in a compelling interest in limiting judicial speech that is absent from
legislative and executive races. Judges, in other words, must be unlike
politicians, and the difference must be sufficiently weighty to strip judges, but
not other office holders, of the right to campaign for office.
But such an idealistic vision of the judicial process is not accurate, and has
been recognized as false for decades, 339 "dumped into the ashcan of history."
340
Judges do not decide cases solely on dispassionate analyses of the facts and
pre-existing rules of law.34 1 Instead, judges often make their decisions-
making the law-based on their own vision of what the law should be342 and
what they perceive as the electorate's vision of what the law should be. Judges
are, in short, policymaking politicians operating under a different set of
constraints in a different institutional environment from legislators and
executives,343 but, where elected, politicians nonetheless.
Contrary to what appears to be Professor Schotland's implication, 344 judges
are not always more constrained in their policymaking than are legislators.
Perhaps most importantly, it is in the nature of case adjudication in a common
law system that rules announced by courts would be impermissible ex post
339. English courts through the mid-fourteenth century did not even purport to be bound by any
external force of law, even when they were interpreting statutes. "First, the courts undoubtedly did
disregard statutes when they thought fit, and secondly, they expressed no principle of jurisprudence or
political theory which would serve as an explanation-still less as a reason-for their attitude."
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 70 (1922); see also THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 296 (2d ed. 1936). Judicial policymaking, relatively unconstrained by external law,
therefore has at least a 700-year pedigree.
340. CARTER, supra note 298, at 19.
341. Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has commented that the Warren Court's activism in
certain areas of constitutional law "contributed to the now widespread perception that there really is no
such thing as constitutional law, that it's all a matter of the philosophy of the particular judges who are
making the decision." Alex Kozinski, Spook of Earl: The Spirit and Specter of the Warren Court, in THE
WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 377, 384 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
342. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Segal and Spaeth predicted that "if a case on the outcome of a presidential
election should reach the Supreme Court.... the Court's decision might well turn on the personal
preferences of the justices." Id. at 70. Of course, scholars differ as to whether the Court's decision in the
eventual case-Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)-was based on more than the Justices' personal
preferences. See, e.g., BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002)
(containing contrasting essays); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (same).
343. Differences in institutions (even from elected court to elected court) affect judges and their
willingness to cast votes against the preferences of the electorate. See Hall & Brace, supra note 304, at
281. An institutionalist approach is helpful in analyzing the factors motivating judicial decisionmaking
more generally, as well. See Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes:
Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING,
supra note 304, at I.
344. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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facto laws and bills of attainder if enacted by legislatures. 345 Thus, while some
aspects of courts' institutional environments should act to constrain judges,
many institutional aspects emancipate judges, and allow them to pursue policy
goals by "rationally vot[ing] their sincere policy preferences" 346 and applying
them to specific favored or disfavored parties.
State supreme courts, though occasionally subject to correction by the
United States Supreme Court on issues of federal law, maintain considerable
freedom to mold state law. Legislative correction of court decisions is difficult
(perhaps even more so in common law issues that are traditionally the province
of state courts rather than legislatures), and judges' relatively insulated
electoral position allows them to push for reform with some immunity from
electoral challenge. Even if judges were universally more constrained in terms
of policymaking than legislators, however, it does not necessarily follow that
their campaign speech should be more constrained as well. It goes without
saying that speech restrictions of the kind championed by Professor Schotland
and others increase the degree to which judges will be free to make law
unconstrained by (i.e., independent from) the voters and external manifestations
of the law, thus ironically making public involvement in choosing judges more
imperative.
34 7
In the nineteenth century it was common for judges and lawyers to believe
that judges did not make, but rather "found" the law.348 This formulation was
reflected in Blackstone's Commentaries, 349 but in the ensuing centuries it has
345. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir.) (holding that a state law
forbidding a power company from charging its customers for costs associated with a past power outage
was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and noting that an "indispensable element of a bill of attainder
is its retrospective focus: it defines past conduct as wrongdoing and then imposes punishment on that
past conduct"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 619 (2002). Additionally, punitive damages awards assessed by
courts may be astronomically costly, thus impacting policy to a great degree, without triggering any but
the most deferential review under the Due Process Clause. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (plurality opinion) (holding that an award of punitive damages was not so
"grossly excessive" as to violate due process, but refusing to formulate a test that would indicate when
an award would be "grossly excessive"). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 71
U.S.L.W. 4282 (2003) (striking down a punitive damages award of $145 million as "grossly
excessive").
346. Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist
Model, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 304, at 237, 239; see also id. at 237 ("[T]he
legal discretion that exists in the type of cases that reaches the Court combines with institutional
incentives that favor independence to produce a Court that is capable of acting like 'single minded
seekers of legal policy."') (quoting Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323, 325 (1992)); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers
Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28 (1997) (arguing that
rarely must Supreme Court Justices vote strategically to avoid having their policy judgments overturned
by the political branches).
347. See supra Subsection IV.A.2. Professor Schotland is thus in the curious position of continually
calling attention to the institutional factors restraining judicial decisionmaking, while pressing for
speech restrictions that are designed to increase judicial "independence."
348. See generally Grey, supra note 58.
349. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (stating that courts should not "pronounce
a new law, but [] maintain and expound the old one").
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become so thoroughly discredited as to be passe,35° even "baffling." 351 Were it
not for the ABA's judicial canons352 and the scholarly commentary defending
them, 353 one would be hard pressed to find any knowledgeable observer who
believes in the "oracular" 354 theory that judges discover (and do not make)
law. 355 Nevertheless, because judicial candidate speech restrictions seek to
minimize the appearance of the judiciary's capacity for policymaking 356 (and
likewise seek to minimize the extent to which judges are free to impose their
policy preferences when deciding cases),357 it is necessary to illustrate the
350. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARY. L. REv. 1733, 1759 (1991) ("It would be only a slight exaggeration
to say that there are no more Blackstonians.").
351. Grey, supra note 58, at 16.
352. See Cafferata, supra note 8, at 1639, 1642, 1651 (arguing that the ABA's judicial canons
reflect a formalist vision of judging that is out-of-step with reality). The ABA's position is reflected in
its plea that judges "be faithful to the law." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (1990).
By implying that "a judge does nothing more than sit on a bench and find the appropriate, pre-existing
law to apply," Rowe, supra note 139, at 608, the Canons ignore the lawmaking function that judges have
been performing for centuries. See id. at 608-11.
353. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 231, at 384 ("Our 'practically wise' judges are best understood
as the priests of the Rule of Law.").
354. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN
JUDGES 8 (1976); see also id at 196-98 (describing the "demise" of the oracular conception of law in
the wake of the Lochner era).
355. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("While I do not subscribe to the Blackstonian theory that the law should be
taken to have always been what it is said to mean at a later time, I do believe that whether a new
constitutional rule is to be given retroactive... effect must [not] be determined... upon considerations
that are appropriate enough for a legislative body."). Even Justice Scalia, the veritable personification of
the desire to leave legislating to legislators, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 263, at 3, 9 (stating that judicial lawmaking "would be an
unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called
democracy"), and Justice Frankfurter, the paragon of judicial restraint, have refused to adopt
Blackstone's formulation. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were 'finding' it .. "); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 310 (Johnson Reprint 1972) (1928)
(arguing that a judge should "gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from reading life");
cf Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that deciding whether to apply a decision retroactively "presupposes a view of our decisions as
creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is" and arguing that such a view is an
incorrect interpretation of "the judicial Power" as granted in Article III of the Constitution). But see
Simon H. Rifkind, A Judge's Nonjudicial Behavior, 38 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 22-23 (1966) ("Judges are
regarded by the public as the custodians of a special body of knowledge. Like Egyptian priests who held
within their bosoms the secret of the Nile, so the judges, it is believed, possess knowledge and modes of
reasoning unavailable to the laity.").
356. The policymaking effect of U.S. Supreme Court decisions is unquestioned. See, e.g., Lino A.
Graglia, Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 171 (2000) ("It would be incredible,
if it were not true, that for the past four or five decades virtually every change in basic issues of
domestic social policy has come not from state or federal legislatures but from the U.S. Supreme
Court."); Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 179 (Anthony King ed., 1978).
357. Compare Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, The Case for Independence: Why Should We Care
About Independent and Accountable Judges, 61 OR. ST. BAR. BULL. 8, 11 (2001) ("In many settings, the
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effect of judges-particularly state court judges-on the development of the
law.
None of this, however, should be taken to imply that the judicial and
legislative branches operate in precisely the same manner. The two have
different areas of institutional competence, which argues for the maintenance of
a distinction between their functions. Furthermore, all courts are to some extent
bound by the pronouncements of other courts and the political branches. To
that extent, courts are not entirely free to make law as they see fit. As one noted
political scientist put it, "judging is something different from legislating or
administering.... [T]he judicial function is still interpretation and not
independent policy making. It is just as false to argue that judges freely
exercise their discretion as to contend they have no policy functions at all. 358
Nevertheless, because precedent, statutes, and constitutions can often be read in
multiple ways (and because courts are the ones to interpret limits on their own
power), a judicial choice is often required as to which precedent, or which
constitutional or statutory construction, should be followed in a given case.359
A judicial candidate who feels constrained by external authority from pledging
to decide a case consistent with his preferences (or those of the voters) can
always cite precedent or statute as tying his hands. But silencing judicial
candidates on all subjects treats the entire judicial function as the robotic
application of settled law, and that is clearly not an accurate portrayal of the
modem American judiciary.
The Supreme Court itself occasionally has admitted that its decisions are
sometimes not robotic applications of settled legal principles, but the shaping of
those legal principles in accordance with the Justices' personal policy
preferences. 360 In those instances, it is not the law, but "the feelings and
law is so clear that a consensus exists about what a judge would say the law is, whatever the prevailing
judicial philosophy."), with Richard L. Hasen, "'High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model
of Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1305, 1335 (1997) ("[M]ost
judges can vote their values, that is, act independently, most of the time, whether they are elected or
appointed.").
358. C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
RESEARCH 27, 42 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
359. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) ("Courts frequently view their
decisions as being 'controlled' or 'governed' by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable contrary
conclusions reached by other courts."); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 342, at 17-18 ("Assertions that
judicial decisions are objective, dispassionate, and impartial are obviously belied by the fact that
different courts and different judges do not decide the same question or issue the same way .... ").
Courts may-indeed should-go about answering the question of which authority to follow by using a
decidedly judicial method of analysis, that is, by consulting appropriate legal texts and not simply
exerting political will. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 105-08
(1983). But the fact that some judges exercise their responsibilities honorably does not mean that all do,
or that the electorate, if given the choice, would prefer the judicious option.
360. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977)) (stating that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should be informed by "our
own judgment"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (arguing that substantive due
process claims should be decided by "reasoned judgment," but maintaining that such a rule does not
leave courts "free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree"); see also RICHARD A.
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intuition of a majority of the Justices that count.' 361 Citation to authority or
legal principle is often a rationalization for a conclusion already reached, a
"game' 363 designed to decoy analysts into thinking that the decisions are other
than politically motivated and equal in effect, if not in form, to the decisions of
legislators. 364 As Professor Lino Graglia put it, "constitutional law is politics by
other means."
365
Policy-oriented decisionmaking is not the exclusive province of the federal
courts, and both state appellate and trial courts exercise considerable discretion
in the crafting of policy. Lawmaking by courts according to notions of public
policy may be entirely appropriate in adjudicating common law cases,3 66 and
there is even an argument that it should be employed in interpreting statutes
367
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 355 (1996) ("[M]any Supreme Court
opinions are at bottom merely expressions of personal predilection on debatable questions of social
policy.").
361. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 338, 122 S. Ct. at 2259 ("Seldom
has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.");
id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's assessment of the current legislative judgment
regarding the execution of defendants like petitioner more resembles a post hoc rationalization for the
majority's subjectively preferred result rather than any objective effort to ascertain the content of an
evolving standard of decency.").
362. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 215, 215-16 (1962) (noting the practice of judges
to reach results first and find reasoning to support that conclusion second); Antonin Scalia, Assorted
Canards of Contemporary LegalAnalysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 586 (1990) (arguing that the
canon of statutory interpretation requiring remedial statutes to be liberally construed is so
"indeterminate, as to both when it applies and what it achieves, that it can be used, or not used, or half-
used, almost ad libitum, depending mostly upon whether its use, or nonuse, or half-use, will assist in
reaching the result the court wishes to achieve").
363. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
364. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The most that
we [dissenters] can honestly say is that we disagree with the majority on their policy-judgment-couched-
as-law."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) ("If you ask
how [a judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life
itself."); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1991) (1881)
("[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the courts
declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds."); LLEWELLYN, supra
note 362, at 215 (questioning whether judges are "[d]elphic oracles, mere voices with a mission only of
accurate transmission [of the law], or whether, in sharpest contrast, you and your brethren are in the
nature of better-class politicians deciding cases the way you see fit while you just manipulate the
authorities to keep it all looking decent"); Joseph Kobylka, Abingdon School District v. Schempp, in
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 1 (Kermit L. Hall et al.
eds., 1992) (quoting U.S. Representative L. Mendell Rivers as accusing the Supreme Court of
"legislating-they never adjudicate-with one eye on the Kremlin and the other on the NAACP").
365. Graglia, supra note 356, at 176 (paraphrasing CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119 (Anatol
Rapoport, trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1832) ("War is a mere continuation of policy by other
means.")); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Power, not
reason, is the new currency of this Court's decision-making.").
366. See Scalia, supra note 355, at 18.
367. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405 (1989).
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(though that argument has not received anything close to universal
acceptance368). Every law student is, of course, aware of the grand debate about
whether policy and judges' views about social justice should drive
constitutional interpretation. 69 The fact that judges do use their policy
preferences to shape the law-properly or not 370-makes it critical, from a
democratic perspective, that the public be aware of the policy orientations of
the judges it selects.
If future litigants (as I have argued above) have no compelling interest in
muting judges to ensure their "independence" or "impartiality," the question of
the constitutionality of candidate speech restrictions reduces to whether it is a
compelling governmental interest to prop-up the judiciary on the pedestal of
neutral, objective decisionmaking, when such a model often fails to represent
the manner in which judges decide cases. 371 Judges, certainly, often feel the
need to cloak their decisions in objective legal language, obscuring the policy
determination at the heart of the decisions.372 This reluctance to admit the
judicial role in the policymaking process may indicate that policy-oriented
368. See generally, e.g., James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation, " 43 HARV. L. REv.
886, 892 (1930) ("It must be insisted that the legislative purposes and aims are the important guideposts
for statutory interpretation, not the desiderata of the judge."); Scalia, supra note 355, at 17-18 (arguing
that policy-oriented statutory interpretation results in undemocratic judicial lawmaking and not the
faithful application of statutory law).
369. Compare, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted as understood at the time of its
enactment), William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 4 (1976)
(same), and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989) (same), with,
e.g., TRIBE, supra note 296, § 1-15 (arguing for a flexible approach to constitutional interpretation
allowing the Constitution to reflect judges' values), LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (same), and William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, Address Before Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985) (same) (on
file at the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court of the United States). See generally
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
370. See Ely, supra note 7, at 835 (observing the difference between "the observation that judges in
fact allow their politics to affect their constitutional interpretations ... [and] the prescription that that's
what judges should do").
371. Case decision is the most noteworthy aspect of a judge's duties, but it is by no means the only
one. Policy preferences also play a role in other decisions made by courts, such as decisions whether to
grant review in a case, how much bail to require of a criminal defendant, etc. Empirical evidence
strongly indicates that in states where judges are subject to contested elections, judges' decisions
whether to grant review in cases are influenced by political considerations, specifically the likely impact
on the next election. See Paul Brace et al., Judicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions,
Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1265, 1289-92 (1999). Judges are also influenced
when their retention is within the power of political elites, so the effect is not simply confined to systems
of popular judicial election. See id at 1291. For discussions of matters affecting Supreme Court Justices'
decisions other than case outcomes, see generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE (1998); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions whether to grant certiorari).
372. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3
(1980) ("[T]he Court has always, when plausible, tended to talk an interpretivist line."); HOLMES, supra
note 364, at 35 ("The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned.").
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judges view their enterprise "to be of suspect legitimacy," 373 i.e., that judges are
supposed to do nothing more than apply the law. If lawmaking is considered an
illegitimate activity for judges, however, it is all the more important that voters
be able to assess which candidates would live up to the ideal (and also to assess
whether they wish to reform the ideal and grant judges more lawmaking
power).
Furthermore, all state court judges make policy, and accordingly voters for
each court level should be able to listen to a candidate who wishes to tell his
judicial philosophy. The policymaking nature of appellate courts is clear,374 but
trial courts also make policy in the way they deal with parties before them.
375
As political scientist Harold Spaeth put it, "[t]he local judge who invariably
sends drunken drivers to jail, the judge.., who throws the book only at
youthful drug offenders, and the judge who... make[s] life miserable for
errant spouses who fall behind in their child support and alimony payments-
all are making policy."376 This is made all the more true in an age when courts
are not only expected to settle private disputes, but are increasingly asked to
settle "grievance[s] about the content or conduct of policy-most often
governmental policy." 377 In this age of public law suits, judges-trial judges-
are issuing rulings that result in "a direct impact that extends far beyond the
immediate parties to the lawsuit.,
378
There can be no real argument that, as a positive matter, judges' personal
opinions (or at least their philosophies of judging, both of which are improper
subjects for discussion under some states' judicial codes) are not a significant
factor in their decisionmaking. Since at least379 the publication of Holmes's The
Common Law, and his later work, The Path of the Law,380 scholars have
recognized that "[e]very important principle which is developed by litigation is
in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of
373. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1975).
374. See, e.g., Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 87 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
375. See Lynn Mather, Policy Making in State Trial Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 374, at 119, 121 ("Surely if appellate courts engage in policy
making without their realizing it (as all judicial scholars agree they do), then the same can be said of trial
courts.").
376. HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY-MAKING: EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION 6-7
(1979).
377. Abram Chayes, Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4,
5 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; see also generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the expanding role of federal courts in
the crafting of public policy).
378. Chayes, Foreword, supra note 377, at 5.
379. One of Holmes's biographers notes that Holmes drew on others who likewise were
challenging the classical, "oracular" theory of judicial decisionmaking. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 148-52 (1993).
380. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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public policy," 381 and that "intuitions of public policy" and "prejudices" have
far more to do with the development of the law than does any theory modeled
on the natural sciences.382 Those conclusions have not been put to serious
challenge since the Great Depression, and their effect is to place the function of
the judge closer to that of the legislator than had been previously recognized.383
In the decades following Holmes, other judges and scholars explicitly
accepted that experiential judging was commonplace, and some commended
the practice. Most notable among them was Judge Benjamin Cardozo, whom
many consider "the outstanding American common law judge." 384 Cardozo's
The Nature of the Judicial Process confronted the question of how a judge
(particularly a common law judge) decides cases385 and, explicitly linking the
functions of judges and legislators, answered that a substantial part of the
equation was policy. According to Cardozo, "the final principle of selection for
judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end,, 386 and "the process, being
legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom. 387 Despite admitting the parallels
between the two branches, Cardozo believed that judges were constrained by
many factors-notably precedent-and were considerably less free than were
381. HOLMES, supra note 364, at 35.
382. Id. at 1; see also N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("[A] page
of history is worth a volume of logic."); Holmes, supra note 380, at 469 (arguing that "[i]t is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV[, and] still more
revolting if.. . [its original rationale] ha[s] vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past").
383. See Holmes, supra note 380, at 465, 467 ("Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the
relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds .... Judges themselves have failed
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.").
384. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 125 (1990) (emphasis added). The
reader will recall that Judge Posner is the author of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Buckley v. Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993), which struck down tllinois's version of the
announce clause. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of California is the only state court judge of the twentieth century
with a reputation approaching Cardozo's. See POSNER, supra, at 76-77. Traynor was even more explicit
about reshaping the law to bring it into conformity with preferred public policies. See Roger J. Traynor,
Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 739, 749 (1970) (opining that policy was not just "for the
legislatures to decide. Recurringly it is also for the courts to decide."); Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita,
La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234 (1962)
(advocating a "limited" "result-orient[ation]" designed to achieve "a value judgment as to what the law
ought to be"); Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 618 (196 1)
[hereinafter Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice] ("Overall, theirs [judges'] is the major
responsibility for lawmaking in the basic common-law subjects.").
385. Indeed, Cardozo's work was "the first systematic effort" at that end, and "also the first serious
effort by a judge to articulate a judicial philosophy." POSNER, supra note 384, at 32; see also KAUFMAN,
CARDOZO 199 (1998) ("He was the first modem judge to tell us how he decided cases, how he made
law, and, by implication, how others should do so."). Holmes's The Common Law is not an exception; it
was largely historical, not prescriptive, and, in any event, was written before he became a judge. See
KAUFMAN, supra, at 204-05. Despite Cardozo's effort, Chief Justice Traynor reported some years later
that lawyers were not knowledgeable about appellate judges' decisionmaking processes. See Roger J.
Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L. REv. 157 (1960).
386. CARDOZO, supra note 364, at 103.
387. Id. at 115.
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legislators to disregard law. 388 As Judge Posner has commented, however,
because the decision whether a judge is within his discretion vel non is the
judge's himself, "it is not clear" how constrained judges are by external
forces. 3 89 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?3 90
Similarly, although Cardozo's individual views of policy no doubt molded
his jurisprudence,3 9' The Nature of the Judicial Process stressed that when
adapting law to fit ideals of social policy, it was not the judge's ideals, but the
community's that should provide the guiding principle. 392 But if it is the
community's values which are to guide judicial decisionmaking, then the
community must be able to communicate those values to its judges. In an
elective system, elections are the natural opportunity for public input.
Candidate speech restrictions, therefore, exacerbate the undemocratic character
of judicial lawmaking, while failing to achieve any significant increase in
impartiality.
The conflict in judging between stability, precedent, and formalism on the
one hand, and plasticity, fairness, and contemporary notions of public policy on
the other, still presents a quandary for judges. The influence (if not the
normative correctness) of the method of decisionmaking described by Holmes
and Cardozo, however, is demonstrated by the fact that most judges today still
use it,3 93 and by the fact that Cardozo is celebrated today (in part) precisely
388. See id. at 103; see also id. at 112 ("[1]n the main there shall be adherence to precedent.").
389. POSNER, supra note 384, at 30; see also Gerard V. Bradley, Shall We Ratify the New
Constitution?: The Judicial Manifesto in Casey and Lee, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 117, 125 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995) ("The Supreme Court...
does not actually decide everything.... But the Court may decide anything, and clearly claims
jurisdiction to do so. The justices reserve plenary authority to decide who decides."); Wendel, supra
note 277, at 75-76. For contrasting views on whether judges willingly restrain themselves when given
the opportunity to make policy, compare Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, supra note 384,
at 620 ("I find little ground for worry that judges.., will become zealous to reach out for more
responsibility than they now have. Judicial office has a way of deepening caution, not diminishing it."),
with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) ("[N]o government official is 'tempted' to place restraints upon his own freedom
of action, which is why Lord Acton did not say 'Power tends to purify.' The Court's temptation is in the
quite opposite and more natural direction-towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own
power; and it succumbs.").
390. "Who will oversee the overseers themselves?"; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 828-29 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court decides
what its own constraints are and is therefore itself unconstrained).
391. See KAUFMAN, supra note 385, at 215 (quoting a letter from Cardozo to Judge Learned Hand
asking "[w]hy can't you say that when I am doing my will, I am interpreting the common will, a process
ever so much more respectable? I have always professed to be doing this, and now you tell me it was a
sham, and maybe it was, though somehow or other there are times when I do feel that I am expressing
thoughts and convictions not found in the books and yet not totally my own"); Noonan, Jr., supra note
282, at 22.
392. See CARDOZO, supra note 353, at 108 ("[A] judge, I think, would err if he were to impose
upon the community as a rule of life his own idiosyncrasies of conduct or belief.... [but] he would be
under a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community, the mores of the times.");
KAUFMAN, supra note 385, at 209.
393. KAUFMAN, supra note 385, at 200.
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because he moved the law in a direction more compatible with twentieth
century America.
2. Prior Commitments and Judicial Independence
In addition to independence from the voters, a second form of
independence, more directly addressed by the White dissents, urges that judges
should be independent from their own past statements. They must feel free to
disregard prior "commitments" when convinced that those statements do not
represent the best view of the law. This neutrality is sacrificed in a system that
permits candidates to make promises, because voters may be disinclined to
return to office a judge who retreats from his pledges.
The two theories of independence (as against the electorate and as against
prior commitments) are in tension with each other. The basis of the first theory
is that the law exists independently of the judge. Following the law and being
faithful to one's role in the judicial system often require that a judge make
decisions inconsistent with his personal preferences. A judge should not be
penalized at the polls, the argument goes, simply for doing his job. The second
theory of independence, by contrast, recognizes that judges generally have
much room to maneuver in making their decisions. Principles of law are often
not controlling, which is precisely the reason we have disagreements within
courts as to the proper application of, or indeed the substance of, the law.
394
Judges must follow the law instead of their campaign promises, but rarely is the
distinction between the two crystal clear. Indeed, a judge who discards the law
will be perceived as doing so only where he really has no discretion. Campaign
promises are, in effect, promises about how a judge will exercise his discretion
when he is not constrained to do otherwise.
Those who would limit a judge's ability to make promises stress the effect
of campaign promises on a judge's willingness to change his mind after the
election. But vote-conscious candidates make decisions by calculating votes in
the next election, not the last one.395 If an election-oriented judge's promises
continue to reflect the preferences of the voters, the judge will honor them. If,
however, it would be more politically expedient for the judge to change course,
he "probably would abandon the prior position. Either way, the earlier speech
itself makes little difference in the judge's behavior." 396 As for the
independent-minded judges unconcerned with a decision's impact on vote
394. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 342, at 17-18 ("Assertions that judicial decisions are
objective, dispassionate, and impartial are obviously belied by the fact that different courts and different
judges do not decide the same question or issue the same way, to say nothing of the fact that appellate
court decisions.., typically contain dissenting votes."); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) ("[T]he constitution often
admits of different interpretations; ... there is often a range of choice and judgment.").
395. See Chemerinsky, supra note 225, at 744-45.
396. Id. at 745.
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totals, under no circumstances would they discard the law and adhere to a
campaign promise that turned out to be in error. An honorable judge who is
faced with having made an unwise or ill-considered promise would simply
confess his error.3 97 After all, "one would be naive not to recognize that
campaign promises are-by long democratic tradition-the least binding form
of human commitment., 398 Whether the situation involves the honorable,
"independent" judge or the more politically sensitive one, therefore, the prior
commitment is not likely to affect the judge's decision.
Admittedly, there is the possibility that a judge who has made a campaign
promise will put a thumb on the scale in favor of maintaining consistency, and
thereby disregard his obligation to adjudicate cases consistent with his current
view of the law. Perhaps a handful of voters would prefer the candidate and
judge who decides cases consistently with his prior statements but against the
preferences of those voters, compared to the waffling judge who comes to rest
on a position the voter substantively likes. 399 The impact of such a "threat" to
"independence," however, must be considered minute when compared to the
effect of other factors on a judge's chances for reelection. A judge who makes
an unpopular, but correct, ruling stands to suffer electoral defeat much more so
than the judge who changes his mind and adopts a decision consonant with the
preferences of the voters. Few would doubt that most of a judge's opposition
would come from people who disagree with the substantive result of his
decision-not from those who object to the fact that the judge had changed his
mind.4 °0
3. Emperors' Clothes and Protecting a False Image of the Courts
Given that judges do not merely apply pre-existing rules of law, and given
that they exert substantial policymaking authority, it is illegitimate for the state
397. See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring); Stephen
Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise [ J"-What Should Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say?, 35
IND. L. REv. 725, 727 (2002) ("We know that lawyers and judges are honestly able to approach an issue
inclined in one direction and then have their minds changed.").
398. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002).
399. I assume that all voters prefer the candidate/judge who regularly votes with the voter's
preferences. The relevant comparison, however, is between the candidate with consistency and the one
whose decisions match the voters' preferences. Only a voter who prefers consistency to orthodoxy will
induce a candidate to maintain a position simply for the sake of consistency. See White, 536 U.S. at 800
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Once elected, [a judicial candidate] may feel free to disregard his campaign
statements.., but that does not change the fact that the judge announced his position on an issue likely
to come before him as a reason to vote for him."). A voter who prefers the consistent candidate who
supports the voter's views when compared to the one who inconsistently but frequently makes decisions
against the voter's preferences acts not because of his view of the inconsistent one as a hypocrite. He is
more likely making the rational calculation that the consistent one is more likely to act in accordance
with the voter's preferences than is a candidate who has already switched sides.
400. Cf CARTER, supra note 298, at 65 (noting that Senators Thurmond and Kennedy have
different views on the Senate's role in assessing judicial nominees' ideologies depending on whether an
individual nominee is liberal or conservative).
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to enact speech restrictions that pretend otherwise. 40 1 In Justice Linde's words,
speech restrictions that pretend that judges do not make policy, or that they do
so only as required to by external law, "sacrifice... free speech to
hypocrisy. ' '4° 2 However uncomfortable it makes us feel about our judicial
system, the ideal of a neutral, dispassionate system of courts applying "equal
justice under law" irrespective of judges' personal experiences and policy
preferences has been discredited as, at best, exaggeration and, at worst, mere
myth. "We are a sadder but wiser nation now, 'A 3 and speech restrictions must
face the impact on campaigns of the subjectivity of judicial decisionmaking.
Even if the image of judges as neutral arbiters were accurate, the
government may not silence those who wish to challenge the prevailing
wisdom. 4  States may not "protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges
as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and spared
the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed.
4 05
"[I]njury to official reputation is an insufficient reason 'for repressing speech
that would otherwise be free.' 40 6 A fortiori, where the judicial image is at odds
401. See Wendel, supra note 277, at 75; cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that a state's interest in
"keep[ing] legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace" is "per se illegitimate."); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 191 (1960) ("[B]ut does not the continuance of any such theory-contrary-to-proved-
and-known-fact threaten the institution at its very heart?").
402. Linde, supra note 206, at 16; see also Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial
Independence by Criticism of Judges-A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
729, 737 (1997) ("Much of the judicial hand-wringing about criticism of judges has more to do with
judicial vanity than with judicial independence.").
403. George Will, Power of Judicial Will Tramples Rule of Law, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000,
at 46.
404. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971) ("[T]he candidate who vaunts his
spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry 'Foul!' when an opponent or an
industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary.").
405. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 270
(opinion of the Court by Black, J.) ("The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion.
For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind.., on all public institutions."); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) ("[T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who
may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate.").
For cases justifying restrictions on speech by relying on the interest in preserving respect for the
judiciary, see, for example, Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1399-1400
(C.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Ind.
2002) (per curiam) (Shepard, C.J., joining the 3-2 majority) (suspending an attorney from the practice of
law for suggesting in a petition for appellate review that a court decision against his client was result-
driven, reasoning that the attorney's actions threatened "the public's confidence in the administration of
justice," and holding that the attorney's exercise of his right to contest the penalty made him worthy of a
particularly harsh punishment); In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 704 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that "[l]awyers who
are candidates for judicial office may not impugn the integrity of the judicial system or question the
decisions of the judge," and opining that the proper fora for questioning judicial decisions are the
appellate and disciplinary processes); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ'g Co., 84 P. 912
(Colo. 1906), affd sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
406. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964)); see also Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63
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with reality, there is simply no legitimate interest in having a government lie to
its citizens and prop up policymaking judges as oracles.4 °7
Applying the familiar strict scrutiny standard, courts must assess whether
restrictions on free speech are narrowly tailored responses to serve a
compelling governmental interest. There is no dispute that judicial impartiality,
in the sense of eliminating favoritism and ensuring the application of the rule of
law, is a compelling interest. That interest, however, is not served (at least with
the requisite narrow connection) by a speech restriction that prohibits judicial
candidates from taking positions on issues. Judicial impartiality, in the sense of
open-mindedness, is not constitutionally required, may not even be a beneficial
quality, and is certainly not a compelling interest. Independence has been
rejected by states with judicial elections, and therefore cannot constitute a
compelling interest. Finally, promoting an image of independence and
"impartiality," when judges often act inconsistently with those models is not
even a legitimate state interest, let alone a compelling one. In sum, the only
compelling interest offered to sustain candidate speech restrictions-the
maintenance of an impartial judiciary-is served scarcely, if at all, by the
restrictions, and therefore the restrictions are unconstitutional.
V. JUDGES AS POLITICIANS: "EACH INDEED IS LEGISLATING WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF HIS COMPETENCE
' 40 8
A. The Supposed Dangers of Unrestrained Judicial Elections
For those who fear issue-based, ad hominem judicial campaigns, recent
(1970); cf 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801) (directing the punishment of those whose speech was made
"with intent to ... bring [government officials] into contempt or disrepute"); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 322 (1988) ("A 'dignity' standard,.. is so inherently subjective that it would be inconsistent with
,our longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience."') (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55
(1988)) (bracketed material in Boos); id. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("[F]uture litigants are unlikely to be so bold or so forthright as to defend a restriction on
speech with the argument that the restriction aims to protect listeners from the indignity of hearing
speech that criticizes them."); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)
("We are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with
the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights.").
But cf Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-36 (1995) (upholding a restriction on attorney
advertising in part because of the belief that the restriction protected the dignity and prestige of the legal
profession). Justice Kennedy, in dissent, referred to the Court's decision as "shield[ing] its own
profession from public criticism." Id. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Interestingly enough, the
empirical effect of state restrictions on attorney advertising may be to lessen public esteem for the legal
profession. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 732-36 (1997).
407. But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 317 (1999) (suggesting that it might be acceptable to prop up a myth of judicial independence as
reality so as to embody "aspirations").
408. CARDOZO, supra note 364, at 113 (typesetting altered).
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trends are discouraging.4°9 Money is playing an increasing role in judicial
elections, as the cost of reaching voters escalates.4 10 In some places, judicial
candidates are expected to support political parties financially before the party
will give its endorsement to the candidate a.4 1 In addition, issue-based judicial
campaigns seem to be increasing in frequency since the 1986 California
elections, in which Chief Justice Rose Bird and two colleagues were denied
retention after opposition campaigns challenged their liberal attitudes and
decisions involving criminal law and capital punishment. Recent controversial
elections involving Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White and
Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier gained national attention as
the interests opposing Justices White and Lanphier focused not on the justices'
qualifications, but on their decisions in high profile cases.412
Professor Anthony Champagne has recently concluded a study of four
states' judicial elections in 2000, and the frequency and vitriol of television
advertisements are not encouraging for those who wish to maintain the dignity
of the judicial profession.4 13 The devolution (if that is the proper term) of
judicial campaigns into ones that are "nastier, noisier, and costlier''414 is made
vivid through the use of television advertising. As in races for other offices,
opposing candidates often take swipes at each other with quotes out of context,
absurd over-simplification of candidates' records,41 6 and the packaging of
409. See Bea Ann Smith, Alarming Attacks on Judges: Time To Defend Our Constitutional
Trustees, 80 OR. L. REv. 587 (2001). But see Snyder, supra note 221, at 241-43.
410. See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 112 (1998); Kozlowski, supra note 325, at 168-70.
411. See Robert J. McCarthy & Michael Beebe, Courting Big Money, BUFFALO NEWS, July 14,
2002, at Al.
412. Justice White's opposition focused on her decision (joining the majority) in State v. Odom,
928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996), which vacated a death sentence on the ground that aggravating
circumstances had not been proven. Justice Lanphier's opposition was based on criminal justice issues
as well as his opinion for the court holding that a term limits initiative had received an insufficient
number of signatures to be included on the ballot. See Duggan v. Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb.
1994). See generally B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 1429, 1433-36 (2001) (discussing the White and Lanphier races); Traciel V. Reid, The
Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83
JUDICATURE 68, 69-72 (1999) (same); Uelmen, supra note 203, at 1133-34 (same).
413. See generally Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv.
669 (2002) [hereinafter Champagne, Television Ads]; Anthony Champagne, Modern Judicial
Campaigns, JUDGES' J., Summer 2002, at 17.
414. Schotland, Comment, supra note 77, at 150.
415. See Champagne, Television Ads, supra note 413, at 671-74.
416. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 202, at 167-70. One of the most memorable deceptions of this
category is the advertisement for a former law professor at the University of California at Berkeley,
which proclaimed that in the forthcoming election, "The Issue is Rape." The advertisement argued to
voters that the candidate "was 30 percent tougher on average in sentencing rapists than other state
judges, a statistic [the candidate's] staff came up with by extrapolating from the five rape or attempted-
rape cases he has handled during his tenure on the bench." PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE:
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 70 (1990) (quoting Roy A. Schotland,
Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American
Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 80 (1985)).
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misleading information in a form easily absorbed by voters who lack the time
and inclination to analyze the candidates' full records and qualifications. 417 The
result is "a game of competitive defamation ' 418 where judges, like other
419 420politiciansa, engage in the "mutual destruction" of reputations.
As Professor Champagne's research disclosed, however, the greatest threat
to judicial reputations in campaigns comes not from candidates themselves, but
from interest groups that make independent expenditures with the hope of
encouraging the election of their preferred candidates. In calling voters'
attention to candidates' attributes, independent speech can make judicial races
seem "nastier," but third party expenditures do allow voters to obtain some
information about a candidate's attitudes even if the candidate himself is
constrained by strict ethical rules against indicating future rulings, should he be
422elected. Independent expenditures thus provide voters with tools necessary to
make intelligent, issue-based distinctions between candidates. It is precisely
that knowledge that makes independent expenditures threatening to a system of
judicial elections with speech restrictions, for speech restrictions hope to
minimize issue-oriented voting and issue-based conflict between candidates. In
any case, independent speech may not be penalized through enforcement of
judicial canons (for the organizations are neither judges nor attorneys), and
even if a state were to attempt to limit third party organizations from running
advertisements in judicial election campaigns, those limitations would almost
423certainly be struck down as unconstitutional. Thus, even if the deception and
issue-orientation of politics were considered an unqualified evil, speech
restrictions do nothing to stop the worst offenders.
B. Elections: The Crisis of Legitimacy
Ensuring legitimacy for judicial institutions presents a paradox of sorts.
Whereas other institutions gain legitimacy (or so goes the theory) by being
open, involving the public, and especially by attracting large numbers of voters
to the polls, 424 the judiciary has taken exactly the opposite approach, fearing
417. See Carrington, supra note 410, at 81, 111.
418. Id. at 113.
419. See generally BRUCE L. FELKNOR, POLITICAL MISCHIEF: SMEAR, SABOTAGE AND REFORM IN
U.S. ELECTIONS (1992) (discussing historical examples of political dirty tricks including the use of
innuendo and outright lies against the opposition).
420. Carrington, supra note 410, at 108.
421. See Champagne, Television Ads, supra note 413, at 684-85.
422. See Minzner, supra note 81, at 223-27. Third-party action is only one way in which voters can
obtain information about muzzled judicial candidates. As Minzner points out, candidates use other
means, including slogans and selective publicity of their records, to convey their philosophies. See id. at
215-23.
423. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
424. See generally, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF




elections as delegitimizing forces. Judicial legitimacy, according to this
theory, depends on courts being perceived as above politics and subservient to
the law.426 As a result, courts may fear public inspection as a threat to perceived
judicial omniscience.427 Secrecy and confidentiality are at a premium in the
courts, and rarely is an attempt to expose the inner workings of courts greeted
with anything but contempt.428 Some legal theorists question the wisdom of this
approach, believing that "too much 'justice behind closed doors' can erode and
ultimately destroy the public's faith in the judiciary, 'A29 or that the secrecy
simply is not necessary430 or is inefficacious,43 1 but principles of confidentiality
continue to be strictly enforced to protect the deliberative processes of the
courts.4 3 2
government the consent of its citizens, but concluding that a high turnout is not itself necessarily good or
bad for democracy).
425. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 723 (1995); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 23 (1956).
426. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992); Jeff Broadwater, Taking Its
Toll. Partisan Judging and Judicial Review, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 41 (2002); Bork, supra note
16, at 3.
427. But see ALPHAEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 203 (1958)
(reporting that Chief Justice Hughes believed that if the Supreme Court's deliberations were public
knowledge, respect for the Court would continue to be widespread).
428. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN
ACTION 5-6 (1990); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 59-67
(2000); Eugene Gressman, Book Review, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 711 (1984) (reviewing BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT (1983)); James A. Thomson,
Inside the Supreme Court: A Sanctum Sanctorum?, 66 Miss. L.J. 177 (1996) (reviewing BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT (1996)). See generally RICHARD
DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS (1994); BARBARA A. PERRY,
THE PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1999); Ifill, supra note
320, at 614 ("The Supreme Court in particular has aggressively worked to protect the image of its
decision-making as above the fray of politics, personal interest, or internecine battles.").
429. Joan G. Wexler, Introduction, Behind Closed Doors: Secret Justice in America, 9 J. L. &
POL'Y 1,2 (2000).
430. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 401, at 324 n.308 ("[T]he storied sanctity of the conference room
represents to me as pragmatic and nonmystic a phase of appellate judicial work as the handling of the
docket.").
431. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("[A]n enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.").
432. It is axiomatic that secrecy is vital to the functioning of the judiciary just as it is to the
functioning of the executive branch. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that despite the lack of any textual basis for the secrecy of judicial
proceedings, there was "little doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of
its internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be required"). In both the judiciary and the
presidency, secrecy is preserved so that principals and advisors will feel free to be candid and discuss a
range of possible actions before one is announced to the public. See Richard M. Nixon, President
Nixon's Address to the Nation, Apr. 29, 1974, reprinted in RICHARD NIXON, THE WHITE HOUSE
TRANSCRIPTS 11 (1974) ("Unless a President can protect the privacy of the advice he gets, he cannot get
the advice he needs."). "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); cf.
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 134-39 (1937) (describing the necessity of
secrecy in the Constitutional Convention).
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One need not seek complete judicial openness, however, to question the
wisdom of election speech codes. It is at election time-when the government
receives its periodic injection of popular legitimacy-that it is most important
for the people to have as much information about the candidates as possible. If
judges are to receive the benefit of legitimacy that comes from having periodic
elections, it seems that elections should encourage participation by as many
eligible voters as possible.
The fact is, however, that judicial elections are the ones most likely to
discourage would-be voters from participating, and they are purposely designed
that way. Election systems have been revised to discourage the "raucous, hurly-
burly, rough-and-tumble ' 433 elections that often characterize races for non-
judicial posts. Instead, judicial election codes promote campaigns and elections
that are docile, gentlemanly affirmations of trust and confidence in the
incumbent judge 434 that have all the excitement of "a game of checkers [p]layed
by mail., '435 These pushes for reform have resulted in use of the nonpartisan
ballot and the Missouri Plan,436 just to name two systems that have met with
433. The terminology is Justice Kennedy's. See Frontline: Justice for Sale, supra note 196.
434. Because some reforms (notably the Missouri Plan) are designed to reduce electoral
competition, those reforms raise troubling concerns of locking-up the political process by entrenching
certain officials (and their ideas) in power. Cf Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (advocating
stringent review of legislative measures that decrease the possibility of effective challenge to
incumbents); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491 (1997) (same). Speech restrictions also have a "lockup" aspect, in that they discourage the
candidacies of would-be judges who reject the paradigm of open-mindedness, and may insulate judges
whose decisions are popular with officials who write the restrictions, but are unpopular with the public.
Additionally, because incumbent state supreme court judges are often the officials who craft or approve
speech restrictions, those restrictions allow incumbents to prescribe the subjects about which their
challengers may criticize them. Cf FELKNOR, supra note 419, at 29 ("[W]ithout attention-grabbing,
cogent, memorable, negative campaigning, almost no challenger can hope to win unless the incumbent
has just been found guilty of a heinous crime.").
435. William C. Bayne, Lynchard's Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into Justice Race: Hernando
Attorney Challenging Cobb, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL
27939675.
436. Under the Missouri Plan (or, alternatively, the "merit selection" plan), judges are initially
appointed by the governor from a list compiled by the state's judicial vacancy commission. After
serving a short initial term, the judges run unopposed in retention elections. If a judge receives a certain
portion of the vote in the retention election (usually 50%), he continues in office without having to face
an opponent in a general election. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING,
THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN
COURT PLAN (1969); Larry Aspin & William K. Hall, Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An
Update, 37 SOC. SCt. J. 1 (2000); Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur
on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315
(1997); Elmo B. Hunter, Revisiting the History and Success of Merit Selection in Missouri and
Elsewhere, 60 UMKC L. REV. 69 (1991); Richard A. Watson, Observations on the Missouri
Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. 1 (1986). The theory behind the system is that it allows some
electoral accountability while exempting judges from most of the rigors of campaigning, some of the
influence of party leadership, and most of the fears of electoral defeat in retaliation for unpopular
decisions. See, e.g., Robert A. Schroeder & Harry A. Hall, Twenty-Five Years' Experience with Merit
Judicial Selection in Missouri, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1088, 1093-97 (1966).
While this may often be true, it appears clear that the Missouri Plan does not eliminate (if it has any
effect at all on) the tendency of voters to vote based on their views of a judge's high-profile decisions.
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some acceptance.437 The result has been judicial elections with widespread
public apathy 438 and low voter turnout.
4 3 9
The decline in turn-out is especially severe among the lower classes, who
lack the resources to obtain information about judicial candidates and therefore
benefit most from the cues provided by party designations on partisan
ballots. 440 Even for more well-off voters, however, non-partisan elections
See Dann & Hansen, supra note 412, at 1431; Reid, supra note 412, at 77. That is, in deciding whether a
judge has done a sufficiently good job to merit retention, a voter will consider the judge's past decisions.
Where those decisions are not in line with the voter's preferences, the vote will be against retention. As
a result, despite the advantages of name recognition and incumbency, a judge under the Missouri Plan
may still feel pressured to conform his decisions to the perceived will of the public. The result is that
retention elections, like policy-motivated moves for impeachment of federal judges, have "the dubious
advantage of confining the susceptibility of federal judges to political intimidation to those cases in
which an extremely large portion of the public or government has been angered by judicial decisions."
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and
Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 684 (1999). Because incumbent judges seeking retention
may suffer political attack but are constrained by speech restrictions from responding in kind, retention
elections have been termed "the most unfair system of all judicial elections." Gerald F. Uelmen,
Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2069, 2073 (1988).
437. Their rather widespread acceptance, however, does not mean that they have accomplished
their goal of bringing issues and controversy out of judicial elections. In fact, a recent study suggests
that they have made the problem worse. The study reports that candidates in nonpartisan judicial
elections focus on issues more heavily than do candidates in partisan elections. See Abbe & Hermson,
supra note 237, at 292-93. This may be because party designations, when present, can serve as proxies
for the candidates' issue positions. The adoption of the Missouri Plan also fails to alter candidates'
campaign strategies or their use of television to broadcast their messages. See id. at 294. More generally,
one prominent judicial politics scholar has concluded that "[c]ourt reformers underestimate the extent to
which partisan elections have a tangible substantive component and overestimate the extent to which
nonpartisan and retention races are insulated from partisan politics and other contextual forces." Melinda
Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 315, 326 (2001)
438. One commentator called judicial elections "boring, low participation, minimally useful
affairs" because of the restrictions on the speech of judicial candidates. See Cafferata, supra note 8, at
1674. For the most part, the only members of the public subjected to "campaigning" have been, until
recent years, those "willing to hear a dull speech about improving the judiciary or about judicial
qualifications." Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1391, 1393 (2001).
439. See Lawrence Baum, Information and Party Voting in "Semipartisan " Judicial Elections, 9
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 62, 63-64, 67-72 (1987); Carol A. Cassel, The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United
States, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 226, 227-28 (Bernard Grofman &
Arend Lijphart eds., 1986) (noting that non-partisan elections result in depressed voter turnout,
particularly when scheduled on dates separate from the dates of state and national elections); Philip L.
Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J.
POL. 865, 871-76 (1979); Editorial, How Can Voters Judge?, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 5, 2001,
at B8 (noting that turnout is unsurprisingly low in judicial races, where candidates can only "smile, and
wave, and proclaim themselves to be upright people with children and spouses who love them");
Rottman, supra 232, at 20-21 (finding that "don't know enough about the candidates" was the most
common explanation for not voting in judicial elections). Dubois has also noted that states using the
"party column ballot," in which voters can vote a straight party ticket for all offices with a single vote,
experience less "roll-off," a term used to describe voters who cast votes for the offices at the top of the
ballot but do not vote for other offices. Dubois, supra, at 876-83. The party column ballot is deemed to
reduce "voter fatigue" and promote greater involvement by the public in less salient elections. See
generally Jack L. Walker, Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and Party
Column Ballots, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 448 (1966). Thus, the partisanship that is seen by many as a
destructive force in judicial elections tends systematically to increase voter participation.
440. See Dubois, supra note 439, at 872 ("It is also known that voter fatigue takes its greatest toll
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deprive them of an important indication of the candidates' philosophies, and
give eligible voters less of a reason to vote for (or against) a candidate.44 1
Moreover, in certain states, elections for judges do not coincide with elections
442for other offices. This scheduling has the predictable effect on voter
turnout.44 3 Because those most likely to be deterred from voting are the "have-
nots," those states may have the "benefit" of "a better informed and more
interested electorate ''444 at the cost of involving fewer people in the electoral
process.
C. Speech Restrictions and Democratic Theory
Speech restrictions, and those who defend their constitutionality, reflect a
conception of democratic government, elections, and the judiciary at odds with
the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor that has animated much of First
Amendment law. Rather than attempting to invigorate our electoral processes
through the participation of competing voices, speech restrictions see those
voices as undermining the orderly workings of the judiciary. 445 Proponents of
speech restrictions point to anecdotal evidence of popular elections in which
the electorate rejected qualified judges in favor of judges with well-known
names 446 or irrelevant demographic characteristics, and claim that popular
election must be restrained to encourage the selection of better candidates and
to avoid degrading the candidates and the judicial system. As a solution, states
have adopted speech restrictions and the other devices discussed in the previous
section as ways of constraining the decisions of voters.447 Though the judiciary
among less well-educated voters who are more likely to become confused by the variety of ballot
choices and thus fail to finish voting"). See generally, e.g., Walker, supra note 439, at 460-61
(describing the phenomenon in non-judicial elections).
441. See David Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 731, 774-78.
442. See generally, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 8, at 1037-38 (describing Wisconsin's judicial
election scheduling); Christine M. Dolfi, Note, The Scheduling of Judicial Elections in Odd-Numbered
Years: Has Sprague Resolved the Issue?, 27 DUQUESNE L. REV. 557 (1989) (describing Pennsylvania's
judicial election scheduling).
443. See Adamany & Dubois, supra note 441, at 742-45; Schotland, supra note 22, at 854.
444. Heffeman, supra note 8, at 1038 (declining to endorse the view of the quotation); see also
Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive Public or an
Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUSTICE SYS. J. 23 (1984) (arguing that the depressed turnout in judicial
elections allows the core of informed, interested voters to influence elections, and that such a result may
strike an appropriate balance between electoral accountability and independence).
445. Cf Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 697 (2001) (arguing
that Supreme Court Justices' votes in election law cases can be seen as reflecting competing visions of
democracy as either flourishing in robust competition or chaotic and in need of imposed stability).
Oddly enough, however, the five Justices Pildes identified as most receptive to the stability interest were
the ones in the majority in White, which held unconstitutional Minnesota's attempt to impose order,
dignity, and stability on the judicial elections process.
446. See Schotland, supra note 22, at 855-56.
447. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Necessity for Constrained Deliberation 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 159, 163 (2000) (arguing for "a massive redefinition and shrinkage of [democracy's] permissible
ends").
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is chosen by popular election, speech restrictions signal to voters that
consideration of a candidate's philosophy or issue positions is improper. Voters
are therefore urged to make choices based solely on prior experience and
"qualifications."
But limiting the scope of political debate follows more from a "cultural"
fear of democracy4 48 and perception of a fragile judiciary449 than it does from
any empirically provable conclusion that judges chosen in issue-based popular
elections are any "worse" (or "partial") than are appointed judges or judges
elected in states with campaign speech restrictions. 450 And while campaigns
may result in the loss of respect for candidates-turned-judges, voters seem quite
unwilling to restore confidence in the judiciary (if, indeed, any has been lost) at
the cost of taking away their ability to choose judges directly.45 The movement
to constrain elections, then, is motivated by the belief-antithetical to the First
Amendment-that "an elite cadre of philosopher-kings ' 452  must limit
democracy in order to save the people from themselves.453 Speech restrictions
see an independent judiciary so threatened by the exercise of deliberative
democracy that the state must step in to stop speech. As Professor Richard
Pildes has said about constitutional election law generally, there is a "fear that
too much politics, or too competitive a political system, will bring instability,
fragmentation, and disorder., 454 Such a fear of democracy is particularly
dangerous when the ordered, stable system imposed by the state is designed, as
in the case of judicial candidate speech restrictions, not simply to allow the
conveyance of political ideas in a clear and understandable manner, 455 but to
prevent candidates from discussing ideas and philosophies at all.456
448. See Pildes, supra note 445, at 710; Wendel, supra note 277, at 107-18. Pildes defines this
culture as "the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, and normative ideals of democracy that
seem to inform and influence the current constitutional law of democracy." Pildes, supra note 434, at
696.
449. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer
Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 710 (1997).
450. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 221, at 262.
451. See supra note 232.
452. Wendel, supra note 277, at 105.
453. Cf RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO 113 (1994) (arguing that government should allow political "liberty to be shared equally
among all, not simply by the 'better' people").
454. See Pildes, supra note 445, at 717.
455. Cf Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(arguing that campaign finance restrictions can "encourage the public participation and open discussion
that the First Amendment itself presupposes").
456. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Government is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen...,
but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed therein."); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). I therefore do not
wish to quarrel here with cases such as Arkansas Educational Television Comm 'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666 (1998) (upholding the exclusion of a third party candidate from a presidential debate), Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding a state's ban on fusion candidacies), and
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a ban on the display or distribution of campaign
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Because courts make so many decisions about the way Americans live their
lives, it is unreasonable to expect the public to accept the decisions of courts
without attempting to correct wrongheaded decisions through the ballot box.
4 5 7
Assuming states have chosen to subject sitting judges to electoral challenge,
issue-based campaigns should be welcomed as a way of reigning in the
judiciary and preventing judges with anomalous values from affecting the law
of a state far into the future. As Justice Scalia wrote,
if... our pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily on value judgments,
then a free and intelligent people's attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought
to be) quite different [from the passive response of the people whose judges simply
interpret the law]. The people know that their value judgments are quite as good as
those taught in any law school-maybe better. If, indeed, the "liberties" protected
by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the
people should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead
of ours. Not only that, but confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate
into question-and-answer sessions in which Senators go through a list of their
constituents' most favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and
seek the nominee's commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments, after
all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow
accidentally committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a sort of
plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put forward.
4 5 8
There is, quite simply, no doubt that judicial decisions have policy
consequences, and that the decisions are often the result of judges' value
judgments. There is little doubt that state court decisions, in those areas where
courts are charged with making policy, should be made on the basis of value
judgments. Accordingly, public involvement by voters in shaping their states'
public policies is a natural (and one would think a welcome) inclination
towards democratic self-government.
4 59
materials within 100 feet of a polling place on election day).
457. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549,
579 (1995) (book review) ("So long as the courts wield enormous power, it is implausible, as well as
wrong in principle, to insist that the people develop an attitude of respectful indifference to how and by
whom that power is exercised.").
458. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000-01 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also, e.g., John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREEN BAG
2D 277 (1998) (arguing that the Senate is empowered, through giving advice and consent, to approve
and reject nominees on the basis of judicial philosophy, and further arguing that public discussion of
nominees is a healthy way "to educate the public about the judicial process"). Justice Scalia's vision of
issue-driven nomination and confirmation processes has, as we all know, come true. See generally, e.g.,
BORK, supra note 369, at 267-349; CARTER, supra note 298, at 85-118; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 297, at
162-65.
459. Of course, not all observers welcome the move toward democratic control of the judiciary.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505 (1999) (concluding that judicial elections should be eliminated because of the
threat that judges will see voters as a constituency to be served by decisions consistent with their
preferences). Judicial elections, just like every other sort of majoritarian process of selecting officials or
public policies, raise the spectre that the chosen officials or policies will be insufficiently protective of
(numerical) minority rights. See DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON
STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995); Steven P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689 (1995).
States could adopt the federal model and attempt to ensure minority protection through protecting
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VI. CONCLUSION
Speech restrictions on judicial candidates are designed to inhibit voters
from choosing judges based on expectations as to the prospective judges' future
decisions. Even the so-called "narrowly-tailored" 1990 version of the ABA
Judicial Canon, which prohibits discussion of only those issues likely to come
before the court for which the candidate is running, is designed to forbid speech
precisely where it is most likely to indicate to the voters how the candidate
expects to discharge the responsibilities of his office. Praising judicial
"independence," ethics codes have banned discussion of issues and promises of
conduct on the bench, leaving voters to select candidates on the basis of
"objective" "qualifications." Such manipulation of the voters through the
suppression of explicitly political speech is blatantly unconstitutional.
Elementary free speech principles dictate that it is the voters, and not any
agency of government, that are responsible for deciding what issues are
relevant. 460 "When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.' 461 A contrary
rule would "allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public
debate" and thereby "allow that government control over the search for
political truth"462 -a result obviously inconsistent with fundamental democratic
principles.463
In addition to judicial independence, proponents of speech restrictions cite a
second rationale for muzzling judicial candidates: protection of judicial
impartiality. Applying that justification, it would be improper for a judge to
decide cases on the basis of prior commitments, rather than on the basis of
"neutral" research and reflection. Accordingly, to protect this "impartiality,"
campaign speech must be limited so as to prevent a commitment to decide an
judicial tenure. Speech restrictions, however, are at best half-measures to serve that goal, as they
continue to allow voters to select judges on any basis, but merely hinder the acquisition of information.
As shown in Part II and Subsection IV.A.2, states with elections have decided that the advantages of
making the judiciary accountable to the voting majority outweigh the potential threats to minority
interests posed by such elections. See also Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
By enacting speech restrictions, state officials are able to avoid the political reaction that would
result from eliminating judicial elections, while nonetheless making those elections less effective ways
of translating voter preferences into law. It is thus both interesting and predictable that elected state
courts generally support the constitutionality of speech restrictions: Such decisions entrench elected
officials in power by making it disproportionately harder for challengers to campaign against
incumbents. Those who wish to exercise free speech rights must appeal to the independence of the
judiciary-a value cherished by proponents of the very restrictions that abridge those rights.
460. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
461. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26
(1948).
462. Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 538.
463. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that
freedom of speech from governmental interference is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth").
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issue one way or another. This rationale falls apart once it is conceded that due
process protections for litigants guarantee only that their judge will not be
biased in favor of one of the parties, and that it is better to have a judge on the
bench who has studied legal issues than it is to have a judge who has an "open
mind" because he has not thought about the duties of his office. A judge who
has made up his mind concerning an issue presented in a case may decide the
case free of any concern that his "bias" has poisoned the proceedings. Because
litigants have no right to a judge who has remained silent in his campaign, and
because judges and voters do have the First Amendment right to discuss
whatever issues seem relevant to them, speech restrictions limiting judicial
candidates to certain subjects of debate should be held unconstitutional.
This formulation does not leave judges completely free to say anything they
desire, even during a campaign. Judges (just like legislators) may not claim any
constitutional privilege for promising to violate their oaths or the law,4 64 so a
promise to decide a case a certain way regardless of the particular facts or
applicable law would not be protected.465 For this reason, a properly tailored
restriction designed to prohibit candidates from advocating violation of the law
464. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 55 ("Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly
possess some element of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on
any right of association protected by the First Amendment."). In this way, Hartlage recognizes that
candidates are subject to rules banning conspiracies to violate the law, just as are other citizens. See
Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?. The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates
Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 26 (2002). Judges may therefore be prohibited from running
on platforms of refusing to implement statutes, the Constitution, or higher court decisions. See Karlan,
supra note 28, at 549-57. But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the
Themes ofRobert M Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33 (1989).
There is, however, considerable tension between Hartlage's accepting of speech restrictions against
advocating illegal conduct and the Brandenburg test, which requires the government to prove that a
speech restriction is necessary to prevent likely and imminent lawless action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); Rohr, supra; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)
(per curiam) (reversing a disorderly conduct conviction where the defendant's speech "[a]t worst...
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time").
Distinguishing Brandenburg on the ground that it involved purely private speech, and not campaign
conduct, does not seem possible in light of Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 449 (1974)
(declining the adopt such a distinction). And White itself stressed the "obvious point ... that the First
Amendment provides [at least as much] protection during an election campaign than at other times."
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002). The more promising distinction appears to be
between mere "abstract doctrine," id. at 450, about breaking the law, and statements with a likelihood of
bringing about that result. Accordingly, unless campaign speech goes beyond abstract teaching and
becomes concrete incitement to, or promises of, illegality, First Amendment principles prohibit the state
from silencing it-regardless of whether the candidate seeks judicial or other public office.
465. Whether in fact such a promise will be held to violate the law is a question for the states. Both
judges and legislators are, occasionally, open about their refusal to follow governing law, but such
outspokenness is rare. See generally Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955) (adhering to a
prior decision though acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court "apparently concluded" that reversal
was appropriate); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 191 (1999) (noting
legislators' pledges to disregard slavery laws); Heffernan, supra note 8, at 1040 (noting the elected
Wisconsin Supreme Court's "nullifi[cation]" of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ableman v. Booth,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858)); Jenni Parrish, The Booth Cases: Final Step to the Civil War, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 237 (1993) (describing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's refusal to comply with the
Fugitive Slave Act). If a state punishes campaign advocacy of illegality, Brown v. Hartlage holds that
the First Amendment is no impediment.
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(for example, by flouting an unpopular U.S. Supreme Court decision) may be
constitutional. But where the underlying conduct is perfectly acceptable-
distinguishing that unpopular case given an appropriate factual setting, or
overruling a decision of the would-be-judge's own court, for example-then I
see no reason why the voters should be kept in the dark as to the candidate's
plans for carrying out his duties, should he be elected.466
Similarly, ex parte contacts and speech concerning pending cases may be
prohibited (depending on the circumstances 467), where such speech would
betray favoritism for one party involved in a case,468 and thus impact the rights
469of litigants. In those cases, however, the compelling interest squelching free
466. In a recent race for Alabama Chief Justice, one candidate, Roy Moore, ran openly on his
notoriety for defying federal court orders that he comply with the Establishment Clause and remove a
display of the Ten Commandments from his courtroom. See Ann LoLordo, Ten Commandments Play
Campaign Role, BALT. SUN, June 6, 2000, at IA. Moore's opponent, Harold See, attempted to criticize
Moore for being soft on drug offenders. See George Lardner, Jr., Speech Rights and Ethics Disputed in
Judicial Races, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at A 13. Moore won the election, and See was charged by the
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission with violations of judicial ethics. See Butler v. Ala. Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001). Upon assuming the post of Chief Justice, Moore promptly
displayed a 5280 pound granite carving of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse and professed his
belief that he could maintain the display regardless of whether a federal judge held the display to violate
the Constitution. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Judge's Biblical Monument Is Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at Al. It is nothing less than incredible that the Commission considered Chief
Justice Moore's open defiance of binding precedent to be less damaging to the public's confidence in the
judiciary than was Judge See's attempt to advocate harsher sentences for criminals.
467. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (noting that statements during the
course of a trial directed at "courtroom administration" will not form the basis of a successful recusal
motion); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 580-83 (1966). The distinction between
permitting statements during the trial and forbidding the same statements if made in other settings has
been called "unrealistic." See Jackson, supra note 275.
468. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (finding bias against the defendants in the
case); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-17 (D.C. Cir.) (admonishing Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson for his comments during the pendency of the antitrust suit against Microsoft that
indicated his disfavor for the Microsoft defendants), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); United States v.
Cooley, I F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (forcing disqualification when a judge's comments evinced
prejudice against "these defendants"). In such circumstances, the harm is that the judge is in fact
prejudiced against one party. The fact that the judge has announced the prejudice merely makes proving
the prejudice easier, see supra note 251, and it makes questioning a judge's impartiality more
"reasonabl[e]" under the federal disqualification statute. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2003). I do not mean to
suggest that the appearance of favoritism by itself triggers a constitutional violation.
469. A judge's divulgence of confidential information (including the identity of testifying
undercover police officers, personal information about witnesses and parties, and national security
information, for example) would likely be unprotected at least where prohibitions on disclosure of that
information protect compelling interests. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075-76 (1991); id. at
1036 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 636 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(hypothesizing that speech may be proscribed when it "might tend to obstruct the administration of
justice"); id. at 647 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (positing that speech may be proscribed where it
was used "to obstruct or prejudice the due administration ofjustice by interfering with a fair trial"); In re
Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that an attorney's letter, written during the pendency
of an appeal, questioning a judge's impartiality was "an attempt to prejudice the administration of
justice"); cf Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-38 (1978) (declining to
reach the question of whether a participant in a confidential proceeding may be punished for releasing
information); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974) (stressing the care that should be
taken to keep in camera material secret unless necessary for the court to execute its functions);
Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the confidentiality of a
judicial disciplinary proceeding did not violate the First Amendment).
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speech is the protection of constitutional rights. A judge holds his position so
that he may ensure due process for litigants, and one whose speech causes him
to violate the Constitution should not obtain refuge in another clause of that
same document. Where a judge is forbidden from making statements about his
judicial philosophy or the way that philosophy would impact future cases,
however, with the only countervailing interest a vague desire for open-minded
judges or for protecting the image of the judiciary, the restrictions must fail.47°
In a free society, and particularly in a society committed to the First
Amendment, government may not cultivate an image of itself and silence those
who would challenge that image.
470. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("[A]n enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect."); supra note 157.
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